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Moral Education

By

Edward Howard Griggs

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The New Humanism and *A Book of Meditations*

"Welche unendliche Operationen Natur und Kunst machen müssen, bis ein gebildeter Mensch dasteht."—*Goethe.*

NEW YORK
B. W. HUEBSCH
1904

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EDWARD HOWARD GRIGGS

PREFACE

It is now widely recognized in America that the chief aim of education is to develop noble manhood and womanhood. The absorption, natural to our pioneer period, in sharpening the tools of the mind and equipping the individual for personal success, is being rapidly replaced by the effort to mold the moral personality that will use the mind's instruments for the great ends of human life, in harmony with the good of the whole. Nor is this movement confined to our own country. The struggle to recover from the disaster of 1870 in France, the influence of the educational reformers in Germany, the enthusiastic awakening of the nation in Italy, the growth of social and humanitarian sentiment in England, have led to interesting experiments in moral education in the countries named. We have still much to learn from these experiments, especially in France and Germany, but it is in our own country that the greatest awakening to the moral aim of education has occurred.

Yet while the end is thus generally, if vaguely, recognized, there is still the greatest confusion as to what it implies and as to the means by which it can be attained. Character is often conceived in a purely negative way, as the avoidance of evil, while the problem of moral culture is at times even interpreted to mean assigning a school period in which to teach 'morals and manners' as one would teach arithmetic. Moreover, much of the literature of the subject is singularly dreary and barren. I have long puzzled over the

cause of this. Certainly, in practice, ethical problems are the most absorbingly interesting of all we must meet, and it would seem that moral education should be the most interesting, as it is the most important part of the whole process of culture. Yet many of the books on the subject are filled with a wearisome repetition of the conventional analysis of duties, and the commonplace, trite maxims that are fruitless for man or child.

I have been able to discover three reasons for this barrenness:

1. Ethical teachers have too often yielded to the temptation to inculcate what they considered useful without much regard to its truth. Where they have allowed their desire to be helpful to supplant their reverence for reality the result is always hypocrisy and artificiality.

2. It is necessary to take a point of view that is not merely of the time, if one's work is to escape triviality. This explains why so much of the literature of moral education that once had a value is useless after twenty years, while the artistic literature contemporaneous with it is permanent in worth. If we lose the eternal in the transient, life ceases to have a meaning; if we live perfectly in the moment we realize the eternal. So Plato and Spinoza are as useful today, almost, as when they wrote, while the ephemeral books born of their hour load our libraries with barren stuff.

3. Deeper than both of these causes is the fact that so much of the literature dealing directly with ethical problems is born of the study rather than the world, evidencing an habitual detachment from human life that involves a loss of appreciation of its concrete problems. While the resulting theory may be logical and satisfying to the intel-

lect, it helps us little in dealing with the real problems of human living.

Therefore, if we can keep close to the process of life itself, asking always reverently what is the truth, and seeking to find the eternal in the best life of the moment, we may hope to retain, both in our study and in the practical work of moral education, something of the deep interest that ethical problems possess in our experience.

Thus I have thought it worth while to attempt a study, as exhaustive as I could make it, of the whole problem of moral culture: its purpose in relation to our society and all the means through which that purpose can be attained. My aim has been sanity and not novelty. In education as in life we are led astray by brilliant half-truths. It is not difficult to detect and avoid what is merely false, but wisdom means putting half-truths in their place, viewing each element in widest relation and therefore truest perspective, seeing life, as Matthew Arnold said Sophocles saw it, 'steadily and whole.'

Today, particularly, it is sanity we most need in education. The tides of thought come with ebb and flow; just now we are in the flood-tide of what is somewhat mythically called "the new education." We have turned from duty to interest, from form to content, from discipline to nutrition, from instruction to expression, from prescription to election. In all this is much gain, but only if we avoid extreme reaction and keep the good of the old in the new. To assume that the novel must be the best, to despise the old because it is old, and regard only the most recent theories as worthy of enthusiastic following, is to mistake a tidal wave for the Gulf Stream and invite a reaction to the extreme of the very elements against which we have been

contending. The great truths of life are simple and universal; they have been repeated over and over again. The form of their expression is ever new and changing, born anew as they must be to meet the needs of a new age. *The Truth* is not a mean between two extremes, nor is it an eclectic patchwork combining pieces of truth artificially. We attain even glimpses of it only with a certain wholeness of vision and sanity of perspective, with a recognition that is inclusive and unified. The aim in this book has been to see 'steadily and whole' both human life and the process of moral culture that leads to it and makes possible the happiest and most helpful living.

I may sometime publish a body of selected and graded material for the ethical instruction of children as outlined in Chapters XIX-XXIII. The present work is not a text for children, but is intended as a guide for parents and teachers, a text for classes studying the subject of moral education in normal schools and universities, and as an effort at a complete and inclusive view of the problem for all who are interested in moral culture.

Edward Howard Griggs.

Montclair, New Jersey, September 1904.

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I

THE CHILD WORLD

It has taken long to learn the lesson that childhood is not simply an imitation of mature life, nor a preparation for it, but a separate and different world with its own joys and sorrows. As the early Italian painters made their children, even their babies, smaller men and women, paying little attention to the true anatomy and structure of the child's body, so the older education treated children as lesser men and women, planning its courses of study on an analysis of the adult mind. Just as the true representation of childhood has been one of the great steps forward in art, so the recognition of the different character and independent meaning of the child world is perhaps the greatest advance in recent education. That recognition is almost universal today, though many of its practical results are not yet worked out; and we are able to state with some definiteness the distinguishing characteristics of childhood.

1. Perhaps beyond anything else it is the intensity of interest in the present moment that marks child life in contrast to our mature attitude. With the child there is less 'looking before and after,' especially with reference to painful experience. It is true children take keen pleasure in the anticipation of a specific promised joy, but largely by living it over in advance in the imagination, while there is no postponing of the meaning of the present moment. Our consciousness that the chapter will end often takes the

heart out of a joy or lessens the bitterness of our pain; but the child lives in a moment that seems to stretch away limitlessly. Wakening on Saturday morning with 'a whole day to play in,' he looks forward to a reach of anticipated joy hardly equaled by the adult's dream of paradise.

2. Thus children feel more keenly than we do the joys and sorrows of the passing moment. Discounting both types of experience for ourselves, we are apt to do so still more for the child, unless we have unusual sympathy with his point of view. But the breaking of a doll may bring the child for the moment into the presence of absolute tragedy. It is we who can say:

> "There, little girl; don't cry!
> They have broken your doll, I know;
> And your tea-set blue,
> And your play-house, too,
> Are things of the long ago;
> But childish troubles will soon pass by.—
> There! little girl; don't cry!"[1]

We can say this because we can see that every experience, however bitter, passes, since we have been schooled to recognize the changing succession of moods and events; but not so the child. To him the pain or joy of the moment is absolute while it lasts.

3. Childhood is further characterized by much greater spontaneity in action and expression than is shown in mature life. This applies to both good and bad impulses. The fit of passion and the mood of happy generosity tend alike to immediate action, since the child has not learned,

[1] From A Life-Lesson, by James Whitcomb Riley, in *Child-Rhymes*, pp. 171-172, The Bowen-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1899.

as we have, to inhibit or control the expression of passing emotions through more permanent controlling motives.

4. So the child is nearer reality as opposed to convention than are we. The fresh impulses of our lives get overladen with an ever denser garment of social forms, until in the end the impulses are suppressed in much of our living. Children live more immediately in the presence of truth and beauty, responding more directly to the simplest things in nature and human life.

5. Finally, in children the imaginative and emotional life is strong, while the development of conscious reflection proceeds slowly. The child is a bundle of impulses and instincts, generic and individual, combined by heredity, called out under the influence of environment, rapidly crystallizing into habits, meagerly supervised by conscious reflection.

As the child world is thus distinct in character and meaning, so it has its own worth apart from its relation to subsequent life. It is most important to recognize this, since there can be no greater failure than in ever postponing life to some future time.[1] This was the mistake of mediæval Christianity with reference to the whole earth life. This world was regarded as so merely a preparation for another that the meaning of the present life was sometimes quite lost. We have learned that if life is to be good anywhere it ought to begin to be good now, and it is our busi-

[1] "To be suddenly snuffed out in the middle of ambitious schemes, is tragical enough at best; but when a man has been grudging himself his own life in the meanwhile, and saving up everything for the festival that was never to be, it becomes that hysterically moving sort of tragedy which lies on the confines of farce. The victim is dead—and he has cunningly overreached himself: a combination of calamities none the less absurd for being grim."—Robert Louis Stevenson, *Virginibus Puerisque*, p. 95.

ness to make it so. The best preparation for any possible future world is the fullest realization of life in the present.

In the same way life should have as complete a meaning as possible in each phase of it, and to postpone one phase ever to the next and the next is to miss the meaning of the whole. Kant's practical imperative of duty was: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case, as an end withal, never as a means only."[1] This imperative must be extended to each phase in the process of the individual life; each must be regarded as having its own value, therefore as in some measure an end in itself, never merely a means to some later phase.[2]

This principle is generally recognized in its application to mature life, and sometimes to youth; but unfortunately the moment we turn to the problem of education we tend to forget it, and so to mold everything with reference to the adult life for which we wish to form the child. The result is the same as with human life in the middle ages. If we treat childhood merely as a preparation for maturity we fail to prepare well, besides losing much of the independent

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[1] *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, translated by T. K. Abbott, p. 47. Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1889.

[2] "The boy has not become a boy, nor has the youth become a youth, by reaching a certain age, but only by having lived through childhood, and, further on, through boyhood, true to the requirements of his mind, his feelings, and his body; similarly, adult man has not become an adult man by reaching a certain age, but only by faithfully satisfying the requirements of his childhood, boyhood, and youth."—FRIEDRICH FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, translated by Hailmann, p. 29.

"Woe to every sort of culture which destroys the most effectual means of all true culture, and directs us to the end, instead of rendering us happy on the way!"—GOETHE, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels*, translated by Carlyle, vol. 2, p. 80.

worth of childhood in joy and beauty. One of our greatest debts to Rousseau is his insistence that we must make childhood joyous in every step of it;[1] and later writers such as Stevenson, Grahame, Barrie, Field, Riley, have done us a priceless service in interpreting childhood so that we are made to see its worth for itself. The books of these modern authors, written nominally for children, often appeal less to a child audience than to us, to whom they give a new vision and appreciation of the child world.

As childhood may and ought to be one of the happiest and most beautiful chapters of human experience, it is especially necessary that we should apply to it the principle of the independent worth of each phase of life. The 'golden glory' in which many of us see our early life, may indeed be due to the mists of the years that lie between, nevertheless the qualities that distinguish childhood, its freshness and spontaneity, its closeness to nature and

[1] See, for example, *Émile*, book II, pp. 59-60, Firmin-Didot et Cie., Paris, 1894:

"Les plus grands risques de la vie sont dans son commencement; moins on a vécu, moins on doit espérer de vivre. Des enfants qui naissent, la moitié, tout au plus, parvient à l'adolescence, et il est probable que votre élève n'atteindra pas l'âge d'homme.

"Que faut-il donc penser de cette éducation barbare qui sacrifie le présent à un avenir incertain, qui charge un enfant de chaînes de toute espèce, et commence par le rendre misérable, pour lui préparer au loin je ne sais quel prétendu bonheur dont il est à croire qu'il ne jouira jamais? Quand je supposerais cette éducation raisonnable dans son objet, comment voir, sans indignation, de pauvres infortunés soumis à un joug insupportable, et condamnés à des travaux continuels comme des galériens, sans être assuré que tant de soins leur seront jamais utiles? L'âge de la gaieté se passe au milieu des pleurs, des châtiments, des menaces, de l'esclavage. On tourmente le malheureux, pour son bien; et l'on ne voit pas la mort qu'on appelle, et qui va le saisir au milieu de ce triste appareil. Qui sait combien d'enfants périssent victimes de l'extravagante sagesse d'un père ou d'un maître? Heureux d'échapper à sa cruauté, le seul avantage qu'ils tirent des maux qu'il leur a fait souffrir, est de mourir sans regretter la vie, dont ils n'ont connu que les tourments."

simple human life, give it a charm and meaning not equaled in the same way by later experience. How foolish then is all educational discussion that regards only what we wish to secure in maturity, without considering the worth and happiness of each moment of the child's life. Our aim should be to treat each child so that if life broke off at any point we could say of the chapter experienced by the child, it was happy and worth while.[1]

On the other hand, if life should have as full a meaning as possible in each moment, it should also be an organic unity. As Wordsworth states it:

> "The Child is father of the Man;
> And I could wish my days to be
> Bound each to each by natural piety."[2]

Nothing makes for general wretchedness more completely than a life in which each phase stands whimsically apart from all the rest, the individual following in every step of his experience the chance will-o'-the-wisp of the moment's desire. Each part of life should have its rational place in the whole, and one phase should lead naturally to the next;

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[1] Compare LECKY, *The Map of Life*, pp. 239-240:
"Many a parent standing by the coffin of his child has felt with bitterness how much of the measure of enjoyment that short life might have known has been cut off by an injudicious education. And even if adult life is attained, the evils of an unhappy childhood are seldom wholly compensated. The pleasures of retrospect are among the most real we possess, and it is around our childish days that our fondest associations naturally cluster. An early overstrain of our powers often leaves behind it lasting distortion or weakness, and a sad childhood introduces into the character elements of morbidness and bitterness that will not disappear."

[2] From My Heart Leaps Up When I Behold, WORDSWORTH, *Complete Works*, Globe edition, p. 171.

for life is a developing process, and the joy and worth of one moment is dependent in no small measure upon its relation to the preceding moments and the use that has been made of those. This is well expressed in the doctrine of 'Karma,' which holds that the possibility of life at any point is the net resultant of all the actions and experiences that precede. Each moment is a new opportunity to live, but our power to utilize it depends upon what we have done in all the yesterdays. Apart from any theory of reincarnation, this statement may be much widened in meaning if we consider the relation of one life, through heredity, to those that precede and follow it. How much of both our power and weakness is due to this relation to the past; and while each life is an end in itself, we regard that individual as highly immoral who does not govern his own life in harmony with the good of all the descendants who follow him. Thus there was a certain rightness in the mediæval view of the relation of time and eternity. The individual life in this world loses its meaning unless it is lived in harmony with the whole of life, whatever that is regarded to be.[1]

Thus there are two balancing principles, each of which must be obeyed in harmony with the other. The present moment should be full and satisfying, yet in harmony with the best for all the moments that follow. Each phase of

[1] Compare FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, translated by Hailmann, p. 27:

"It is highly pernicious to consider the stages of human development—infant, child, boy or girl, youth or maiden, man or woman, old man or matron—as really distinct, and not, as life shows them, as continuous in themselves, in unbroken transitions; highly pernicious to consider the child or boy as something wholly different from the youth or man, and as something so distinct that the common foundation (*human being*) is seen but vaguely in the idea and word, and scarcely at all considered in life and for life."

life should have its own value, yet prepare for those succeeding. And so we should keep the child's life joyous and in itself worth while, yet bring it into unison with the whole of life and make it prepare naturally for the most happy and effective manhood and womanhood. Nor are these principles opposed; on the contrary it is impossible to fulfill one on a high plane without obeying the other. We have seen that if we miss the meaning of the phase that passes we fail to prepare best for the subsequent life; and invariably we make a wrong use of the present moment when it is out of harmony with the whole. This, indeed, is one of the best tests for distinguishing false pleasure from true joy. A brutal intoxication may seem pleasurable for the time, but it as completely destroys the real worth of the moment as it separates the part from sane relation to the whole of life. Let me repeat: one of the best tests of the worth of the moment is that it prepare rationally for what follows; while one of the best ways of measuring the preparation is to estimate the growth, joy and worth of the present life. This point of view is fundamental in the chapters that follow.

II

THE UNITY OF HUMAN LIFE

The most important fact in education is that we are dealing always with a world of persons. Whatever aim we set before ourselves can be realized only in personality. It is this that makes it impossible for true education ever to become a mechanical process. As we are concerned with persons, and must seek to form them in harmony with some ideal, there will always be an element of the unpredicted and incalculable that no system can organize. It is the most promising mark in the 'new education' that the heart of the whole movement is a deeper reverence for persons. Thus it is of first importance that we should see the nature and characteristics of the personal world.

The fact that we make any educational effort at all implies a recognition of one basal truth with reference to personality, namely, the likeness of one individual to all others in fundamental elements of life. It is solely because one is like all, that science in dealing with personality is possible. If each individual were entirely new and unparalleled, no body of law would be discoverable, no general principles could be laid down, and education would become mere artifice. Yet nothing is clearer than that human nature is law-abiding. Our recognition of this fact is the basis of half-a-dozen modern sciences; and most recently the studies of the minds of children have shown how entirely they obey great laws in their development.

The possibility of any science of humanity depends upon the fact that life is universal in its nature, being made of few and simple elements. There are not many great types of experience in human life; and most of us pass through them all in some form. Birth and death, love, work, hunger to see truth and appreciate beauty, struggle and joy, failure and suffering: these are the characteristic aspects of life common to all men. Consider how few are the problems upon which all novels and dramas rest. Half at least of these works of art deal with the adjustment of one personality to another, in love; while the rest treat the struggle in the vocation, the effort for culture, or the problem of religious faith. Each human being begins at the beginning and must travel over much of the same path of life as all others. We come out of the dark into the light; we live a little while in a dream-world, where all forms and shapes seem larger than they are and life is transfigured by a golden or gray atmosphere; we pass from play that is an imitation of life to a vigorous awakening of personality in the serious business of living; we find or sorrowfully fail to find our work; we form a few personal relations that bring us unguessed joy and pain; we travel some way down the hill of life, while the visions of the great world drop away more and more, as we draw toward the shadowy valley of ebbing memories that dims to the night; and so we pass again into the gloom. The story may be shortened, syncopated; the end may be in any scene, and whole chapters may be blotted out; but how much the same it is for all!

It is this unity of the human spirit that makes life centre in each individual in every place in the world. How often as one travels in a railway train and passes some straggling

group of houses huddled together with a few trees, in the midst of a dreary plain or in some lonely valley shut in by the hills, one feels that life would be impossible in such a place. We feel that we should suffocate were we doomed to live there, cut off from the great world, with no sense of the sweep of its forces. But go to such a place for one week, and how utterly the feeling changes. Nearly everything in human life is there. Not only love and work, ambition and failure, but relations that ramify to the last corner of the earth. Look into the post-bag and see where the letters are to go and whence they come, and you begin to realize that the village is a nerve-centre, a little one it is true, not a great central brain like New York or London, but a true centre nevertheless, from which ramify nerves of connection, motor and sensor, throughout the human world. Thus life becomes not only endurable but intensely interesting, in the most isolated community, when once these nerves of communication are established for the individual. Indeed, if one be not awakened to the need of the larger world-life, the unity of human experiences and the vividness with which they are realized in limited environment may give the local community a charm to the native dweller that no vaster centre can equal. I remember the story told me by a merchant of Florence who employed seventy-five expert wood-carvers in Prato, ten miles away. He suggested to the foreman that the workmen should move with their families to Florence and thus be in closer touch with the business, with a saving of expense to all concerned. "Oh, that would be impossible," the foreman replied, "our men are all *campanilisti;*" that is, they would die of homesickness if they tried to live out of sight of the bell-tower of Prato! Of course such an incident

is characteristic of Italy rather than America today; but it serves to show in extreme form how completely life centres in the little place for the one who has established the relations of his personality there.

Everyone who has gone up and down the Third Avenue Elevated in New York must have looked pityingly into the windows of the cheap lodging-houses the train passes, at the forlorn groups of shipwrecked men, huddled in winter about the one stove that heats the putrid air of the lounging-room. How lost they seem—stranded here on the edge of things for a moment, before they are swept down in the pitiless but all-hiding sea. Yet could we enter the consciousness of any one of them we should find that each is the centre of a world as important to him as any other's world can be to that other. Here is a whole network of relations ramifying in all directions, ambitions broken or half-fulfilled, service of some loved one, disappointment in failure, grief at death or separation, faint reaching toward larger hope, and dumb brooding over the dark mystery of it all: life is absolute in meaning to each man who lives.

The charm of many a novel of the hour, dealing with out-of-the-way lives, is in its revelation of this fact that all life centres in each one. I take an illustration at random: *The Biography of a Prairie Girl*, by Eleanor Gates.[1] A simple story of a little girl growing up on a remote Dakota farm; nothing unusual in it: merely affection for mother and brothers; first-hand contact with a rude nature world, now kindly, now treacherous; intense desire for knowledge and thirst for humanity: yet how it brings the tears to one's eyes and stirs the pulses with the thrill of the common wonder of human life.

[1] The Century Co., New York, 1902.

One is like all, life is a unity, humanity is much the same in all its expressions. This, indeed, has been the cry of the pessimist everywhere. It is because "there is no new thing under the sun," that life seems to him such a vanity and weariness. The same round is repeated over and over again.[1] We must accept this premise of the pessimist, but we need not accept his conclusion. On the contrary, this likeness of one to all is the sole basis of our understanding each other. Without it, there would be no possibility of converting the experience of one into terms of another's life. Thought, emotion and will are known only in thinking, feeling and doing. We divine in another an activity we know already in ourselves, by recognizing external signs of it with which we are familiar.

Thus we can understand only that to which we are related. Mathematicians tell us that a world might exist in space of two or four dimensions; and they prove their ability to construct a system of mathematics for such a

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[1] "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth forever.

The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose.

The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits.

All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full: unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again.

All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing.

The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.

Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us."—*Ecclesiastes*, chapter I, verses 4-10.

world.[1] We can conceive the possibility of it, but we cannot imagine life in it; for were there such a world, it would be non-existent for us, since we are built on the plan of space in three dimensions.

I once knew a man who had apparently no ear for music. Possessing every opportunity for travel and culture, he resented the fact that others enjoyed what was a closed world to him. So he set to work to study music from the ground up. He became so expert that he could take to pieces a Wagner opera and recompose its motifs. He enjoyed hearing such an opera rendered; but his pleasure involved scarcely any appreciation of music. It was the pleasure accompanying the intellectual process of analysis and synthesis, the kind of joy one has in working a difficult problem in calculus; but the man remained almost as deaf to music as before he undertook the course of training. I realize that the illustration is inadequate, but it is the best I can give to show that all appreciation of the experience of other persons comes through reducing it to the common basis from which they and we alike spring. We interpret other lives in terms of our own, that is, in terms of the universal element in our own.

So all appreciation of literature, all reading of history

[1] Compare C. H. Hinton, *The Recognition of the Fourth Dimension*, Bulletin number XIV, pp. 179–204, of the Washington Philosophical Society, published by the Society, Washington, 1902. Mr. Hinton's paper shows the impossibility of imagining and the difficulty of conceiving a fourth dimension of space.

Compare also E. Jouffret, *Traité Élémentaire de Géométrie à Quatre Dimensions et Introduction à la Géométrie à n Dimensions*. Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1903.

An interesting little book called *Flatland; A Romance of Many Dimensions, By a Square*, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1899, attempts to imagine life in space of two dimensions and incidentally contains much bright satire on human life.

depends upon this unity of human life. This is Emerson's constant thought, expressed in his greatest essays, as those on the Over-Soul and History.[1]

"I am the owner of the sphere,
Of the seven stars and the solar year,
Of Cæsar's hand, and Plato's brain,
Of Lord Christ's heart, and Shakespeare's strain."[2]

I am the owner of all this because the potentiality of humanity is wrapped up in each individual. Give us time enough and opportunity enough, and all that man has done is our possibility. We may not be able today to think Plato's thought, create Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, or live with the moral sublimity of Lincoln; but give us eternity and infinite opportunity, and there is no limit to our possible growth in these directions.

Thus the first truth in regard to the human personality is that one is like all, life is made of simple elements and its great experiences are common, each person is a kind of epitome of humanity, able therefore to appreciate the lives of others.

[1] "Of the universal mind each individual man is one more incarnation. All its properties consist in him. Each new fact in his private experience flashes a light on what great bodies of men have done, and the crises of his life refer to national crises."—EMERSON, *Essays, First Series*, p. 10. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1883.

[2] EMERSON, stanza prefixed to the Essay on History.

III

THE UNIQUENESS OF EACH PERSONALITY

I HAVE pointed out how easily we may be led astray by a half-truth; and the phase of the personal world we have been studying gives us just such a partial view. It is true that human life is a unity, that one is like all, but it is equally true that each person is in some measure unlike any other that ever was or ever will be. If the elements are simple and universal, the form they take is unique in each individual. Indeed, this principle holds of all life. Each form in the organic world is unique. No two leaves upon a tree are identical; no two animals with the same ancestry are just alike. The element of variation, the unexplained basis of evolution, shows in every life. No matter how thoroughly we may know the parents, it is never possible to predict the exact character of the offspring of any two organisms. The new life is a fresh combination of old forces, unlike any other. In human life this law reaches its highest expression. No two persons have just the same heredity, environment, experience. We must all struggle with the same problems, but there is infinite variety in the form they take. How rarely in practice can we find a rule to fit a particular case; we may discover the principle, but this must be given fresh application.

As the likeness of one to all makes possible our under-

standing of each other, so the uniqueness of each personality is the source of the freshness and interest of life. Here again Nature is our teacher. She is always original, because she never strives for the false originality of novelty. She does not ask: "Can I afford to make the grass green and the skies blue another year? Shall I risk another season of violets?" The same old elements are used over and over again, yet each life is born as freshly out of the old as if no such life had ever been in all the ages that are behind. The sun glorifies the new day as if the sun had never shone before. The wild-flowers of this springtime do not blush that wild-flowers have covered the earth for innumerable springs that have gone. And so every element of beauty in Nature is new, original and unparalleled.

In proportion to the vigor and reality of life is the same quality true of humanity. Life is original in every expression, and the problems we must meet are as if they had never been tried before. Our struggle is no less absorbing because men have struggled with the same kind of difficulties for so long. Our love means no less to us because love is so universal a fact of life. Grief stalks into our chamber with just as awful a power as if grief were not common to all. Indeed,

> "Common is the commonplace,
> And vacant chaff and empty grain," [1]

on the part of those who would comfort us in our sorrow by pointing to the universality of the experience. Such comfort merely insults our grief; and the people who offer

[1] TENNYSON, *In Memoriam*, canto VI.

it cannot really have lived. Byron answers them in that exquisite elegy, where he says:

> "Away! we know that tears are vain,
> That Death nor heeds nor hears distress:
> Will this unteach us to complain?
> Or make one mourner weep the less?
> And thou, who tell'st me to forget,
> Thy looks are wan, thine eyes are wet."[1]

Turn again to the Bowery lodging-house dwellers: not only is the same humanity present in every one, but the world of each is unique. All may be hungry and cold and broken, but the particular range of problems and relations each must meet is unparalleled in the life of any other.

So with the literature that reflects and interprets life. We have seen how common are its problems, how few and universal its elements. Yet if the last work be true to life and born freshly out of the heart and brain of a real man, it is new and appeals to us as if its problems had never been met before. Consider such a poem as the *Ulysses* of Stephen Phillips. How few are its emotions, and these as old as humanity. Moreover, the author has dared to take Homer, whom we all know, and relate again part of a story as old as Europe and familiar to every school-boy. Yet how new and all-powerful it is! "There are but few great things in the world, and they are all here," exclaimed my friend as we finished reading the poem aloud together. And indeed they are all here: hunger for wife and child and home, struggle with the lust of selfish desire, manly

[1] From Oh, Snatched Away in Beauty's Bloom, in *Hebrew Melodies.*

conflict with the exigencies of a despotic fortune—the great elements of life, old as humanity, simple as childhood, are there. Yet when we hear Ulysses cry:

"Ah God! that I might see
Gaunt Ithaca stand up out of the surge,
You lashed and streaming rocks, and sobbing crags,
* * * * *
I am an-hungered for that human breast
That bosom a sweet hive of memories—
There, there to lay my head before I die,
There, there to be, there only, there at last!"; [1]

or hear him tell how, from the shore of Calypso's Island, he

"looked o'er the wide sea,
And softly said, 'Little Telemachus'," [2]

the tears come to our own eyes and we thrill to the old, ever new story of personal life.

"There is no new thing under the sun;" yes, and there is nothing under the sun that is not new, fresh-born out of the Infinite, unique, unparalleled by any other life. These are the two balancing truths with reference to the human personality, each of which must be interpreted in harmony with the other if we are to have a true perspective in dealing with human beings.

Because each is unique, there is an unavoidable element of experiment in all human life. There can be no mechan-

[1] Stephen Phillips, *Ulysses*, act I, scene II, pp. 65-66. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902.

[2] *Ibid.*, act III, scene I, p. 131.

ical application of rules to the exigencies of experience. Life continually presents unexpected situations and combinations of old elements that cannot be predicted. If we wait to know how to live before we begin, we never begin. The man who does not choose his vocation until he knows all about the different callings and their relation to his personality dies without finding his work. If we wait to know all the laws of personal relationship before making friends, we live friendless. All we dare ask is to have light enough to see the next step, and then we must take that step bravely, trusting that if we do, the light will still be one step in advance.

"Here work enough to watch
The Master work, and catch
Hints of the proper craft, tricks of the tool's true play."[1]

Indeed, some of the saddest tragedies are those of people who have not quite dared to live. Such a tragedy of negation is in the life of that sensitive poet-philosopher Amiel, whose *Journal* even in its English dress has become a classic, expressing as it does the extreme of a peculiar type of experience. Amiel was a professor at the university of Geneva, yet he never dared teach his own life to his students, and so he read over year after year a dull routine of philosophical lectures, and the students never dreamed that under the shell of the scholastic professor was a live man, hungering for love and truth, yet not quite daring to live. Even Amiel's personal friends, who thought themselves his intimates, never knew him until the publication of his *Journal* after his death. They had

[1] BROWNING, *Rabbi Ben Ezra*, stanza XVIII.

supposed him cold, but in reading the pages of his *Journal* they discovered that whenever a friendship was budding between Amiel and another, he was so conscious of all the ways in which he might disappoint the friend, or the friend disappoint him, that he nipped the friendship in the bud.[1] It is a way of existing safely, but life is never safe. It may be very safe to be dead; but in proportion to the vitality and depth of the individual spirit will life be unsafe. The more vigorous the blood that courses through the veins, the larger the ambition, the more tense the aspiration that stirs the heart, the less safe life will be, for the greater is the element of the unexpected and incalculable that will enter into it. As long as we stay moored to the regular shore of negative respectability and conventionality we are safe. When we set sail on the untried ocean of life, with only the stars of God and the compass of our own instinct to guide us, there will be days and nights when the heaven is clouded and we cannot see the stars, and the compass of our instinct may point any other way than toward the north star; and then we sail wrong. But unless we set sail we reach no port worth while.

Thus education, seeking to mold personality, has to

[1] The following is typical of many passages expressing Amiel's self-analysis:

"Family life, especially, in all its delightfulness, in all its moral depth, appeals to me almost like a duty. Sometimes I cannot escape from the ideal of it. A companion of my life, of my work, of my thoughts, of my hopes; within, a common worship, towards the world outside, kindness and beneficence; educations to undertake, the thousand and one moral relations which develop round the first—all these ideas intoxicate me sometimes. But I put them aside, because every hope is, as it were, an egg whence a serpent may issue instead of a dove, because every joy missed is a stab; because every seed confided to destiny contains an ear of grief which the future may develop."—*Amiel's Journal*, translated by Mrs. Humphry Ward, vol. I, pp. 18-19. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1896.

deal not only with law-abiding material, with certain elements common to all life, but with an element of the untried and incalculable resulting from the unique character of each personality. Hence education must be both science and art. It must discover those general laws resulting from the likeness of one to all, but it must ever recognize that science should flower out into art, since each child is unique in personality. Teaching, like living, is an art, to be learned only in practice, involving the constant adjustment of one personality to others irregularly changing. That is why experience counts for so much with the teacher. No normal school or university instruction can compensate for the lack of direct contact with children and of the concrete insight developing from such contact.

If either one of the balancing principles is forgotten the result is failure. In education if we recognize only the science that depends on the likeness of one to all, the result is dead routine, an effort to cut all children after one pattern, destructive formalism. If we realize that teaching must be an art, but fail to base it upon science, we lose all guiding principles, fall into an excessive individualism where art becomes artifice, and thus work from one thing to the next without aim or reason, causing the school to disintegrate.

The two types of failure are perhaps equally complete, but one is much more common historically than the other. Extreme individualism is so obviously failure that it tends to correct itself; but by resting on those elements that are common to all, we are able to grind out a certain mechanical result which can be estimated at the end of the process; and so the failure may pass unrecognized, or even be

estimated as success. Thus the relatively constant failure in education has been the tendency to dead formalism, while the other error has appeared only sporadically. Therefore we must seek especially to reverence the personality of each child and to foster its natural growth. It is necessary to base the individual on the great moral principles common to all men, and to integrate him with humanity by leading him through its generic experiences; but with this unity in our aim, we must see to it that each child becomes an independent person, free and intelligent in self-control, and is thus equipped for the art of living.

IV

THE GROWTH-PROCESS OF HUMAN LIFE

I HAVE assumed that human life is a developing process, as is universally conceded today; we are now ready to consider the nature of that process as influencing our work in education. It is to biology we owe the elaboration and modern statement of the idea of evolution which has transformed every department of our thinking, including our attitude toward children. The moment we recognize that growth is not mechanical change, but the unfolding of a higher phase of life out of a lower one, the passing from one plane of action to another, we have a conception that must affect everything we try to do in education. Obviously the study of the adult will not enable us to prescribe food and stimuli for the mind of the child; each phase in the process must be studied for itself, and educational influences adjusted to its specific needs.

This problem would be less difficult if the process were a smooth and regular one; but the development of personality never goes on simply in a straight line. Now one element, now another, may spring suddenly into active being. A brief time of rapid advance may be followed by a long period when the elements unfolded may have time quietly to establish themselves. Recent studies of the physical development of children have shown how

irregular is growth in that field,[1] and the same unevenness is present in the mental and moral life. Here a world of irregular movements is evident, now one, now another element of personality asserting itself, until the whole growth-process becomes a maze of acting and reacting forces. It is this that makes the educational problem so perplexingly difficult as sometimes to lead us to despair of its solution. Not only must every child be dealt with as an individual, but every phase of his growth must be treated individually. The first question in education is, Where is the child now; and until this has been asked and answered there is no use in raising any other.

If, however, mental and moral development is irregular, it is none the less law-abiding. Though each individual, as I have shown, is unique in his expression of the common elements of life, still the mass of irregular movements falls into certain clearly marked periods. This is due to that far-reaching law of rhythm which applies to all life and possibly to all movement. Spencer attempts to show that motion in every phase of the inorganic world, from the formation of a crystal to the evolution of a solar system, is regulated by rhythm.[2] Whether this be accepted or not, certainly all life is ruled by this law. The great biological types would seem to have been developed in comparatively brief periods, while following these, long ages

[1] See the somewhat popular review of the facts of irregular physical growth in chapters II and III of Dr. OPPENHEIM'S *Physical Development of the Child.*

President HALL'S recent great work on *Adolescence* contains the most vast and thorough collection of facts in this connection that has yet been made. Compare especially chapters I and II for data illustrating irregularities in physical development.

[2] See SPENCER, *First Principles,* chapter X. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1878.

were required to establish the types. A forward leap followed by an extended period of quiescence, such has been apparently the law of movement in the evolution of organic life.

Unquestionably this is the principle ruling in human history. Throughout the past, epochs of production and epochs of preparation, periods of rapid advance and periods of slow incubation, ages of faith and quiet acceptance and ages of unquiet doubt and investigation,—these have alternated. It is interesting, too, to note how very brief relatively are the periods of production and expansion. The crowning time of the Periclean age in Greece, of the renaissance in Italy, of the Elizabethan age in England, is in each case measured by less than a hundred years; while each of these epochs is preceded and followed by a long age of preparation and incubation. Ebb and flow in the tides of life: ten centuries of Christian aspiration and one of pagan reaction, the sleep of the middle ages and the awakening of modern life, the old régime and the French revolution—everywhere the law holds of the movements of human history—the inspiration and expiration of the breath of life, the beating of the universal heart.

It is this law which applies to the development of personality. In the mass of seemingly irregular movements that characterize the growth of the individual spirit, it is possible to trace the ebb and flow in the tides of life. Times of sudden awakening and times of quiet expression, periods of forward movement and periods of quiescence are present here as in the history of the human race, the evolution of organic life, and perhaps in the formation of the universe of stars.

Viewed in a large way childhood and maturity represent

the two types: the one the age of rapid growth, the other the period of quiet establishing of the forces of life with ordered expression. Yet each of these breaks up into numerous lesser units of one and the other type. Indeed, in direct proportion to the vitality and growth of the individual will such ebb and flood tides be present. The abortive life, early hardening down into fixed lines, the life smothered by convention and negative respectability, may show little of them; but the spirit full of human potentiality, coming ever into wider relation with the great world, thirsting for life and continuing to grow even into old age, will show a large number of clearly marked movements of action and reaction.

Thus such movements instead of deserving our suspicion and efforts at suppression should be welcomed and understood. That absolute regularity which is the ideal of the pedant is an indication of the choking of the forces of life; and the irregular movement to and fro, so disconcerting to our plans and so thwarting to the success of our prearranged system of culture, is the highest and should be the most welcome indication of the life which it is the purpose of education to foster.[1]

We are yet far from understanding even the typical periods that appear normally in personal development, but we have learned to see how important it is to strive to

[1] "The law of nascent periods, or the age curve of growth of each organ or faculty, is one of the first desiderata of genetic psychology; how to apply it, by what means and to what degree to stimulate each part in its stage of most and least rapid growth, and how to apportion training of mind and body between developing the powers that excel to a degree of specialized culture that corresponds to their hereditary possibilities, or educating the weakest parts and powers in order to improve proportion and symmetry, is one of the chief problems of individual pedagogy."—G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. I, p. 128.

understand them. Any one which we can clearly recognize will serve to illustrate how completely the educational problem centres in understanding the particular phase of development the individual has reached.

For instance, there seems to be in many children a definite period of subsidence in mental growth about the eighth year. This by no means appears clearly in the lives of all children, but so frequently as to be more than an individual variation. The child who has been going forward rapidly, suddenly becomes stupid, careless of study and irresponsive to stimulus. And what is the result? The fond parent who is vain of the child's ability and the teacher who is ambitious for results unite to crowd the child on. Stimulus is multiplied at home and at school. The parent tells the teacher the child has done well in preceding rooms and there is no reason why he cannot do as well now. The teacher's pride is hurt and energies are redoubled to push the child forward. In other words everything possible is done to force the child across the period of retarded growth at the same speed shown in the time of most rapid and expansive forward movement.

But now suppose that this period of quiet incubation is nature's provision for gathering slowly together the energies of life for the great forward leap in the period of transition from childhood to youth: what have we done? Crowded sail, only to crack the mainmast and strain the ship; forced the steam until the engine of life is perhaps permanently disabled.[1] How many over nervous and

[1] President HALL (*Adolescence*, vol. I, p. 44) rejects the theory that the period of retarded growth occurring between the eighth and twelfth year means a husbanding of force for a later forward movement, and attempts to explain the retardation on the basis of race history. The educational application is the same, however.

morbid children, drifting in a sickly way through the period of transition, unable to respond to the appeal of that epoch of life and come forth into bounding manhood and womanhood, are sad memorials to the successful gratification of the vanity of parent and teacher. Suppose the child should even drop out of school for a time and revert to mud pies and sand houses, forgetting his arithmetic and letting his soul sleep in a calm physical life like an unawakened seed in the soil —what then? This: that a month of such a child's time later may be worth a year of the over-strained child's; that acquirements in arithmetic and grammar are poor tests of the worth of life. Too often when the child who has been allowed to sleep his two years, if necessary, strides ahead of his neighbor who has never missed a school day, nor even an evening's study at home, we regard it as unusual talent and anomalous. How much genius is simply health! And how genius might be multiplied if we let Nature take us into her confidence and followed the open secret that broods over the spring flowers.

Take another example: about nine or ten or eleven most children pass into an awkward age which to the unsympathetic observer is most disagreeable. The growth is irregular and the feet and hands are too large for the body. The child, too, is just becoming conscious of them and keeps them well in the foreground—not only of his consciousness, but of the stage of the domestic and social life. In the same way his words are too big for his ideas and the dawning mental life expresses itself in the same awkward way as the physical. And thus we, who for years have been taking the child into the drawing-room to show him off to strangers, now send him out of the room with a

sharp word or, worse, a sarcastic reference to his awkwardness. It is not his fault that he wants to display himself: we have taught him that; until now he comes noisily into the room with the high-pitched voice and disagreeable behavior that children use to attract attention, and is irritating enough to us. But as it was our vanity that displayed the younger child, so it is our vanity that is hurt now; and if for once we were to follow, not the whim of our pleasure, but the good of the child, ought not our treatment of him to be opposite in both cases? The young child, so endlessly attractive to us because of the mysterious dawning of the soul we behold in him, needs nothing else so much as to be left alone to establish quietly the roots of his being in the soil of affection. Instead of jigging him till his nervous system is exhausted, displaying him to all comers, and compelling him to go over and over his small vocabulary of baby words, we should restrain our vanity and let him lie much of the time in the lap of his nurse, Nature. While, on the other hand, the child in the awkward age needs nothing else so much as companionship with us and guidance and sympathy through the period of bungling expression until one of natural and ordered life is reached. The child who is over conscious of his hands and feet will not be made sweetly unconscious by sarcasm, and sharp suppression will hardly turn awkward words into natural and beautiful self-expression.[1]

Not only that: the very awkwardness is a clue to the needed lessons. With the first consciousness of personality the child has no sense of proportion and is irritatingly aggressive in the assertion of opinion. All parents know

[1] See the chapter on Ugly Ducklings, in *Short Studies in Character*, by Sophie Bryant, pp. 173-186.

the case: "Now, Mamma, you *think* you said so, but I KNOW you didn't." The temptation is to suppress the child as vigorously as possible; and there is no doubt that impudence must be suppressed—for the child's sake. Yet the child who says just that annoying thing is ready to recognize for the first time that two people may come to diametrically opposite opinions, and both be earnest and intelligent. The true lesson of toleration can now be taught. Hitherto we might have preached about it incessantly and the child could not have understood; now it is possible to develop in him that respect for the personality and opinions of others that gives proportion and beauty to intellectual relationship. Indeed, one may go beyond this: the child is also ready to understand that of the two in dispute the right is probably with the one of larger experience: *probably*, not certainly, for sometimes the child is right and the parent wrong. Such cases do arise, and a little modesty will not lessen the parental dignity.

These examples out of the multitude that might be given must serve to show how all-important is the law of periodicity in relation to child life. The problem of education is not to lead the personality along such a process as can be represented by a straight line, but to seek to understand the different periods of development and adapt our educational influences to the successive phases of movement through which the personality passes. This must be achieved both generally and individually. It is necessary to understand the typical phases in the growth of mind and spirit through which all children tend to pass, and also, among the innumerable modifications of these, those presented by the specific children with whom we must deal.

V

THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF MORAL EVOLUTION

The law of periodicity applies to every phase of human development. I wish to consider more nearly the aspects of moral growth that most concern us in education. There are two principles conditioning growth in this field for the individual and the race alike. The first is, *the gradual substitution of an integrating end of conduct, for the mere pull or push of desire, as the cause of action.* If we turn to the animal world we find action occurring largely as the immediate expression of desire. The brute is hungry, it seeks and slays its food, and lies down in the sleep of satiety. Where the satisfaction of immediate desire is postponed, this is usually due to instincts which have been established by ages of biological selection, and rarely indicates conscious reason. Primitive man must have been largely upon the same plane, as is evident from the lowest races today. The whole history of mankind in this aspect is the record of the steady growth of obedience to a rationalizing aim, as against the immediate response to the whim of desire or the inhibition of the latter merely through blind instinct.

The importance of this is evident when we see that action is rationalized and unified by being directed consciously toward some aim. Even a lower purpose, such as seeking the accumulation of wealth, will lead a man to forego

countless pleasures and deny whole ranges of natural desire. Thus his days are organized into what is relatively a unity even though the end is unworthy. The higher the aim the more complete will be the resulting unity and rationality of the life.

It is evident that in this race progress we are still far indeed from the conclusion. With the majority of human beings, much of the time, action is still due to the accident of desire in the moment, or to instincts, without the regulation of conscious reason. Yet surely we can see what the end of the process would be: life so wholly devoted to one supreme end that all momentary desires would be affirmed or denied according as they were or were not in harmony with the dominant aim; and thus the whole life would be made one rational unity. This does not mean that desire and instinct would ever cease to be springs of action, but only that they would be brought completely under the regulation of reason.

The process that is evident in the life of the race is repeated in the individual. The baby is hungry and cries for food; he eats and sleeps. The little child affirms each desire as it comes, except as he is restrained by other persons. Only very slowly are we able to lead children to postpone or deny their desires, and so to help them to obey significant aims. In its more intellectual aspect the chief work of moral education is to do just this, until in the end the individual is made wisely and consistently obedient to the highest aim he can see.

The importance of this phase of moral development is shown in the fact that when the mature life renounces all reasonable aims and gives itself over to the immediate gratification of capricious desire, it degenerates into what

is immoral instead of non-moral as with the undeveloped life. Goethe has made a study of this problem in Faust. Mephistopheles is "the spirit that denies." Intellectually he represents the scoffing denial of all reason in the universe; but practically he becomes the guide to the life of careless sensuality. In this Goethe means to show that the worst form of denial is not in the intellect, but in living as if there were no reason or law in the universe, and so seeking to satisfy merely the changing caprice of the moment. As the degenerate life is always repulsive, while the yet undeveloped is innocent, Faust's irrational living is as ugly as capricious childhood is charming. Mephistopheles is therefore right in exclaiming:

> "Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft,
> Des Menschen allerhöchste Kraft,
> Lass nur in Blend- und Zauberwerken
> Dich von dem Lügengeist bestärken,
> So hab' ich dich schon unbedingt;"[1]

for Faust's abandonment of all reasonable aims is an abrogation for himself of one of the most precious fruits of moral evolution.

Thus moral education must lead the child through the natural process of growth in substituting an aim of conduct for the pressure of desire. As all development is irregular, so the ebb and flow in the tides of the moral life

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[1] *Faust*, part I, scene IV; in Bayard Taylor's translation:
"Reason and Knowledge only thou despise,
The highest strength in man that lies!
Let but the Lying Spirit bind thee
With magic works and shows that blind thee,
And I shall have thee fast and sure!"

give us certain periods when the awakening to the great aims of life proceeds at a rapid rate. It is our business as educators to watch for these precious times and utilize them to the full when they come.

The second principle of moral evolution is *the gradual extension of sympathy, or of the personality, over an ever-widening area of life, so that the individual comes to feel the pain and joy of all other lives as somewhat like his own.* In the race this process begins far below the human plane with the first glimmerings of instinctive motherhood. The mother, even the brute mother, reaches out over her offspring, as it were, and feels its pain or pleasure as at least vaguely her own. In the earliest human life this mutual sympathy has already loosely unified the entire family group. Gradually it is extended over the clan and the tribe. By and by it includes, though tending to be less intense as it expands, the nation or race; and ultimately even these limits are broken down, so that all humanity is gathered up in at least a dim way in the conscious sympathy of the individual.

It is needless to point out how far we are from the end of this process. We can take up our newspaper in the morning and almost hope that there has been a battle in China or Turkey because it makes such interesting reading. Let a flood occur a thousand miles away and our sympathies are touched, but let it happen with the river beside which we live and we are shocked almost beyond endurance. Differences of time and space and race still influence deeply the extension of our sympathy, of our *personality,* both in intensity and in reach, over other areas of life; yet surely we can see what the end of the process would be, could we attain it: a sympathy so fine and

inclusive that the joy or sorrow of any other, existent today or to be tomorrow, would be felt as like our own. This would indeed be 'loving our neighbor as ourself.'

This process of growth must also be repeated in the individual if he is to reach a matured moral life. Little children are relatively non-moral rather than moral or immoral. Much that we used to regard as an evidence of 'total depravity' in them is now seen to be due to a lack of extension of personality over other lives. When children torture a younger playmate, it is rarely conscious cruelty, but a lack of realization that the child suffers. When a boy ties a tin can to a dog's tail, and then jumps with glee to see the dog go bounding down the street, it does not often mean joy in giving pain. The child has not yet reached out in sympathy to appreciate the dog's distress as something like his own. Were we not conscious that the dog suffered we might enjoy the sight also. The dog runs wildly, the tin can resounds as it strikes the stones, it is interesting to see what will happen next; but the pleasure we might take in the unusual spectacle is excluded by the fact that we are conscious of the brute's suffering. Obviously the cure for the boy is to waken him to sympathy with the dog; and then, indeed, to repeat the torture would mean malicious cruelty.

A friend gave me recently a striking illustration of this principle. She said that when she and her brother were children they invented a very interesting game. About dusk they tied a dark thread from a tree at the edge of the sidewalk to the top of their hedge just in line with a man's hat. As the men were hastening home from work, suddenly their hats rolled in the gutter, with no apparent cause. The children could hardly restrain their glee

sufficiently to avoid discovery. But suddenly they heard the step of their dearly-loved grandfather. They were filled with horror at the idea that his hat might roll in the gutter, and he be humiliated and distressed. So they hastened and got the thread down just in time and—it was never put up again.

The meaning is plain: the children had entered into their grandfather's spirit so that they realized his experiences from within. They felt sympathetically the annoyance he would experience were his hat knocked off. Through this appreciation of the grandfather's feeling the children realized the experience of the men who were strangers to them. Thus the game could no longer be attractive to an unspoiled child. To continue it with a consciousness of the humiliation it caused its victims would have been real malice.

Thus the problem of education, here as in the first aspect of moral evolution, is to lead the child on in the normal process of growth. The cure for the harmful actions that spring from a lack of sympathy with the experiences of others is, less repression of the action, than the wakening of an appreciation that makes the action impossible. An illustration of the power of education in thus influencing practical conduct is found in a field somewhat aside from the ordinary range of ethical problems. A decided increase in the number of song-birds has been evident during the last ten or twenty years in certain sections of the country, in spite of the steady growth of population. The cause of this is not only the growth of park systems, but much more the nature-study in our schools. Children have been brought into such sympathy with bird life that the careless robbing of nests and stoning of birds ceases

to be attractive to an unspoiled child. The action that was non-moral becomes immoral, and its presence in an educated child means either an unusually retarded development or a distinct moral perversion. I may add that much of the cruelty to animals and human weaklings on the part of rather childlike races should be interpreted in the same way.

The growth of conscious sympathy obeys the general law of periodicity, advancing in irregular waves in certain epochs of development. In both aspects of the moral life education must seize upon the right moment, utilizing every influence to stimulate and guide a natural process of growth. It is therefore that the work of education seems so subordinate and even incidental in character. Life and Nature educate far more effectively than we can ever hope to do. To try to usurp the place of the great natural forces would be attempting to make the child artificially, instead of helping him grow. Yet our work, if supplementary in character, is none the less important, since through it we can determine in a large degree the response of the individual to those vaster influences that come from life itself. It is really comparatively small margins of difference that determine success and failure in moral life as in all other phases of human living; and the fact that these margins are partly within our control gives an absolute importance to our work in guiding and fostering the natural development of children in the two great aspects of moral evolution.

VI

THE RELATION OF MORAL CULTURE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF EDUCATION

So FAR we have been considering the growth-process of human life itself, the material with which we must deal in education; we are now ready to define more nearly the problem of moral culture. The supremacy of the ethical interest in human life is perhaps the point of most general agreement among philosophers of all schools. If Aristotle's argument as to the central importance of ethics among the sciences[1] is not accepted by all, nevertheless its practical import is universally recognized, since in human living all other problems converge upon ethical problems. The question as to the worth of any tool, equipment, skill or opportunity can be answered only by estimating its effect on manhood and womanhood. Our statement of the aim of life is always the formulation of our highest ethical conception. The basal laws of life are all moral in meaning.

It is therefore impossible to separate conduct into two parts, one of which we regard as moral in import, the other as indifferent. Even Spencer makes the common mistake of attempting this separation;[2] yet the moment he begins to illustrate how easily actions we regard as in-

[1] See the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book I, chapters I and II.

[2] Compare SPENCER, *The Data of Ethics*, chapters I, III, XVI.

different may take on a moral import when we consider their less immediate relations, his own argument implies that the smallest element of seemingly indifferent action would have an ethical significance if we considered it in relation to the whole of life. It is true, only a small part of our action is consciously moral; but it is the characteristic of all human conduct, conscious or unconscious, that it is never morally indifferent, but will always mean something for good or evil. Even the details of the physical life, eating, walking, sleeping, which have become largely unconscious habit, must help or hinder the realization of the great aims of life. Indeed, a very important ethical question, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, is just how far it is wise to relegate these activities to the control of automatism, how far there should be a regulating supervision on the part of our conscious reason.

Thus every natural law is moral in its import the moment we consider it in relation to the aims and welfare of human life. Take the simplest of natural principles, gravitation, the law that holds the last star-dust in place: it is a moral obligation on the builders of every house to construct it in obedience to the law of gravitation, that it may not fall and crush those who dwell or meet within it. It is the figurative obverse of this truth Wordsworth utters when he exclaims in the Ode to Duty:

"Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong."

Carlyle touches the same truth when he says: "A false

man found a religion? Why a false man cannot build a brick house. If he do not know and follow *truly* the properties of mortar, burnt clay and what else he works in, it is no house that he makes, but a rubbish heap. * * * A man must conform himself to nature's laws, *be* verily in communion with nature and the truth of things, or nature will answer him, no not at all!"[1]

As a further illustration of the moral import of every natural law the moment we consider it in connection with the ends of human life, take the laws of physical health, simple natural principles applying alike to man and other animals. The moment we recognize that the body is the temple and instrument of the mind, these laws take on a moral meaning. It is as much our duty to obey them as to be honest in business; and avoidable illness, vain as people are of it, is as disgraceful as any other form of vice.

It is unfortunate that in English we use the word law in two very different senses. In the purely legal use, we mean by the word, a rule or principle laid down by some authority. In science, however, we use the word law to signify 'an observed order of sequence among facts.' Moral laws are usually mistakenly regarded as falling under the first head; yet while to those holding a certain religious belief further sanctions of morality may be superadded by a divine or other authority, the laws themselves are not so superadded, but are in the nature of life itself. They are the basal principles on which we are built and in harmony with which we must live if we would grow, serve, and be happy. All moral laws are natural, that is, they are in the nature of life; while all natural laws are

[1] CARLYLE, *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, lecture II.

moral in import the moment we regard them in relation to the aims and welfare of human beings.

As it is impossible to divide either conduct or law into two parts, one moral the other natural or indifferent in meaning, so is it with education. We cannot separate moral culture from other aspects of education, as a distinct part of the whole; but rather every phase of education has its moral import. Indeed, we may go so far as to say that the worth of any aspect of education can be estimated only as we find its relation to the development of good manhood or womanhood.[1] Thus moral culture is the integrating centre and interpretative end in all education.

Therefore physical, emotional, intellectual culture is good only if utilized by a good person. A strong and supple body is a splendid instrument, but it may be used for bad ends as well as good. Emotional sensitiveness is so much capacity for life; but it may be made a means of decadent self-indulgence as well as a doorway to the appreciation of humanity. Intellectual and executive skill is power that may be used either helpfully or harmfully. Indeed, one of the crying evils in our own land is the extent to which men of great intellectual and executive ability are willing to use their power for purely selfish ends, sometimes even in direct violation of the public welfare. Thus the greater the power and training, the more harmful to the social whole will be their use when directed toward bad ends. Plato pointed out long ago that the worst men

[1] "As the highest purpose of man, and consequently of education we universally recognize morality. He who should deny this would not really know what morality is; at least, he would have no right to take part in this discussion."—HERBART, *The A B C of Sense Perception*, translated by Eckoff, p. 93.

are the corruption of those who might have been the best.[1] The same force of personality that made them go far on the path of crime would have made them the more serviceable to humanity had their native energies been rightly controlled and directed. We say "a good workman is known by his tools;" but to put well-sharpened tools into the hands of a fool or a criminal is to endanger the safety of the community. Skill in penmanship will make a bank clerk more useful or a forger more successful. Insight into human nature and shrewdness in dealing with men will add to the practical effectiveness of a reformer or the harmfulness of a swindler. Thus there is no meaning in education unless it converge on moral education, and all culture and training must be interpreted in terms of the manhood that is to utilize them for the purposes of life.

On the other hand, every element of education has some reaction on character.[2] The gymnastic that makes you hold your head up tends to straighten your moral behavior; discipline in clear thinking makes for ethical sincerity; while all cultivation of the imagination and emotions renders us more responsive to ideals and appreciative of other persons. Beyond this inevitable reaction, when any phase

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[1] "And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?"—PLATO, *Republic*, translated by Jowett, book VI, section 491.

[2] "If * * * the teacher succeeds in bracing aright any mental power—be it purely intellectual or of some other class—he does by that act remove one important obstacle to the success of the processes by which he would directly strengthen the Moral Nature of the Child, and enlarge its capacities."—J. P. NICHOL, *Moral Training in our Common Schools*, p. 44.

of education is brought into sound relation with the whole, and so made to converge upon the moral centre, it contributes an indispensable element to moral character. Take the simplest and most fundamental of all forms of education—physical culture. How necessary a sound body is to moral living. To be sure, the heroic struggle to rise above some painful physical limitation may give a sweetness and beauty of character rarely obtainable otherwise; nevertheless, every bodily disease and disturbance is just so much handicap to the moral life. It is all but impossible to have 'a sane mind' unless it is 'in a sound body.' Indigestion, nervous irritability, physical depression, sluggish organic functioning: what obstacles they are to sane ethical living![1] Thus the problem of giving the child a healthy, sanitary physical environment, good, simple food, rational exercise, bodily culture, wise medical care when needed, is distinctly a moral problem, indeed, is a basal element in moral education.[2]

So with the cultivation of the imagination and the emotions. Much of the evil of human life comes from the inability to 'put yourself in his place.' A cultivated imagination is the basis of altruism; and a sensitive emo-

[1] "Though far from fond of paradoxical expressions, we are tempted to say that a good diet is a necessary part of a good education; for in one very important sense it is emphatically true. In the great body of the people all education is impotent without it."—James Mill, *Essay on Education*, p. 29.

"Sickly natures feel themselves dependent, robust ones dare to *will*. Therefore the care of health is essentially a part of the formation of character, though without belonging to the science of education, where even the first principles for that care are wanting."—Herbart, *Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 218.

[2] See an excellent chapter on Physical Training a Means of Mental and Moral Training, in *The Spirit of the New Education* by Louisa P. Hopkins.

tional life is the requisite for all response to moral ideals. Personal appreciation, the power to enter into the lives of other people and to realize how they react upon the changing and the permanent factors of experience, is an element of central importance in the kind of character moral education should seek to foster.

Equally important for moral character is the cultivation of the reason. Sound intellectual judgment is necessary in every department of human life. There are few men more injurious to the world than the well-intentioned man whose intellect does not reason straight on the simple questions of life. We are just as responsible for seeing the right as for doing it when we see it; and thus we are morally guilty for every element of fanaticism we might have avoided. Therefore it is part of our problem in moral education to cultivate the reason and form sound intellectual judgments on the questions of living. Moreover, large, calm thinking exercises a peculiarly elevating effect upon one's moral attitude. Herbart, better than any one else, has shown the importance of 'the circle of thought' for morality; and everyone who has dwelt for a while with the great thinkers knows how powerfully they influence the moral life.[1]

There is thus a certain solidarity in the human being; we cannot touch one phase of life without influencing the whole. Moral health depends upon the sane union of all

[1] "To deny the moral influence of intellectual culture is as great an error as to affirm that it alone is a sufficient safeguard of morality. Its tendency unquestionably is to make men gentle, amiable, fair-minded, truthful, benevolent, modest, sober."—J. L. SPALDING, *Means and Ends of Education*, p. 193.

"Great moral energy is the result of broad views, and of whole unbroken masses of thought."—HERBART, *Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 222.

elements of life, cultivated in just proportion. This is well expressed in a suggestive old book of essays by Mary G. Chandler. She says: "We cannot think wisely unless we imagine truly and love rightly as well as warmly. We cannot love rightly unless we think justly and imagine purely; nor can we imagine purely unless we love that which is pure. We cannot do all this unless we live out what we think, imagine, and love. * * * What we do must follow closely in the footsteps of what we know, if we would arrive at breadth and depth of knowledge."[1]

This unity of the moral life is often ignored in the current discussion of education. Character is divided into instinct, habit, will, judgment; and each of these elements is separately considered. This is almost as grave a mistake as was formerly the practice of dividing the mind into distinct 'faculties.' Modern psychology has shown us how completely the mind is a unity, and that what we called faculties are merely aspects of its activity. So we must learn to recognize the unity of the moral life. We are educating not faculties, but children. The training of

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[1] MARY G. CHANDLER, *The Elements of Character*, pp. 46-47. Compare also E. THOMSON, *Educational Essays*, pp. 239-240:

"The different organs of the spiritual system—intellectual, sensitive, and moral—are also united by sympathy and mutual dependence; if you get one of them into the habit of vigorous and healthy action, the others will assume, to some extent, a corresponding action. Quicken the heart, for instance, and intellect and conscience will wake up; touch conscience, and intellect and heart will leap; arouse intellect, and its associated sensibilities will be more or less stirred. With what godlike energy does even a sluggish mind move when brought under the power of some strong passion! * * * The divisions, strife, enthusiasm, fanaticism, bigotry, etc., in Christendom are chiefly owing to a want of intellectual training rather than a want of religious principle. From this correspondence and dependence of action it follows that you cannot educate one part of our nature without influencing others."

different aspects of the moral life must be subordinated to the development of the unified moral personality.

Therefore, the problem of moral education is the problem of the whole of education in relation to its moral centre and aim. Moral culture cannot be the function of any single influence or institution. The home, the school, the church, must all contribute; every instrument of education must be used with primary reference to the building of good character. Formerly there was much discussion as to whether moral culture was properly a function of the public school. The question becomes meaningless when we recognize that the influence of every phase of the school life and work can never be indifferent, but must count for good or evil, and therefore that it is our business to make it as good as possible. Moral culture is then, not a phase or a part of education, but the directing and organizing of the whole process of culture so that it may end in forming happy and useful manhood and womanhood.

VII

THE TYPE OF CHARACTER MORAL EDUCATION SHOULD FOSTER

In our study hitherto I have assumed a general conception of moral health, of good manhood and womanhood; it is now necessary to define what we mean by good character, and so to formulate the aim we should set before us in moral education.

The first requisite in regard to the conception of character is that it should be essentially positive. The mere avoidance of evil is one condition of a good life, but it is only a condition, and when it is fulfilled, the question remains open as to the worth of the life in either happiness or human service. We want, not that a man should refrain from harming his neighbors, but that he should love their welfare, enter sympathetically into their lives and seek to help them grow toward their highest aims; not that he should avoid falsehood, but that he should love and strive for the truth. So we need to foster the development of positive insight, cosmopolitan sympathy, generous instincts of service, an heroic attitude toward difficulties.

Thus it is a widespread error to interpret the moral life merely negatively, as is evidenced in the current use of such words as 'good,' 'moral,' 'ethical.' When we have nothing really creditable to say of a man and wish to be generous, we are apt to say: "Well, at least he's a good

man," and it is indeed "to damn with faint praise;" for we mean that while he has done nothing significant for himself or others we have seen nothing in his life conspicuously wrong. To call such a man good is to misuse a noble word; he is merely not bad, which is something quite different.

Indeed, one of the meanest types of character is that of the cowardly virtuous—the people who never do wrong because they are afraid to, but who are not in love with the right and never affirm it positively. These make the gossips and scandal-mongers, people who take their vice at second hand—the worst way to take it. There is some hope that he who does wrong may see the ugliness of his deed and react against it; but the one who is afraid to commit the evil deed, yet secretly loves it and satisfies his evil desire by gloating over the bad actions of others, is cultivating an inner morbidness destructive to every element of nobility in character. Dante places these negatively good people with the fallen angels who did not take sides in the battle of the heavens, who were not for God, nor for Satan, but wanted to await the issue of the conflict and join the winning side:

"The heavens expelled them, not to be less fair;
Nor them the nethermore abyss receives,
For glory none the damned would have from them."[1]

Dante has authority for his view. One may recall what is said in the Bible to the angel of the church of the Laodiceans:

"I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot.

[1] *The Divine Comedy*, Longfellow's translation, canto III.

"So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth."[1]

In our civilization it is these negatively respectable people who are the great burden upon us, which must be lifted in every movement toward moral and political reform. The blindly reactionary people are not the gravest menace to our institutions. The anarchist and nihilist, harmful as they may be, can nevertheless help us by showing us the seriousness of the problems we must solve. Nor are we in America in any immediate danger through the ambition of an Alcibiades or a Napoleon. It is the selfishness of indifference that is the real menace to our national life, displayed often by the very people who imagine they are the salt of the earth. The respectable people who are absorbed in serving the interests of their families, but forget all about the larger public interest; who are so devoted to their private affairs that they have no time to look up the record of the men for whom they vote, consider the principles at stake, or even go to the polls; who will not face the local bully in a convention or stand up for a cause that is unpopular—these are the people most to be feared. They will never be found "with truth upon the scaffold," but far back in the noisy procession that follows her banner, once it is victorious.

Thus for our aims as a people and for every end of human life, the type of character we need to develop is one that is large in its view of life, positive in obeying what it accepts as right, effective in the service of humanity. Yet while this positive force of personality is the prime requisite, it must be brought under the regulation of reason and into harmony with the laws of life. The forces of human

[1] *Revelation*, chapter III, verses 15-16.

nature are exuberant, and may easily flow into extreme and distorted expression. There is always one way of right action, any number of wrong.[1] We may leave the path at any point, and so limitation is constantly necessary. The problem of living is one of proportion; we need to love the best thing most, the next in its order, and so on through all the objects of human endeavor. If we seek any object, no matter how good in itself, out of relation to the whole of life, the result is some measure of moral disaster. Thus reason never contributes the energy of the moral life; its function is that of limiting and regulating among desires.

The need of this rigid obedience to 'the goddess of limits' is doubtless the chief cause of the persistence of the purely negative view of morality. This cause has been supported, it is true, by an historical tendency. During much of Christian history the negative virtues were unduly emphasized. The highest ideal of the middle ages was retirement from the world into a 'life of the spirit' apart from ordinary human activity and relationship. There is enough sanction for this negative ideal in the teaching of Christianity to insure its persistence even into a more positive epoch like our own. It is important, however. that we should not allow either the historical bias or the necessity of moral limitation to blind us to the fact that life is significant only in proportion to the vitality of its content. The limitation has a meaning only in relation to

[1] "Again, there are many different ways of going wrong; for evil is in its nature infinite, to use the Pythagorean figure, but good is finite. But there is only one possible way of going right. Accordingly the former is easy and the latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark but difficult to hit it. This again is a reason why excess and deficiency are characteristics of vice and the mean state a characteristic of virtue."—ARISTOTLE, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by J. E. C. Welldon, p. 47. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1892.

what is limited; the restrictions to keep us in the path are of value only if we travel the path.

Probably the ancient Hebrews show the most elaborate attempt in human history to give life a moral meaning by hedging it around with ever finer limitations. The ten commandments sum up the spirit of the written law in a series of 'thou shalt nots,' warning against the great phases of moral failure. Even those that are verbally affirmative have a strong negative import. The written law was followed by a vast body of oral commentation drawing ever finer restrictions about life. The effect was less harmful for the Hebrews, owing to the intense vigor of the race, their strong hold upon the simple realities of life; yet even so, their long-continued and painstaking effort ended in relative failure. At the time Christianity came how "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable" had become the learning of the Scribes and Pharisees, with the ebb-tide in the forces of Hebrew life. Christ showed the rich young man that one might keep all the commandments from his youth up, yet be morally worthless;[1] and the two commandments of love to God and one's neighbor were said to contain all the law and the prophets, because they inculcate the spirit from which would ceaselessly flow the good actions the law sought vainly to guarantee by multiplied negative restrictions.

There are thus two different forms of moral failure. If vigorous emotion and desire are given free sweep, the result is a wild luxuriance of human nature, a kind of tropical jungle where beautiful, fragrant flowers bloom beside noxious poison plants. If, on the other hand, life has little positive content of feeling and desire, but is surrounded

[1] *Matthew*, chapter XIX, verses 16-22.

with careful restrictions, the result is sterility, a Sahara desert where all life is destroyed over the barren waste. As an example in thought and life of the unrestrained expression of natural forces, Rousseau may be taken; and one sees readily how foolish is the theory that human nature is all good at the heart and only the removal of limitations is necessary to bring paradise. John Stuart Mill has given us an illustration of the opposite failure out of his own life. After the admirable intellectual education he received, he found himself at the age of twenty thoroughly convinced that he ought to live for the good of humanity, and caring nothing about the good of humanity.[1] Reason was admirably regulative, but there was nothing to regulate. The machine was perfect, the engineer's hand was on the throttle, but there was no steam in the boiler. After all, a tropical jungle is better than a Sahara desert; for in the former is much life, though distorted and uncontrolled, while the latter is mere death.

Thus there are two basal principles, one primary and one secondary, governing our work in moral education. We must foster the growth of the positive and effective moral personality, seeking to call out every natural power in harmony with all the rest; and we must bring this wealth of vigorous life into harmony with the laws of the universe and under the regulative control of clear-sighted, conscious reason.

There is a third principle which we must follow. We have seen that human life is a growth-process, and therefore the moral personality we seek to develop will be not statical but changing. It is therefore necessary to see to it that the change is growth ever toward the higher. We

[1] See JOHN STUART MILL, *Autobiography*, chapter V.

have emphasized the need of loving and willing 'the best;' but the best is construed differently on every plane of life. This is not the place to undertake a discussion of the theory of relative and absolute ethical standards; but this much I can say: any statement of the moral ideal that attempts to be absolute will be merely formal, while the content gathered up within the form will change with every step of our growth. Suppose one accepts the statement that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," still the meaning this has for us will change as we learn higher and larger ways of serving and enjoying. The moral ideal of any individual is relative to him, and therefore absolutely binding upon him. We owe obedience to the highest we can see upon the plane of life we have reached, and it is our duty to see as high as we can. Disobedience to our own loftiest conception is punished by loss of the vision and degeneration to a lower plane.

Thus the crowning element in the type of character moral education should seek to foster is the power to go on growing independently. I have emphasized the need of helping the child on in the natural process of his development: after all, the greatest help we can give is to make him independent of our assistance. We can aid but a little while and over a limited area of life; the individual must be able to grow steadily from within if his life is to be increasingly worth while to himself and to others. Therefore the wisest teacher is the one who makes himself unnecessary at the earliest possible moment. This is not usually understood in our present American education. We hear much of the need of strong personality in the parent and the teacher, and the current discussion implies that it is impossible to have too vigorous an assertion of it over the

child. It is true, we need strong personality, but it is equally necessary to have the reserve of wisdom in its expression, otherwise there is danger that the child may be converted into a mere satellite of the parent or teacher. This is so far from being generally recognized that we hear certain institutions and teachers even boast of sending out their students stamped with a conventional type and manner.

There have been many teachers who could get good work out of their pupils and an obedient response from them, while the teacher's authority was present; but the really great teachers are those who have been able to touch the student's spirit into life, yet leave the flower of personality unspoiled. If education is to fit for the world in which we live there is supreme need of the power of self-direction and the ability to grow without depending on outside stimulus. Let me repeat: the wisest teacher is the one who makes himself unnecessary at the earliest possible moment; and he becomes most useful just at the point where he ceases to be necessary.

The principle has an even wider application. There is much said today about the desirability of so organizing the forces of education as to be able to stamp a definite national and moral type upon all children. Indeed, this is often assumed to be unqualifiedly desirable, and the question raised is only as to the method of accomplishing it. Certain foreign countries have gone further than we have in this connection. France, in particular, through her modern highly centralized system of education, has gone consciously and systematically to work to stamp one national type upon all children. It may well be ques-

tioned whether the result is not a threatened breakdown of moral initiative and originality. The test of French temper that came with the famous Dreyfus case indicated in great masses of the people a lack of cool, independent moral judgment, a tendency to fall easily into the whims of mob-mind, a ready willingness to abandon the right for some supposed 'honor of the army' or the nation, that are full of peril for the future of French freedom. There were redeeming features, I know: the moral independence of a few men stood out in heroic contrast; but the very impressiveness of their action came from the fact that they were so few.

Wherever militarism has been dominant there are illustrations of the breakdown of moral independence, shown in the sheep-like willingness to follow a leader, even when the path he has chosen is wrong. Militarism demands of the rank and file but one virtue, the most primitive of all, unquestioning obedience; and surely that virtue is utterly inadequate to the demands either of free citizenship or of independent, moral manhood and womanhood. Whether one turn to the history of Sparta or to phases of modern German life, one may find with equal ease evidences of the evil of militarism adopted as the profession of a nation, and of the endeavor it always involves to stamp a single moral type upon all citizens. For certain ends of the state such a process is most effective, but these ends are attained at the expense of the full, free development of human life in each individual. One can understand why Prussia hated Froebel.

What of the present tendencies in American education? President Butler has said that "Spontaneity is the keynote

of education in the United States."[1] Hitherto, this has been largely true. Will it always be so? The tendency is strong today in our public education toward greater centralization and more and more machine-like organization. Is there not danger that we may sink into the death of unprogressive uniformity, losing the moral initiative of the individual teacher, the touch of his life upon the life of the child? If our education is to prepare for American life, if it is to conserve the aim of moral culture, centralization must be balanced by democracy, the advance of system and organization must be no faster than the growth of free moral initiative in the individual units. It is unity, not uniformity, that is desirable. The former means sympathy in spirit through mutual appreciation and a community of ideals; the latter would be hampering identity in the form and body of life. Thus we should not wish to stamp one national or moral type on all our children; but while initiating them into the full inheritance of ethical thought and action from the past, and seeking to waken in them an appreciation of the great ideals for which our country stands, we should strive to preserve and deepen their moral originality and cultivate an independent power of growth.

[1] "Spontaneity is the keynote of education in the United States. Its varied form, its uneven progress, its lack of symmetry, its practical effectiveness, are all due to the fact that it has sprung, unbidden and unforced, from the needs and aspirations of the people. Local preference and individual initiative have been ruling forces. What men have wished for that they have done. They have not waited for state assistance or for state control. As a result, there is, in the European sense, no American system of education."—Nicholas Murray Butler, Introduction to *Education in the United States: A Series of Monographs Prepared for the United States Exhibit at the Paris Exposition, 1900*, p. VII.

To sum up: the aim of moral education should be to develop in each individual a strong and effective moral personality, reverently obedient to the laws of life and controlled by clear-sighted reason, seeing, loving and willing the best on the plane of life that has been reached, strong in moral initiative and able to grow independently ever toward loftier vision and nobler action.

VIII

TYPES OF ACTIVITY

We come now to the heart of our subject, the problem of the means we are to utilize for moral culture. Reconstruction of the current view is as necessary here as we have found it to be in connection with the aim of moral education. Frequently the problem is discussed as if it meant merely teaching ethics to children. It is evident that ethical instruction is a necessary part of our work. To live well we must be able to distinguish intellectually between right and wrong; yet one may have that power and still fail utterly in moral living. Between seeing the right and doing it, lie two other activities, love and will. Character is organic; the virtues must be built into the very structure of our habits and instincts. Moreover, even the ethical judgment depends less upon any form of intellectual instruction than upon practice in life itself. Thus, while ethical instruction is a necessary part of moral education, it is only a part, and far from the most important one.

If we consider our own lives we shall recognize the forces that are most powerful in developing character. It is our own action and the reaction of surrounding conditions and forces upon us, that determine the moral nature of our lives. The work we have done and the pleasures we have enjoyed, the sorrows and struggles through which we have

passed, the streets and houses about us, the government under which we have lived, the natural world, the social atmosphere, the individuals who have been associated with us—it is these forces that have molded us for good or evil. Hence our main work in moral education consists in directing and controlling the activities of children, and in utilizing and regulating the environment that acts upon them.

Moreover, the effect of environment upon any individual is determined by his attitude and action in reference to it; and therefore the activities of children will have the most direct influence upon their moral development. Surely since Froebel, no one is excusable for failing to see that every educational influence is to be interpreted only in terms of the child's 'self-activity.' What children do is more important than what is done to them.

There are three different types of action which can be clearly distinguished from each other, each of which has its own value for moral education. They are:

1. Work compelled by external forces, as the wills of other persons or the necessities of life. In such action the will of the individual responds to the pressure of some objective force.

2. Work self-compelled. This is activity which is not spontaneous, flowing from joy in the action itself, but performed, even though somewhat distasteful, because it leads to some end the individual has freely chosen.

3. Play, or spontaneous, uncompelled action. Here the action in itself is attractive. The forces of life, physical or mental, flow out naturally into joyous expression, with no compulsion, subjective or objective. These three

types of activity form an ascending scale toward freedom; we are to consider the value of each for moral culture.

Just here we come upon an old struggle. The conflict between love and duty goes far back in the history of thought and has come up anew in education. Is an action morally better because it is difficult? Is it nobler to do right because you love to, or because you ought to? Kant is the extreme expression of the type of philosophy which holds action to be good only as it is consciously impelled by an imperative of duty. Kant went so far as to argue that when we do right because we love to, the action has no moral value.[1] The poets, who stand so much closer to the common thought and experience of mankind than the philosophers, have been the best interpreters of the opposite view, which holds that love is better than duty and that the moral value of an action is increased as it becomes spontaneous.

Undoubtedly the *merit* of an action that is difficult is greater than that of one flowing naturally from a love of the best. For instance, a sailor who is more or less a slave to drink, and who finds himself alone in a great city with three months' pay in his pocket, deserves credit if he succeeds in passing the saloons without going in and falling victim to a debauch. On the other hand, a man like Emerson, sane in appetite and self-control, with no temptation to gross self-indulgence, earns no merit by passing a row of saloons without entering any one of them to get intoxicated. Yet as the second type of action is more beautiful is it not morally higher than the first? Habitual

[1] KANT, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Section I, in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, etc., translated by T. K. Abbott. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1889.

resistance to a temptation ends by making us insensible to it. The action that began as morally difficult becomes attractive and easy as it becomes habitual. Kant would reduce us to the paradox that an action which began as morally good ceases to be good merely by repeating it.

Thus we must distinguish carefully between the merit of the man, under all the circumstances, and the moral worth of the action in itself. For the man on the higher plane to deserve as much credit as the other, he must strive just as hard for the excellencies that are still beyond him; if he rests on what has been attained he quickly deteriorates. On the other hand, no good action reaches its full moral worth until it becomes the natural expression of a loving heart.

The same paradox that Kant held in ethics long dominated education. It was assumed that only what was unpleasant for the pupil had an educative value. As in religion a melancholy behavior was supposed to be pleasing to God, so the school was made as forbidding as possible. Rousseau led the strong reaction against this fallacy. His protest was partly put in practice by Pestalozzi and completely carried out by Froebel. It is impossible to state too strongly our debt to the kindergarten for its insistence upon the educational value of free, spontaneous action. In all his work Froebel stands for the emancipating truth that action is worth while, in education and life, in proportion as it is joyous. Yet, even with this lofty teaching behind us, the old discussion goes on. 'Interest' and 'duty' are pitted against each other; and it becomes necessary to see clearly the value of each type of action in moral development.

The most important point with reference to the three

types of action is that in the ascending scale each lower phase tends to pass into the next higher. One who begins to work in response to the spur of necessity or the authority of others, tends more and more to work from inner choice. If the end be worth while, one comes to recognize it and so to affirm the means, thus substituting an inner for an outer compulsion and achieving a considerable measure of freedom. Even more rapidly does work tend to pass into play. Almost any action expressing power becomes attractive as we learn to do it easily and well. Therein lies the well-known possibility for good or evil in habit. The action that at first was difficult becomes increasingly easy and spontaneous. The thing we did because we must, we come to do from delight in it.

This applies not only to all ordinary work, but to every moral action begun in obedience to duty. You have a neighbor whom you dislike and whom you pass every day upon the street. From a sense of duty you force yourself to speak to him as kindly as possible. After some days this ceases to be an effort; you begin to appreciate the other's humanity, to realize how largely the faults you resented in him are the result of accidents of which he has been the victim. Perhaps his sourness is altered a little; and in the end, the action that began as a hard expression of duty becomes a positive joy.

How much more beautiful is the action at the end than in the beginning, though at first it was far more meritorious. People who force themselves to do generous deeds for us from a sense of duty, deserve our reverence but do not give us joy. How impossible it would be to live habitually with any one who never did a kind action except from a sense of duty! The deeds that make us happy are

those that overflow from a loving heart. Thus the spontaneous action is not only more beautiful than the compelled one, but has a higher function of service.[1]

This process of transforming the lower type of action into the higher is constantly going on in the moral life; its end would be the complete transfiguration of duty into love, and work into play. Wordsworth has this in mind when he says:

> "Serene will be our days and bright
> And happy will our nature be
> When love is an unerring light,
> And joy its own security."[2]

Dante, in more detail, describes the end of the process in the last charge Virgil gives him at the top of the mountain of struggle:

"The temporal fire and the eternal,
Son, thou hast seen, and to a place art come
Where of myself no farther I discern.
By intellect and art I here have brought thee;
Take thine own pleasure for thy guide henceforth;
Beyond the steep ways and the narrow art thou.
Behold the sun, that shines upon thy forehead;
Behold the grass, the flowerets, and the shrubs
Which of itself alone this land produces.
Until rejoicing come the beauteous eyes

[1] "By being happy, we sow anonymous benefits upon the world which remain unknown even to ourselves, or when they are disclosed, surprise nobody so much as the benefactor."—Robert Louis Stevenson, An Apology for Idleness, in *Virginibus Puerisque*, p. 122.

[2] *Ode to Duty.*

Which weeping caused me to come unto thee,
Thou canst sit down, and thou canst walk among them.
Expect no more or word or sign from me;
Free and upright and sound is thy free-will,
And error were it not to do its bidding;
Thee o'er thyself I therefore crown and mitre!"[1]

There is no hope, or danger, however, that the end of the process will come to human nature as it is in this world. Our effort may become more harmonious and less painful, but effort will always be necessary to the highest life. Here, every height is but a stepping-stone to a higher. The more we convert hard actions into glad, spontaneous ones, the more free are we to press on in obedience to a still loftier call of duty; and perhaps this process might extend to infinity. Thus in the world we know and the life we live both types of action are always necessary. If education is to prepare adequately for human living it must utilize both in the training of the child. The third and lowest type of action, work in obedience to external compulsion, may entirely disappear in the best human life, and therefore is to be utilized in education only as a means to the other two.

[1] *The Divine Comedy*, translated by Longfellow, Purgatorio, canto XXVII.

IX

MORAL EDUCATION THROUGH PLAY

We have seen that logically work precedes play and leads up to it. For an adult, to play well one must have worked well. With the child, on the other hand, the free, spontaneous action precedes the other type. This contrast is but one expression of a general law. Everywhere in life and education we are beginning to see that the logical order we discover by analyzing a certain subject-matter is often, perhaps usually, opposite to the chronological order in the development of life. Logically we would construct a living organism of the higher group by laying down as a basis the bony skeleton, covering this with flesh and muscle, and finally adding the skin and special organs and senses. In nature, on the contrary, the organism is born alive, the elements that logically follow one another develop simultaneously, and the skeleton, the logical foundation of all the rest, is one of the last to receive its final form.

So in teaching any subject, we would begin logically with the abstract elements and gradually build up the concrete whole from these. In drawing, the first element logically is the straight line, then the curved line, then the combination of these into geometrical forms, thus preparing for the drawing of objects from nature. Really, however, the child begins to use drawing as a language for expres-

sion, he is interested in copying and creating concrete scenes long before he can understand the abstract elements of form that furnish the grammar of art.[1] So with every art, he should acquire the means of expression before he can understand its grammar or theoretic principles. He can sing before he can understand musical notation. He speaks long before he is ready for the grammar of language. We are only beginning to understand the reach and importance of this principle in its application to education. Many of our text-books, even in subjects most transformed by the modern spirit, continue to be constructed in harmony with the logic of the adult mind instead of the order of development in the child.[2]

In its application to moral education this law means that the habit of good conduct should precede ethical reasoning, that the child's activities in harmony with the best should be developed before he can understand ethical principles. Thus the first element of moral education in the earlier period of childhood will be to waken and guide these activities. Moreover, as we have seen, the earlier form of activity is the free, spontaneous type. This is due to the almost perfect adjustment of pleasure to life-sustaining action in the child's instincts. The baby works for his dinner until he is in a profuse perspiration, but instinct renders the effort itself pleasurable. As the child

[1] Compare two studies in the Pedagogical Seminary on children's drawings: by HERMAN T. LUKENS, vol. IV, pp. 79-110; and by FREDERICK BURK, vol. IX, pp. 296-323.

[2] Compare the study on Children's Interests by EARL BARNES, *Studies in Education*, vol. I, pp. 203-212. The results of this study indicate that children are interested in use and movement before color and form. Mr. Barnes concludes that therefore our natural history and other object lessons with young children need to be reconstructed on the basis of the growth of the child's interest.

grows out of his babyhood into the period of manifold imitation of life, his activity still falls largely under the head of play. Self-compelled work becomes possible only with the development of a conscious reflection that can recognize ends; and in the earlier period, while work directed by others has a small but growing value, play is the form of action we must chiefly utilize for education.

For child or man play gives more complete self-expression than work. It is therefore so wonderful a test of character. When we do what we like to do because we like it, we show what we mean and care for. Goethe understood this in portraying the common people in *Faust*. When he desired to show the meaning of their lives he chose, not the six days of their compelled action in obedience to the wills of others, but the one day of glad freedom to do as they pleased. It is then that what they really care for appears.[1]

As play is the most expressive form of action, so it gives a growth, both in power to do and power to appreciate, that does not come in equal measure from work. When we compel ourselves to an action we grow in power to compel ourselves, but in the action itself we are hampered by the friction involved. When the action itself is attractive and our whole interest is absorbed in it, the growth in power is greatest; for we go forward most rapidly in mastering the difficulties of the action when our attention is not forced by the will, but held by the charm of the action itself.[2] Similarly with appreciation: our work initiates

[1] *Faust*, part I, scene II.

[2] "What children acquire in the spontaneous, intense, self-directed use of their faculties is always more valuable than the results of a less eager though more prolonged attention to enforced tasks."—President Eliot, *More Money for the Public Schools*, p. 72.

us into the struggles of other people, our play makes it possible for us to appreciate their love and desire. When a little girl plays 'dolls' or 'keeping house' she is living herself into the deepest springs of human life. So play quickens observation and imparts instruction in the most effective way. The boy who watches the carpenter build a house on the corner, and then on Saturday constructs a hut in the backyard, has learned how a house is made better than we can teach him by any process of intellectual instruction.

Many who have reflected carefully upon their own early development have acknowledged how much more important to their culture was some form of play than the ordinary work of education. This was confessed by several of the writers in the interesting symposium in the *Forum* some years ago on "How I was Educated."[1] Goethe gives a still more striking illustration in his *Autobiography*. The puppet-play he enjoyed with such varied activity and large play of imagination meant more to his real culture and to the work of his mature life than some parts of the formal education he received.[2]

If play is then so powerful an instrument of education it should not be left to chance and whim, but should be utilized consciously in the home and the school, and adapted to the period of the child's development. Froebel was the great pioneer here; and though the over mystical interpretations he gave to the toys he would place in the hands of children were unwarranted, and have certainly led to folly

[1] See the articles by E. E. Hale, T. W. Higginson, F. A. P. Barnard, and others, in the *Forum*, vols. I and II.

[2] Compare Goethe's *Autobiography*, translated by Oxenford, pp. 35-36.

in those of his followers who have no sense of humor, still it is to Froebel we owe the first clear formulation of the law of a succession of 'gifts' and games for the child adapted to the phases of his growth, and utilized consciously in his education. Indeed his was not only the first but the only great attempt except as developed by his followers. Coming as he did before the modern study of child-development, Froebel based his arrangement of 'gifts' more upon the nature and relations of the object than upon the phase of development of the child. Thus in some measure he shared the mistake, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, of following the logical instead of the natural order. The value of the ball is not that it symbolizes the principle of sphericity in nature, but that it is simple in form, easily fits itself to the hand, suggests vigorous action and lends itself to social games. Similarly the little wooden blocks given to children are of value as units for creative construction, not as expressing abstract geometrical principles. Thus in general the 'gifts' of Froebel are helpful, not because they cultivate analysis of form or an understanding of abstract principles and type ideas, but in so far as they lead to observation of the concrete and to interest in constructive action. The child's play is of value not chiefly as a means of instruction, but as calling forth healthy expression of intellect, imagination and emotion, developing the creative power and the ability to appreciate, and cultivating at once independent action and social harmony. With this larger moral aim before us the following principles should guide us in selecting and regulating the toys and games of children:

1. There should be simplicity in the character, and rigid limitation in the number of toys given a child. Many

complicated toys suppress instead of wakening a child's activity.[1] One simple cloth doll a child may dress and undress is worth a show-window of wax puppets finished in imitation of overdressed adults. One box of plain blocks is better than a hundred complicated toys, whose chief use is to stimulate the child's faculty for investigation, as he takes them to pieces, at the expense of cultivating a dangerous destructiveness.

2. The toys and games should furnish a means of activity and stimulate to it, the better if the activity is creative. This principle is vastly more important than questions of color and form in the toys. Indeed those questions are rather incidental, to be settled by good taste without much reference to education. The toy I remember with greatest pleasure from my own early childhood was a quantity of blocks sawed from a piece of smoothed scantling. They were home-made, in size about $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches each way, uncolored, with no distracting pictures upon them, and could not be broken. They were simple units from which one could construct all manner of interesting objects, especially trains and castles, and outlasted, both in interest and educational value, the objects of admiration of many a Christmas morning. Next to that toy I recall with most interest a box of empty spools possessed by a fortunate friend whose mother was a seamstress. While less ready units than the blocks, these spools could be used in many a game and construction.

The value of the collections of stamps, flowers, minerals, which most children have a passion for making at a certain stage of their growth, is, similarly, that such interests

[1] See an excellent chapter on Toys, in *Practical Education*, by MARIA and R. L. EDGEWORTH, vol. I, pp. 9-39.

stimulate an educative type of action. Still more helpful are living pets in furnishing opportunity and stimulus for much activity on the part of the child. No inanimate toy can be equally effective. Moreover, in caring for his animal friends and charges, building huts for them, feeding and protecting them from storms, the child's action is not only creative, but expressive of the most generous and affectionate emotions. Thus few instruments can be more valuable for moral culture than this.

3. In all the child's play there should be room for the imagination and a stimulus to its activity. Any one who has watched a child make a train of cars out of a row of chairs placed together or a few square blocks on the floor, and has contrasted the lastingness and intensity of the child's joy with the brief interest he has in a complicated, mechanical imitation engine and cars, will realize how largely both the pleasure and the educational value of play are due to the imagination. From this point of view simplicity in the character and limitation in the number of toys become doubly desirable. In every aspect of human life today we can see the deadening effect of over-equipment. We are always in danger of slipping into slavery to the things that should serve us. We need good tools, but we must keep the upper-hand and use our tools, otherwise they become a burden. It is difficult to study hard in a college over luxurious in its appointments. I have seen school-rooms so decorated with a multitude of things that pupils and teacher alike seemed unable to live up to their clothes. Life, like art, demands a certain hard restraint if it is to be independent and forceful. Thus especially in childhood we must beware of suppressing mind and imagination by a multitude of things. The

blasé child sitting in the midst of a nursery crowded with uncared-for toys is father of the man who has 'gained the whole world' or a good part of it, and lost the kingdom of his own soul; and the child is more to be pitied than the man because he is not to blame for his condition.

Thus a child gains far more in joy and culture from his play when a large element must be filled out by his imagination. This explains why the little girl will cherish a rag-doll that does not look at all like a real baby with so much more affection than an imitation of a human baby, uncanny in its lifelikeness. On the other hand, wonder is closely akin to active imagination, and the stimulus that comes with surprise in the presence of some unexplained mechanism may waken activity. Thus occasionally it may be helpful to surprise the child with some little invention of the age, that is not good as the daily bread of his play life.

4. It is well that a child should learn to play alone, without the stimulus of association with other persons. This makes for resourcefulness in human life and involves an independent activity of the imagination that is helpful. Except for those children who tend to withdraw overmuch into a dream world of their own, parents should seek to cultivate in the child this ability to depend upon himself in some part of his play.

5. On the other hand, a wholly new element of moral education enters, when play involves association and combination with others. Here, again, it is to the kindergarten we turn for the most noteworthy application of the principle. The games of the kindergarten involving social union and action cheerfully in harmony with others, are among its most valuable contributions to education. The

same principle is the basis in those vigorous athletic games, played by organized teams, and especially available for boys. If only the number of players and spectators could be reversed! Such games demand at once strong personal initiative on the part of each member with rigorous subordination of his action to the purpose of the whole; thus cultivating just that combination of independence and obedience necessary in moral living. These games, however, which have often been pushed quite beyond sane relation to the aims of education in school and college 'athletics,' if the most spectacular, are by no means the best illustration of the principle we are considering. Many quiet games played with toys, even in the nursery age, can be so guided as to teach the child harmonious combination with others; and all outdoor play can be so arranged. We thus gain, not only the added education in socially harmonious action, but the great stimulus to the child's activity that results from companionship. This element of social combination can be utilized increasingly as the child grows, since the natural process of moral development is toward action where means are consciously adjusted to ends and where the individual's sympathy extends over a widening area of life.

6. It is impossible to emphasize too strongly the value of some measure of companionship in the child's play on the part of the parent and others guiding the child. Not only do we thus learn to know more intimately the tastes and tendencies of our children and gain opportunities for the exercise of the most helpful personal influence, but our companionship is itself one of the most important factors in making the play morally educative to the child. His self-expression is helped and guided and his activity is

brought into harmony with the whole of life. Parents should take a hint from the fact that the most effective workers in boys' and girls' clubs have always been those who could 'play the game' most enthusiastically.

7. On the other hand, we must beware of over regulating the play of our children, or its spontaneity will be lost and it will degenerate into a dull routine. The child must keep his initiative and the adult should be comrade, not master.[1]

By consciously selecting and guiding the child's play in harmony with the principles above outlined, we can utilize it as a powerful force for moral education. Perhaps the most important moral result, however, is the learning of the art of joy. With all our failure in the art of work through overhaste and misdirected energies, we understand that form of action so much better than we do the art of joy. One of the most significant evidences of failure in our civilization is found in the way we strive to enjoy ourselves. The soldier or sailor, home from some months' endurance of hard work and privation, who wanders into the underground dives where poisonous drink is sold and sad caricatures of what once were women are ready to pander to every degraded sensibility, is seeking to be happy. The rich man who strives to distract himself

[1] "From those who grow up under the oppression of constant observation, no versatility, no inventive power, no spirit of daring, no confident demeanor can be expected. We can only expect human beings of simple, unvaried temperament, to whom the flat monotonous round of prescribed business is pleasant and right, who would shrink from all that is elevated and peculiar, and give themselves up to all that is commonplace and comfortable. Those who so far agree with me in this must be careful not to think for a moment that they can claim to form great characters, because they leave their children to run wild without supervision and without culture. Education is a vast whole of ceaseless labor, which exacts true proportion from beginning to end; merely to avoid a few errors is of no avail."—HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 98.

by wandering aimlessly over the earth, by incessantly gambling, or by buying thousands of acres other people need and turning them into a wilderness through which he may follow dogs, is trying to be happy. Even the cultivated human being, who should know better if his education has been sound, makes such sad work of it when he attempts the art of joy. The very name we give our play shows our failure; for we speak of 'distraction' and 'diversion' as if we wanted to be diverted, pulled off, from the serious business of life, failing to see that true play is recreation, the recreating of our powers, bodily and mental, through their spontaneous and joyous expression.

Perhaps we are so slow in learning the art of joy because joy itself has so long and so widely been regarded as evil. We are only beginning to understand what Spinoza argued so clearly:[1] that joy as joy is life, and pain as pain is death. It is true life may spring from death, and the 'ministry of suffering' may teach what could be learned in no other way. Yet true joy means greater vitality and power, and it should be the inheritance of every human being.

Thus we should give opportunities of joyous play to our

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[1] SPINOZA returns to this argument again and again in distinct reaction against the views of the religions that prevailed in his environment. Compare his *Ethic* (translated by W. Hale White, second edition, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1894) part III, propositions XI and LIX; also part IV, proposition XLV, p. 217: "Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. For why is it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? My reasons and my conclusions are these:—No God and no human being, except an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or my trouble, or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, and other things of this kind, which are signs of mental impotence; on the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we necessarily partake of the divine nature."

children if we are to educate them for the art of joy in human life; and "our children" should mean all children. As it is the duty of every parent and teacher to utilize the play of his children so that it may contribute to their whole culture, so it is the duty of society as a whole (that is, of every man and woman) to give every child opportunity for such culture and guide his use of it. Only as this is done for all children can we hope to make play contribute the great aid it may furnish for moral education.[1]

[1] "Man eats and works; so does the ox. But man is created also to enjoy, and his capacities for enjoyment put him into communication with fields of being of which the mere animal cannot faintly dream. Some of those whose thought and care were given to the poor felt that their work was hardly begun until they could waken into activity those distinctly human faculties of social intercourse, of intellectual pleasure and artistic delight, which for themselves made the world so fair and life so well worth living. It would seem as though this were a proper function of the State-supported school system; but it will probably take several generations yet to convince taxpayers that it is not a waste of money to teach the rising generation how to be simply and rationally happy."—JAMES O. S. HUNTINGTON, in *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, by JANE ADDAMS, *et al.*, pp. 108-109,

X

MORAL EDUCATION THROUGH WORK

We have seen that work as well as play is present in all human living, that the motive of love must be completed by duty; therefore if moral education is to prepare for life it must train both the desire for earnest work and the habit of its performance. Moreover, not only as a preparation for adult life, but in its direct moral results, work is a precious instrument of education. It can be made to contribute in four ways:

1. The power to work is the mastery of the means indispensable in the pursuit of any end of human life. Spontaneous action is an end in itself as work is not, but we do not go far on the path toward any aim that is worth while without the power of hard, sustained effort. Genius has been defined as the capacity for hard work; genius is much more than that, but no talent or gift will carry a man far without the ability to work earnestly and continuously even when the work is distasteful.

2. While play is the form of action most rapidly developing power, it is through work that we round out character and bring elements in which we are deficient into harmony with the whole, thus making our lives more effective instruments than they could be otherwise.

3. Work is the means by which we establish good habits we would not otherwise form. In so far as our desires are

right and our play-instincts sound, we can leave the habits formed by spontaneous action to take care of themselves; but it is only by hard and repeated effort that we can build brain paths to actions and ends we know to be right but to which we are not naturally drawn in desire.[1] Yet it is just these habits formed by hard, conscious effort that are the one trustworthy safeguard against the forms of failure to which we are individually peculiarly liable.

4. It is work that gives us self-mastery in every phase of the moral life. Play is expressive, harmonious, beautiful, but hard effort is the one path to a self-control, positive not negative, that makes it possible for us to trust ourselves and utilize all our forces for the ends we consider worth while.

Obviously these four values come primarily through work that is from inner compulsion, depending upon the will of the individual and not upon external forces. With the work that is compelled from without the chief direct gain is in the formation of habits and the growth that may be utilized later by self-direction. Still, when the work is for good aims and rightly adjusted to the personality, we have seen that the lower form tends to pass into the higher, the outer compulsion to be replaced by an affirmation of the individual's own will. Thus rightly utilized, the work from external compulsion, such as we may exact of children, contributes only less directly than the self-compelled action to the same four moral ends we have studied. Thus work must be utilized as a precious and constant

[1] "As the Strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, so also does that of the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of all Virtue and Worth is plac'd in this: That a Man is able to *deny himself* his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho' the Appetite lean the other Way."—LOCKE, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, edited by Quick, p. 21.

element of moral education. The power to work is gained only by working. Everything possible should be done to lead the individual to put the pressure on from his own will increasingly; but in one or the other form he must work, otherwise character deteriorates or atrophies.[1]

It is a pity we obey this principle so little in our present education. In certain communities where the modern reaction has been carried furthest the schools seem to lack moral fibre. The children have never done anything that was difficult for them; and so, while bright and quickly responsive, they lack stability, continuous self-direction and the power to overcome obstacles. One finds this error in an occasional abuse of the kindergarten where there is too much 'managing' of children, and frequently in homes where moral 'coddling' prevails.[2] Elaborate devices are developed to trick children into doing good.[3]

[1] "Self-chosen occupations, everything else being equal, are certainly the best, but children seldom know how to occupy themselves sufficiently and with perseverance. Definite tasks—to do this or that, till it is finished—secure order better than any desultory play, which is liable to end in ennui."—HERBART, *Letters and Lectures on Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 121.

[2] "Is not the exclusively sympathetic and facetious way in which most children are brought up today—so different from the education of a hundred years ago, especially in evangelical circles—in danger, in spite of its many advantages, of developing a certain trashiness of fibre? Are there not hereabouts some points of application for a renovated and revised ascetic discipline?"—WILLIAM JAMES, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 365. Compare also HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 248:

"Coddling in moral matters, just as in all others, is the worst means of protecting individuals against the harmfulness of climate. Warding off outward cold does not mean increasing warmth; but, on the contrary, moral warmth arises for the most part out of true work and conflict, in which already existent power is gradually firmly established through the stings of external ill."

[3] As an example of what not to do in this connection compare AURETTA R. ALDRICH, *Children: Their Models and Critics*, pp. 67-78.

Instead of demanding what is right of the child because it is right, his attention is skillfully diverted, schemes are arranged to interest him in something else, and finally he is brought around to doing the action without knowing it. This may smooth the path for the teacher or parent, but it is of small moral value to the child. There are times, I grant, when the attention of a stubborn child needs to be distracted and a conflict should be avoided at all hazards; but the child who is habitually kept in line by adventitious managing will show a lack of stable self-control.

John Stuart Mill pointed out that we are in danger of raising up a race of men "incapable of doing anything which is disagreeable to them."[1] A very little experience or even reflection will show the necessity of doing many things which are disagreeable to us, if we are to live happily and helpfully. Thus there is a moral value in holding children to the steady performance, cheerful if possible, of tasks they do not like to do, where it is right that they should do them. The fact that the work is distasteful to the child is no evidence at all that it should not be exacted, though rather sentimental modern educators have so misinterpreted the fact. It is true, we want to associate pleasure with good action in every helpful way, but this should be accomplished, not by allowing the child free following of whim (which would lead to bad as well as good action)

[1] "It is, no doubt, a very laudable effort, in modern teaching, to render as much as possible of what the young are required to learn, easy and interesting to them. But when this principle is pushed to the length of not requiring them to learn anything *but* what has been made easy and interesting, one of the chief objects of education is sacrificed. I rejoice in the decline of the old brutal and tyrannical system of teaching, which, however, did succeed in enforcing habits of application; but the new, as it seems to me, is training up a race of men who will be incapable of doing anything which is disagreeable to them."—*Autobiography*, pp. 52-53.

nor by seeking to manage his whims, but by wakening love of the good end and associating our sympathy and approval with the effort that leads to it.[1] Thus in assigning work to children our questions should be: Is the work adapted to the child's period of development and proportioned to his whole activity? Is it an element that will contribute helpfully to his moral growth? If we can answer these questions affirmatively the child should be held to the task, whether or not his whim is attracted by it.

Thus children should contribute helpfully to the life of the household. They may or may not like washing dishes, making beds, bringing up coal and wood, or mending stockings; but this work needs to be done and should not have the stigma attached to it of being relegated, wherever possible, entirely to subordinates whom the child may come mistakenly to regard as inferiors. The best way to make him reverence simple hand-work is to have him do it, and do it helpfully in relation to the needs of those nearest him. His little part of the work of the home it is morally advisable the child should contribute, because it is right to do so; while the more he comes to work from his own will, and finally to love the work and convert it into play, the better. Moral education, like all other, must come most of all through practice. The child will grow into the best moral attitude toward those about him only by practising helpfulness toward them; and there is no way by which he can grow into the desired attitude unless opportunities for helpfulness be given him and he be required to fulfill them.

[1] Note how a mother learns to love tasks a girl finds it most distasteful to do for her younger sister or brother. The task itself is just as disagreeable in the one case as in the other, but the difference in attitude toward the person for whom it is done gives it an entirely different meaning.

Professor Adler has sought to apply this principle systematically to the children in the Ethical Culture Schools. He says in a paper on The Moral Instruction of the Young (*Ethical Record*, July 1889):

"Another point * * * is that our classes are organized for purposes of practical charity. The pupils collect among themselves each month a certain sum, and this is used partly to assist in defraying the expenses of an evening school for poor children,—partly to purchase comforts and delicacies for the sick poor. In the teaching of morals, if anywhere, practice should not be divorced from theory."

This is a step in the right direction, seeking to make children practise helpfulness toward the larger human world. To make the scheme most helpful, however, the children should earn the money and thus contribute from what is their own. Even then there would be some danger of cultivating that false spirit of patronage, on the part of those who have toward those who have not, which spoils so much philanthropy. Of all forms of practising helpfulness, the giving of money is often the easiest and usually the least desirable. Thus the great need is that children should contribute what is truly their own—their time and effort in simple work—to the welfare of those about them.

The moral value of such work is multiplied if the parent is associated with the child in the performance of it. This of course means a considerable expenditure of time for the parent, but the moral gain to the child far more than compensates. Thus no mother is morally excusable for doing all the housework herself, on the ground that it is easier than to teach her children to coöperate. It is not only that by such association with the child opportunities for

helpful direction and counsel come to the parent, but the right attitude toward the work itself is then developed, and the lower form of action is more quickly transformed into the higher. Moreover, the general good of companionship with children, making possible our deeper understanding of them and giving opportunity for that highest education that results from contagion of spirit, is realized wonderfully when the companionship is in helpful forms of work.

The formation of the habit of work will proceed more rapidly if the work required of children is definitely assigned and comes at regular times. The children should have stated tasks which they are expected to do without constant prompting. However, the principle of regularity may easily be carried too far. The power we want to cultivate is not the ability to perform a single monotonous task, but the power to turn from one kind of action to another without wasteful friction. Thus it is a great moral advantage if the work demanded of children is varied and not over specialized. The very special task comes to be performed more and more mechanically, while the more varied action gives large human development.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the most desirable form of work for children comes with simple farm life. Here is the ideal combination of variety and regularity in work that can be done under the best physical conditions. City parents, on the contrary, are confronted with two opposite evils. The well-to-do, under our present social standards, have much difficulty in finding suitable tasks for their children. If the work is adventitiously made the child resents it, and much of the moral value is lost. The situation is complicated by the fact that parents who have had to struggle in early life are apt to wish to protect their

children from 'having such a hard time' as they recall. Thus they deny their children the very element that gave them power, self-control and efficiency.

As the problem is difficult for prosperous city-dwelling parents, there is the more need that they should give earnest thought and effort to its solution. It may be well to discharge a servant that the children may have some really helpful work to do. When all possible is done, the problem almost defies solution; but then, well-to-do people are rarely compelled to live in the city. They may at least go where it is possible to keep a horse the boy may take care of, or have a bit of ground in which the children may make and care for a garden. Where it is impossible to give the children varied and helpful tasks throughout the year, there is considerable compensation when this is done at least for the vacation, through the summer farm or camp.

For the city poor there is the opposite difficulty with far less chance of escape from it. The need is not to find work for their children, but to protect them from the over-pressure that stunts and kills. And alas! it is just the most specialized forms of work for which children can be used: ceaseless care of a baby, until the child is worn with a premature, enforced motherhood; or far worse, the daily endurance in factory, or what is called home, of some fragmentary mechanical action to which the child's supple body and mind can be readily habituated at the price of his larger potentiality of growth. The exploitation of its children is not only the crowning shame of a nation, it is its most wasteful crime. No other slavery is so costly as economic child-slavery; for in it we pay the life-blood of the nation for the transient commercial interest of some

individuals, and invite the premature decrepitude that makes a people an easy victim to military foes without and moral foes within.

Good legislation and wise enforcement of it are extremely difficult in connection with this problem. Starved parents and wicked employers unite to defeat the law and exploit the child; and those who try hastily to solve the problem, while ignoring certain factors, pass measures that serve only to exasperate. Yet here again, the greater the need, the more pressing the duty; and what I want to emphasize is the fact that *every one of us* is responsible for every child that is stunted. The parent fighting a losing economic battle, the employer struggling to meet a merciless competition under existing industrial conditions: these are but parties to a crime that stains the whole of society. We must ask what, on the whole, will give the highest moral development to the children, and we must follow unswervingly the dictates of that principle in legislation and its enforcement. Let me return to our initial point of view: everything is bad which does not make the child's life as joyous as possible now and as natural a step as it may be to the life that follows.

The school can do much to aid both classes of children; for the aim of the school should always be human and never merely economic; therefore in school the child's activity can be regulated entirely with reference to his best development. The private boarding-school, fulfilling a larger measure of the parental function, can go beyond the public school in guiding the child's activity; but in both, the moral education that comes through work may be furthered in four ways:

1. The school can utilize forms of physical action that

are educative in the highest degree. Manual training has already proved itself a priceless instrument of moral culture. Its great value is not that it may prepare for certain tasks in adult life, but that through creative self-expression the child comes into contact with the universe of law and his simple deed becomes a doorway to the whole. This moral value is far more important than the manual expertness such work fosters, though that too has a moral implication. Nothing else clarifies the spirit so effectively as to do something skillfully; and the simpler the deed the greater is the clarifying effect. One great value of such work as Sloyd[1] is its demand for accuracy of execution while producing objects which appeal to the child as worth while. Such work tends to correct the frequent slovenliness in the child's performance of household tasks. It is a promising sign, too, that simple industrial work is being introduced into the schools; not that the economic value of the results should be considered, but that the moral value of the work is enhanced when it produces what the child recognizes to be useful. If instead of an imitation bookcase or bureau the child can make a really useful ruler or box, and instead of a complicated but purposeless arrangement of straws and fibres he can weave a little basket which will be of service in the household, his consciousness of the worth of what he makes multiplies the moral value of his constructive activity.

School gardens furnish another means of giving children an opportunity for simple, varied, creative work. Re-

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[1] Compare the pamphlet on *American Sloyd*, by GUSTAF LARSSON, Boston, 1900 (?).

garded as a substitute for farm life they are pitifully inadequate, still they can furnish an element of education in work possible to nothing else in school life.

2. The work in direct physical lines is so attractive to children that it passes readily into play, which is one of its greatest advantages. In another way the school can utilize for moral culture those subjects of study in which it is less easy to make action spontaneous, and which always demand some measure of compelled effort, as mathematics and the languages. These subjects are tools rather than ends, to be mastered for aims that are ulterior to the study itself. It is well to make them as interesting as possible, but when this has been done, hard effort is usually necessary in order to master them. In mathematics particularly there must be a definite effort in order to develop the power of abstract thinking which the study demands. Mathematics is the grammar of science, a purely abstract language for stating and examining the facts and laws of science. To make it entirely concrete is to make it something else than mathematics. When a child sees that two apples put with two other apples make four apples, it is an interesting observation; but it becomes mathematics only when he reasons abstractly that two and two make four. We have always taught arithmetic too early, and in the modern effort to correct the bad results of this, instead of pushing the subject further on in the course to the period where abstract reasoning rapidly develops in the child, we have tried by innumerable devices to make the study easy and concrete, thus creating an anomalous subject which has in some instances lost its educational value. Thus where we decide it is wise to teach mathematics,

we should insist upon the hard effort necessary to abstract thinking, and so gain not only good results in the particular study, but an increased power of concentration and self-control.

3. The school can utilize, for the moral ends of work, those subjects the student does not like. Doubtless everyone would agree today that it is a waste of life to compel a pupil to study mainly what is distasteful to him; but for almost all students there is the need to master some subject, not in itself attractive, in order to round out one's power. One should then work to master the subject because it is right to do so, because the additional element is necessary to one's equipment for life. With modern experiments in election of studies how often this principle is disobeyed. One sees a political economist hampered all his life because he 'did not like languages,' so neglected two or three of his most important tools; or a minister who 'did not like natural science,' hence missed the most valuable balance-wheel in his thinking. Thus by beginning early and guiding with wisdom, the school can help to round out character and develop the power of work by holding the student steadily to the faithful mastery of subjects not in themselves attractive to him, but necessary to his best equipment for life.

4. There is the same moral value, perhaps in greater measure, in doing the hard work necessary in every subject of study. As in every avenue of life there is some dead work, unattractive in itself, that must be done for the sake of the end in view, so is it with every study the pupil undertakes. To hold the individual to the loyal doing of this dead work because it is right and necessary, however unattractive it may be, is to give him one

of the most precious elements of his equipment for moral living.[1]

I need hardly point out how much wisdom is demanded of both parent and teacher in order to give just the right amount and kind of work most helpful to the individual child in the specific period of development he has reached. Here, as everywhere in morals, there is just one combination that is best, and we can err from it in any direction. It is so easy to overburden the child, to press him to a point of weariness that is exhausting, or to require of him work unsuited to his phase of growth.[2] We made the latter mistake in the kindergarten, before modern physiology and psychology had taught their lessons, in assigning to little children forms of paper-cutting and sewing demanding too fine a nervous adjustment. Meantime the problem faces us at each step of the child's life, and the worst solution is to let go and allow the child to drift. We must attempt the problem with all the devotion, patience and wisdom we can summon.

A further warning must be given to both parents and teachers: work should never be assigned arbitrarily as

[1] "Whoever is able to maintain the order and discipline necessary to merely intellectual or knowledge teaching, will leave upon the minds of his pupils genuine moral impressions, without even proposing that as an end. If the teacher has the consummation of tact that makes the pupils to any degree in love with the work, so as to make them submit with cheerful and willing minds to all the needful restraints, and to render them on the whole well-disposed to himself and to each other, he is a moral instructor of a high order, whether he means it or not."—BAIN, *Education as a Science*, pp. 401-402.

[2] "But above all, external activity must never be so much overstimulated that mental respiration—alternation of acts of concentration and reflection—is disturbed thereby. There are natures with whom, from their earliest years, the teacher's principle must be to keep within due limits all external incitements to their activity." – HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 241.

punishment. Of course, the child should be required as far as possible to repair damages he has done: that is one of the most helpful elements of discipline. But to assign a specific piece of work as punishment for a moral offense with which it is not connected, is to render the work distasteful, prevent its transformation into free, spontaneous action, and so do positive harm instead of attaining the moral ends work should further.

Parents and teachers alike should be alert to discover through all the work that is done the bent of the child and the special combination of abilities he possesses. For work in line with the future vocation and conforming to the tendencies of the individual has a high value, since it most powerfully awakens the interest that will transform each of the lower types of action into the next higher. Such work alone is not enough, but it should be the centre of our demand. It is absurd to require the individual to work in the main at what he is least fitted to do. We should focus his activity along the line of his greatest power.

Thus, while education in work is a precious part of our moral equipment, it is the sheerest folly to multiply unnecessary obstacles, as was so often done in the older education. We may make life as easy as possible, it is still painfully difficult, *if it be life.* So with education: appeal to the child's interest in every possible way that is not harmfully adventitious, make every subject as easy and simple as possible, and there will be plenty of dead work for all educative purposes if we really teach the subjects in hand. Similarly, it is not necessary to ask the child to 'make bricks without straw,' to wipe the dishes without a cloth, or put them on a shelf he cannot reach, to secure the moral

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value of household work. So we do not need to put the child in the way of temptation in order to strengthen his character. Remove all unnecessary temptation, make the path of right living as smooth and attractive as possible, and if the child really live, there will be temptation enough and to spare for all purposes of moral culture.

The moral education work gives should come, then, not through unnecessary obstacles and adventitious tasks, but by mastering the difficulties that are inevitable in the path of right living. We need have no fear that the process of transforming work into play may go too far. There is no danger that the kingdom of heaven will come too soon. The free, spontaneous action, as a rule, expresses a more earnest effort than the one partly forced. Thus, while holding children to the faithful performance of the work necessary for the ends that are worth while, we should rejoice at every step in the transforming of painful effort into free and joyous action, since that is the law of moral growth.

XI

THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENT: ART AND NATURE

Next in value to the activities of the child as a means of moral education is the reaction of the surrounding world upon him. This needs to be considered in every phase, since we can determine it so much more than is possible with the child's action. Of more importance than is usually realized are the relatively statical conditions of environment. If less powerful in the single impression than more active influences, by their steady and insistent presence they weave themselves into the very spirit of the child.

Thus the problem of school buildings, furnishings and grounds is one, not merely of economic significance, but of moral importance. It is hard to exaggerate the moral value of light, air and cleanliness in the child's immediate environment. Self-respect and aspiration go along with breathing good air; and clean, light rooms make for moral uprightness. This influence comes first through the immediate effect on the physical health and growth of the children. Physical soundness is not an indispensable condition of moral character, and it may coexist with moral depravity, but it is the surest foundation on which to build a positively good character. It is true, the effort to rise above some form of bodily suffering

will, in essentially noble natures, often develop a moral heroism that exalts and sanctifies character; nevertheless, physical health is a predisposing cause of moral soundness, and a depressed, poorly developed organism, especially if this be due to general conditions rather than a specific disease, is apt to lead to distortion of moral character.

Beyond the immediate physical effect, surrounding conditions may influence the moral life through the chastening, exalting and harmonizing effect of beauty. It is a grave mistake to regard beauty as a dispensable luxury or adornment of life, ministering only to pleasure. Beauty is *useful* in the highest sense. Without going so far as those who regard moral goodness as only part of the larger harmony we call beauty, we may recognize that beauty can be utilized as a powerful instrument in giving harmony, peace and elevation to the spirit. It is true, ugly forms of degeneration appear where beauty is sought merely as a means of self-indulgence, but that is true of every good in life. Children are seldom in danger of the attitude of the æsthetic voluptuary; and quietly and simply beautiful grounds, buildings and school-rooms will exercise an unobtrusive but cumulative influence over the child, not only fitting him for the conscious appreciation of art later on, but ennobling and refining his inner life.

To exercise this effect in fullest measure the beauty should be adapted to the child's phase of development; to his need however, not to the whim of his desire. I am not of those who believe that we should study to find just what the child likes and then furnish that. To do so would be to follow exactly the policy of the worst kind of newspaper, which boasts of giving just what the people want; and surely its 'children's page' is not an ideal instrument of

moral culture. All good teaching must adapt itself to those who are to be taught, but it need not give what they think they want, and it should always give that which is somewhat above the learner's present point of development that it may lead him on.

Moreover, on any plane of development it is possible to respond to the highest art. It has been hastily and unwarrantably inferred from the theory of evolution that the child and the race begin, both in expression and appreciation, with the clumsy and the imperfect, and grow gradually toward perfect art. This is simply not true. Of course on any plane there must be mastery of the technique of expression natural to that plane, but with such mastery, the art may be as perfect for one phase of development as for another. The baby waves a good-by with a grace and beauty of arm and hand movement the best trained actress cannot equal. A simple folk-song is as perfect art as a Wagner opera. The Hymn to the Dawn in the early Vedic poems is as artistic as Milton's *Lycidas*. An early Greek myth may rival Goethe's *Faust* in the harmony and beauty of its artistic expression and interpretation of life. Thus life on any plane may have perfect artistic expression, and the response to that expression on the same plane is always natural and possible. Therefore the adaptation of art to the phase of development does not mean beginning with slovenly imperfection and working toward artistic harmony; it means that art, while perfect, must be, in both content and form, close to the life on the particular plane of growth.

I dwell on this principle because it is so often violated today. The art we give children should deal with subjects they can appreciate and be expressed in terms they can

understand, but it need not and should not be merely what the child thinks he likes. He may express a decided preference for some vulgar, ephemeral song over a simple, child folk-song from the German, but that is no reason why we should feed him the former. Most children prefer candy to oatmeal mush, and cake to whole-wheat bread, yet the parent who allows the child's caprice to be the guide in this matter injures everybody but the doctor.

Cannot we take a hint from Nature? She does not make one kind of sunshine for children and another for adults, though I grant you it may be a different sunshine in the child's reaction; nor does she make flowers on different principles for varying ages of human development. She pours out the living flood of beauty, infinite in form but one in principle, and we grow in changing appreciation of it. Thus there is not one kind of beauty for children and another for grown people. The kind of beauty we want about children is *beauty;* not a fashionable adornment in obedience to the changing whim of taste, but simple, natural, harmonious beauty.[1] In the school grounds we need trees well-grouped, grass and flowers. The rooms should be spacious, well-lighted, quietly colored, and adorned with a few simple works of art. The subjects of these may well be close to the child's world, and the form and color should be simple rather than complex, but every picture should be a true work of art. Further,

[1] "Reason and observation, as well as my own experience, assure me also that it is *great* poetry—even the greatest—which the youngest crave, and upon which they may be fed, because it is the simplest. Nature does not write down her sunsets, her starry skies, her mountains, and her oceans in some smaller style, to suit the comprehension of little children; they do not need any such dilution."—Lucy Larcom, *A New England Girlhood Outlined from Memory*, p. 135. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1889 (?).

frequent opportunities should be given the children both to hear and sing simple, beautiful music. As no other art so completely expresses and directly appeals to the emotional life as music, it has a special function in giving harmony and serenity to the spirit.[1]

The moral effect of this environment of beauty comes largely through its inevitable impression upon the child, without his conscious effort. The normal reaction of children on beauty is different from that of the cultivated adult. Indeed, in our conscious appreciation is a kind of withdrawal from the world we appreciate. Perhaps this accounts for the element of sadness in our response to the beautiful in nature or art. The child's reaction is generic, an unconscious response of his whole being. If the sun shines he plays as buoyantly as the birds sing, without stopping to say to himself that the sunshine is beautiful. So the presence of an harmonious artistic environment may exalt the child's spirit, without reflection or an analysis of his sensations on the child's part. To force the beauty upon him and compel him to study it reflectively, before he is able to appreciate it consciously, may be to do great harm: disgusting the child now, and emasculating for future use an influence that ought to be powerful when the time for the conscious response to it arrives.

It is not, let me repeat, that the beauty can be too high or the art too perfect. Even art whose subjects are far beyond the child's comprehension may exercise a good influence. The Sistine Madonna that looks down from

[1] I do not make the obvious application to literature here, as I have reserved that art for discussion in the chapters on indirect ethical instruction. It should be noted, however, that the principle does apply unreservedly, and that the literature that is given to children on any plane, should be, on that plane, the highest art.

the wall of his school-room may prepare the child, all unconsciously to him, to respond later to a loftier ideal of motherhood, and uncomprehended music may deepen the rhythm of his soul. But to force the child into an attitude normal to the adult defeats what should be our aim now and later.

Much of our current teaching violates this principle. We have been so anxious to enrich the child's spirit and enlarge his opportunities that we have made the same mistake in teaching beauty in art and nature, we made earlier in teaching science, namely, arranging the material by the logic of the mature mind, and teaching it in harmony with the adult attitude. It is difficult for us to realize how little even cultivated children get consciously from works of art that are full of meaning and beauty for us. Not long ago I took two children, who had always lived in good surroundings, leisurely through the Pitti Palace in Florence, not forcing in any way their interest or attention, but trying to answer such questions as they asked in the presence of the marvelous paintings the gallery holds. Three months later the children were overheard conversing about their visit to the Pitti Palace. The girl, eleven, said: "Do you remember the picture of that woman who was killing herself with a snake?" (a rather commonplace and theatrical Cleopatra by Guido Reni). "Yes," answered the boy of eight, "and do you remember that lovely bath-tub?" That was all! The host of wonderful pictures remained unmentioned. And yet I do not mean that the experience was of no value. Rather I believe the unconscious influence was far beyond what the child could recognize or state. The touch upon his soul was lasting; and art may always have a little nearer meaning because he wandered

through the galleries of Florence. But that good effect could come only if the child's attitude was not forced and made over into an anomalous imitation of the adult's. Thus we need to make the child's environment as beautiful as possible, but to let this act as a quiet background whose influence must be largely unconscious.

So far I have spoken only of the school. Obviously the principle applies quite as significantly to the home, though there it is less easy to carry out universally, owing to the economic conditions under which so large a part of our people must live. It is our fault if we do not apply it to the schools, and more completely in proportion to the local difficulty of carrying it out in the homes. The poorer the quarter of the city, the more crowded and sordid the conditions of its home life, the greater is the need for spacious, beautiful school grounds and buildings, with artistic rooms. It is a sardonic evidence of the breakdown of our democracy that we reverse this principle, putting the most beautiful school environment just where the children need it least, because its main physical and moral effects are accomplished in their homes.

However, there are difficulties in the homes of the rich as well as in those of the poor. The unavoidable ugliness of poverty is perhaps less morally harmful than the gorgeous ugliness of extravagant and tasteless expenditure of wealth. If dirt is 'matter out of place,' certainly there is more of it in some rich homes than in many poor ones. The effect of over rich and tasteless surroundings is not only to benumb the spirit but to give false ideals and make the child blasé before he has had time to live. The 'goddess of limits' presides as rigidly over our enjoyments as over our arts. It is impossible to eat more than five or

six good meals a day and really enjoy them; and to heap up even pleasing objects in our environment beyond rigid limits is to produce moral nausea. Perhaps the greatest folly of vast wealth is that one can do so little helpfully with it for oneself or for others.

Thus it is as necessary to bring simplicity, limitation and harmony into the homes of the rich, as to bring light, air, space, beauty to the homes of the poor. The problem of the poor is the more pitiable, however, because they can do much less to help themselves, since they are so cruelly handicapped by our present economic and social conditions. Still, even with the very poor, how much can be done by a little initiative and awakening of courage and desire. This has been shown by the work of every social settlement in transforming the homes in the district in which it has been set down. It is evident that for parents to improve the home conditions about their children, there is needed not only some measure of economic freedom and resource, but conscious desire and effort, and that of the two elements in the solution of the problem the second is even more important than the first.

There is the same need then in home and school; where one fails we must seek to compensate through the other. It is a problem of moral education, incumbent on the whole people and intimately touching the national welfare, that everything possible should be done to make the surroundings of children in home, school and community as simple, clean and artistically beautiful as possible.

The moral influence of beauty may come to children even more through the nature world than through art. Obviously, the two cannot be completely separated, for human art reaches some of its most educative expression

by coöperating with nature, as in the artistic planning of grounds, gardens and shrubbery. In a large way, however, we may distinguish between the living nature world and the creations of human genius. Speaking metaphorically, we may say that nature is God's art, while art is man's highest nature. Therefore, while art goes further in the expression of human life, it does not attain the perfect serenity, simplicity and harmony of nature. That is why Nature is so calming to us that we turn to her more and more from the stress of our modern life. Children are even closer than we to the great Nature-mother, and if they can have constant opportunity for contact with her beauty, it will build itself into their very spirits, giving a dignity and harmony difficult to gain in any other way. It is not that we should force the beauty upon the child's consciousness: that is as fatal in the case of nature as of art; but that we should give him ample opportunity to live in the lap of his best nurse—Nature.

It is not only the beauty but the truth of nature that is of direct value for moral education. Nature never lies to us; there is nothing there comparable to the garment of conventionality and deceit worn by human society. Nature is real as every unspoiled child is real, not understanding pretense and affectation. Thus Nature is the great teacher of sincerity. This most essential moral quality will be deepened in children by living contact with the outdoor world as is possible in no other way.

There is a still deeper element of moral culture that may come from Nature, not simply by responding to her beauty and truth, but by acting in harmony with her laws. I have already touched upon this in discussing moral education through work, but it is so important as to demand special

treatment. Human laws change and fail, society involves much that is irrational, but the natural world is one of regular, hard, inexorable law. In human society, in the conflict between men, it is possible to 'succeed' sometimes by lying and trickery, but not when your action touches nature. If you plant chaff instead of grain, nothing grows. If you shirk deep, regular plowing your crop is lessened. If you try to live without good food, sleep, fresh air, physical action, you are as surely punished as the days and nights succeed each other. Life and growth are possible only by obedience to natural laws: we are free to obey and live, or to break ourselves against the iron walls of nature's laws and die; there is no third freedom of caprice.

There are two elements in the obedience required of us: *conformity* and *action*. These are, indeed, two phases of one moral quality; the one being harmony with law, the other work in fulfillment of law. A wonderful development of character results from these two simple elements of obedience demanded of us by the natural world. Some of the strongest and worthiest men and women are built up by the simple struggle of life in obedience to necessity.

Consider such men and women as Pierre Loti presents in his *Iceland Fisherman*, which interprets so truly the actual Breton fisher-life. From the coast of Brittany all the able-bodied men go away in March to Iceland or Newfoundland, leaving the towns and villages inhabited by women and little children and old men. In the autumn the boats return—not all of them, for nearly every season some are lost, and the walls of the little chapels are covered with tablets asking prayers for the sailors who went down in certain storms. The returning boats bring fish representing perhaps one hundred and fifty or two hundred

dollars for each sailor as the season's catch. Hard, narrow lives, full of struggle with the most treacherous aspect of nature, involving grinding hardship, for the women even more than the men; and yet if France could only boast that all her citizens were like the Breton fisher-folk, there would have been no Dreyfus scandal and Paris would not hold the elements of corruption that eat the heart out of her life today.

We must interpret moral education in terms large enough to include such training in the school of necessity, if we are not to lose its essential meaning. Thus we need to bring children into contact with this nature world, not so as to crush or depress them with its inexorable forces, but to give them the strength that comes from simple obedience and work in harmony with its laws. Here again the superior opportunities of farm life are evident, not only because its activities are more liberal and varied, but because they are in direct contact with nature. The care of animals, the work in the garden, the thousandfold activities of farm life, all teach the regular, hard, beneficent laws of nature, and, slowly but steadily, active harmony with them is built into the very structure of the child's instincts and habits.

What of the vast number of children who have little or no opportunity for regular contact with nature?* They furnish our grave problem. There are three ways in which we can work toward its solution:

1. Everything possible should be done to stimulate the movement, already strong, away from the cities toward country or at least suburban life. Parents should be taught to recognize that it is to the child's moral interest to give him his early years in the country rather than in

the city; and where that is impossible, or the sacrifice of other interests would be too great, earnest thought and attention must be given to compensating for the influences the child loses. It is true, a qualifying principle comes in here: it is wrong to desert those who need us, and the interest of the family must be considered in relation to the larger need of society. Still, it cannot be doubted that the movement away from the congested centres, on the part of thoughtful people, is sane and right.

2. Each of us should recognize it as his personal duty to advance in every way the movements working to change the character of our cities from economic swarming-hives to human centres where life may be sane and nature within the reach of all. Public parks should be put down in each little part of the crowded sections of the city, instead of being segregated for show in the fashionable districts. Each school should have, not only beautiful grounds about it, but the gardens, mentioned in the previous chapter, where the children may cultivate plants and flowers, and get something of the first-hand contact with nature. If the land is high in price, the greater is the need to pull down a tenement and open up a breathing-space where a bit of nature may come in to bless the children. No economic cost is to be weighed against the moral gain that would thus come. Might it not even be well to make deliberate arrangements in connection with each school, in the crowded section of a city, for keeping and raising a few animal pets, that the children might have, if only in a slight measure, the moral good that comes from caring for such friends?

3. If we cannot bring city children into contact with

nature throughout the year, we may often do so for the most beautiful part of it. While there are obvious moral evils in the idle life of typical 'summer resorts,' the growing tendency to take children to farms, camps and villages for a part of the summer is full of promise. Unfortunately this is still confined largely to the children of the prosperous, though fresh-air charities take an increasing number of children each summer to the country for a few days or weeks. If direct contact with nature is so important for moral education, is it possible that we may come to regard it as a public duty to give all children an annual opportunity for such experience? May we come to feel that it is as much a function of the state to coöperate with parents in sending all city children to well-managed and carefully instructed summer farms and camps, as to provide buildings and teachers for ordinary instruction? I have no answer to the question, but certainly the experiment would be less dangerous than free meals to school children as tried in England, and hardly more so than free text-books.

Meantime vacation schools, so wisely begun recently in certain of the larger cities, can be utilized to furnish some measure of opportunity for contact with nature. The great need is that we should realize the importance of giving the child such opportunity. If we appreciate fully the need we can find the means to answer it. Obviously, wide coöperation is necessary to any thorough solution of the problem. Every parent and teacher who is awake must not only seek to give his children sane and active contact with nature, but must aid in stirring the general consciousness, that this powerful means for educating harmony, sincerity and active obedience to law may be utilized for all children.

XII

MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIAL ATMOSPHERE

We have studied the effect of environment in art and nature upon children; we shall turn now to the living human world. Before studying the dynamic influence of its institutions and of persons, let us consider another force that is relatively statical—the influence of the social atmosphere. This is a real, if subtle, force which must be reckoned with for good or evil, though it is a composite result from the action of many other forces. Into its formation enter the influence of the state and lesser institutions, the cumulative tradition and social heredity that perpetuate the experience of one generation in the life of the next, the effect of the action both of the few powerful individuals, who set a standard of behavior for imitation, and of the uncounted multitude of men and women. Yet composite as it is, the social atmosphere once formed becomes an important influence over every aspect of the life of the individual. Without the most searching analysis we get no hint of the extent to which our ideals and aims as well as actions are merely echoes of the social type. Since this must always be so, we need to recognize it and utilize the force as far as possible in education. It is, however, so difficult to control that evil effects resulting from it must often be counteracted by other agencies. There are two

different aspects of the influence of the social atmosphere upon children, and we shall consider them in turn: (1) The effect of the adult society surrounding children; (2) The effect of the child society in which they live.

Children are almost as much influenced as we are by the general adult society about them,—sometimes I think they are much more influenced by it. Consider how difficult it is to keep a child simple and unspoiled, with healthy tastes, in a society where money, dress and fashion are dominant. It can be done: one knows cases where in the worst social conditions it has been done; but the task is hard indeed. Where the parents are careless, in such an atmosphere, the children inevitably slip into the over-dressed, precocious imitations of the worst adults in their environment. When the parents themselves belong to the vicious social type, there is little to be done except to try to reform the parents.

Where the social atmosphere is one of grinding poverty, sordid aims and moral dirt, the difficulties in another way are even greater. Apart from the direct danger of moral contamination through criminal individuals, it is all but impossible to give children a sweet, healthy, clean moral attitude in such a society. The problem in both cases is made more difficult by the fact that our modern city life, with its material aims, industrial tension and rapid means of transit, involves far more acute separation of rich and poor than was true of older societies or than is found in towns, villages and farm life today. Those parents who are fortunate enough to live in a community where the social atmosphere is sound and helpful should be deeply thankful.

Where parents find themselves in an unwholesome atmosphere what is to be done? The first and most positive

and worthy solution is to strive to maintain an ideal social atmosphere in the home. There are few tasks that demand more moral heroism than this, and therefore few that are so educative to all concerned. The worst thing about a bad social type is that it does not meet us in rare crises when we might summon our courage for a fight, but insinuates its influence by ceaseless iteration in the routine of daily life. We must steel ourselves to the more consistent effort to stand out against it where it is wrong. If our neighbors persist in overdressing their children, we must continue to clothe ours simply, in spite of sneers, taking the children into our confidence and seeking to give them a courage and appreciation of the ideal involved that will save them from moral humiliation. We must not give way to the temptation to emulate our acquaintances in giving children's parties that are vicious imitations of the most artificial adult society.[1] If the ideals in the general atmosphere are grossly materialistic, we should strive the harder to keep the conversation within the home upon a better plane and steadily hold more worthy aims before the children. If, on the other hand, we are dwellers in an over crowded tenement, we can strive to keep our rooms clean, our clothes neat and our talk free from vulgarity, no matter how weary we are with the hopeless battle and how filthy is our moral and physical environment.

[1] "Fashionable parties for children, those abominations upon the face of the earth, are but seasoned condiments of that most wholesome food for the young soul, social contact with its peers. That so simple, so sweet, so holy, and so necessary a thing as the commingling of little children in play and work with those of their own age and ability, should be twisted and turned into an artificial fashionable party, seems, to the real lover of childhood, incredible, save for the sad fact that it is."—Elizabeth Harrison, *A Study of Child-Nature from the Kindergarten Standpoint*, p. 58.

It is further possible to secure a better moral atmosphere by utilizing the various opportunities at our command for segregating ourselves from undesirable social groups. The most obvious of these opportunities is to change our place of residence. Usually we move for our pleasure, our business convenience, or our vanity—to be among people of higher social and economic position. Of course, moving in obedience to such motives by no means assures a more moral environment. We need to recognize that the problem of our place of residence is centrally the problem of the moral atmosphere to which we would subject our children; and we must be willing to sacrifice a considerable amount of pleasure, convenience and vanity for their moral welfare.

It is true, fleeing from evil is a negative solution, if often necessary, usually somewhat cowardly; and every attempt at social segregation, even when dictated by the highest aims, involves three evils:

1. There is the sad desertion, on the part of those who can go, of the less fortunate who are tied to the bad environment or unawakened to its evil influences. Rich or poor, the more distorted the social type, the greater is the need for every unit family that stands for something saner and higher. One of the most perplexing problems in modern city life arises from the widespread desertion of the city by the better middle class. We cannot say they should have remained, but their going complicates the problem.

2. There is the less evident, but none the less real danger of dwarfing the segregated. *He who cuts himself off from any part of humanity does so at his own moral risk.* Human nature never atrophies quite so hopelessly as when a group for its own selfish interest cuts itself off from the whole.

Of course this is much worse when the segregation is for comfort, pleasure or vanity; but even the pursuit of a moral end may be selfish if it is sought only for ourselves apart from the good of the whole. There is no meaner or more harmful man than the one who prays God's blessing only on his own family, and—he never gets blessed.[1]

3. The segregation which began for moral reasons almost inevitably becomes artificial in time, and depends upon family, money, social and industrial opportunity, and not upon moral endeavor. The social settlement is the great effort to stem this tide of the higher selfishness and reintegrate segregated portions of humanity. In the ideals of its leaders and the experience of its working hitherto, it is found that this reintegration is quite as helpful for those who come primarily to give as for those who were expected to receive.[2]

Yet even in the social settlement is some measure of segregation. The worker's hands are upheld by his associates. A little social atmosphere is created within a

[1] "Nothing so deadens the sympathies and shrivels the power of enjoyment as the persistent keeping away from the great opportunities for helpfulness and a continual ignoring of the starvation struggle which makes up the life of at least half the race. To shut one's self away from that half of the race life is to shut one's self away from the most vital part of it; it is to live out but half the humanity which we have been born heir to and to use but half our faculties."—JANE ADDAMS, The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements, in *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, p. 11.

[2] "Not only the obligation, but the joy, of thus entering into natural and real relations with others, rather than trying to create artificial and strained relations as dole-dispensers and friendly visitors, is being brought home in many ways to many hearts. When we have learned to value the friendship of the woman who washes our clothes, and the man who carts off our rubbish, we shall find it easier to understand our neighbors, whether poor or rich."—JAMES O. S. HUNTINGTON, Philanthropy and Morality, in *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, by JANE ADDAMS, *et al.*, pp. 200-201.

larger one in a way impossible to the average family in the district. Moreover, the social worker is a trained and cultivated, matured man or woman, with independently established ideals of life, while we are considering the influence of the social atmosphere on plastic children whose ideals are forming in response to its type. Thus we are compelled to face a very perplexing dilemma. We must segregate our children socially in some measure if we can, and to do so involves grave moral danger. Hence we must balance one principle against the other, and seek, not a compromise, but a moral proportion of the two.

The solution of the difficulty comes upon a higher plane. The segregation involves harm through selfishness. If it is sought, not for the interest of the individual apart, but for the sake of his largest service to the whole, the moral danger is mainly obviated. For instance, we approve of a temporary withdrawal from the world for the sake of returning to more effective service. This justifies our taking four years for college, or periods for rest and travel. Even Jesus had his forty days in the wilderness, and every prophet and teacher has felt the necessity of periods of withdrawal for the sake of the largest service of humanity.

It is the same solution we must find for the problem of our relation to different social groups. Any measure of social segregation is right and safe only as it leads to the closest union with humanity in helpful service in the whole of life. Even with this aim danger is present: it is so easy to forget the end in the pleasant means. Yet a good principle should not be given up or obscured because people abuse it. Thus we must accept, in so far as we are free to choose, that form and measure of social segregation which will help to mature, in us and in our children, the

most effective and independent moral personality, capable of the largest human service. This moral aim of human service must be kept constantly before us, and we should rejoice in renouncing the temporary separation as fast as its educational end is accomplished.

Under the guidance of this principle can we not see the moral place and value of the different forms of segregation possible in the conditions of our life? It is not only by change of residence that we can influence the moral atmosphere about our children. Any institution that brings into contact with each other people who hold similar moral ideals is developing a specific moral atmosphere that counteracts the evil in the general social type. The best illustration I can give of this force is the work of the New York Ethical Society under the leadership of that moral prophet, Felix Adler. Not only by its direct service in educational, political and philanthropic ways, but by joining the hands of people who in the great industrial and social maelstrom hold to moral aims or hunger for them, the Ethical Society has given its members much of the advantage of social segregation, without removing them from the world that needs their help and can so vitally refresh and instruct their spirits.

This type of influence is exerted by every sound church, whose aim is not salvation apart but the best life for its members in harmony with the most effective service of the social whole. It is difficult to state strongly enough the power of such a church to create a lesser social atmosphere that will uphold and stimulate the members of the institution and mold their ideals of life. So with the effect of Young Men's Christian Associations and the multitude of organizations for which they are the prototype. Like the

churches, these may exercise a strong influence for good over their members through the moral atmosphere they create; yet if they hold themselves apart with a better-than-thou attitude, their most devoted members are apt to degenerate into the effeminate moral weaklings so despised by all sound men.

All that has been said of the influence of the adult society in molding the character of our children applies with multiplied force to the effect of the child society; and the same principle must guide our efforts to regulate the latter. Schools are the most obvious means of bringing the atmosphere of a specific child society to bear upon our children. By sending a child to a particular day-school we determine the moral atmosphere that is about him for a large part of his waking life, and when the school is one at which the child regularly lives three-fourths of the year, it is the relatively constant social influence upon him.

Unfortunately, here, as in the problem of residence, our action is governed largely by motives of class distinction. These motives are shown, not only in sending children to fashionable private schools: even the public school, democratic as we boast it to be, expresses much of the class separation that mars our society. A school building naturally gathers together the children living in the neighborhood; and we have seen how different classes are separated in residence districts. Moreover, what parent, regarding himself as of the better class but compelled by poverty to live in a social environment he considers beneath him, will not strive, if there be any chance of success, to have his children transferred to a school in some other part of the community? Undoubtedly there is justification for this attitude when it is inspired by moral aims and not by vanity.

for one bad child may poison a whole child society. If only one were sure that the transfer would give a better moral environment for one's children! Occasionally the worst phases of child society are found among people who regard themselves as of the better class, but who have little time and interest for association with their children, and so give opportunity for poisonous influences to creep in and spread by contagion.

Furthermore, all segregation of children from the general child world involves the same evils we have studied in connection with separation from groups of adult humanity. To send a child to a socially exclusive private school may or may not be to protect him from evil influences and bring a helpful atmosphere to bear upon him; but even if this good is attained, it is bought at the price of a certain loss of relation to the larger world which the child can help and from which he has much to learn. Children cannot be taught too early that it is their business not to let "evil communications corrupt good manners," but to regard every element of good influence they have enjoyed as so much obligation to live to a standard above that of less fortunate children. I do not mean that we should make them moral prigs, thanking God they are not as other children,—the prig may be no worse than the vicious person, he is certainly no better,—I do mean that we should strive as early and as fast as possible to make their moral character independent, active instead of passive with reference to environment.

On this basis, then, I think we may say that the public school should be the rule, the private school the exception. Children should have the larger, freer contact with a mixed group of all sorts of children, just so far as we can dare to

trust them; and the limitations of this wider contact should be for specific reasons in individual cases. Of course I am not considering the relative excellence of private and public schools in equipment and teaching, nor the great service the private school can do the other by setting a standard possible only with a larger expenditure of money, and by avoiding the evils of centralization and uniformity toward which our public schools in some communities are tending. We are dealing here with one point, the influence of the social atmosphere in a child society; and in that aspect of the problem, the larger measure of democracy in the public school gives it an advantage which should never be foregone except for a specific greater good.

Perhaps the problem can be seen most clearly if we take the extreme case of an 'only child.' Where there is but one child in the family the educational problem is very difficult, since there is no chance within the family for the education that comes from the free play of the child's will with the wills of other children, and this discipline must always be sought outside. If now the parent makes the mistake of employing a private tutor for such a child, no excellence of teaching can compensate for the fatal loss of the influence of a general child society. Thus there is even a positive value in the large roomful of children in the public school, where little individual care and attention can be given the pupils.[1] We want individual care and attention for each child, but even more the child needs contact with a wide representative human world; and nothing can take its place or compensate for the lack of it.

[1] "It is necessary to treat people as individuals; but it does them a world of good sometimes to treat a great many of them together, and to let them get used to it as best they may."—Le Baron Russell Briggs, *School, College and Character*, p. 46.

A very different form of social segregation occurs where the separation is in regard to age and sex with no immediate reference to class distinction or moral character. Obviously such segregation need not directly violate the principles of democracy. Still our main argument applies without reservation. The child needs contact with the general human world, with adults and children of both sexes and all ages. Any separation from the whole of society is to be admitted only for a specific gain greater than the loss, and only if through the separation a more vital union with humanity is made possible.

Particularly important is the application of our principle to the question of the segregation of the sexes. The moral atmosphere is much more sane and clean where men and women, boys and girls, meet in natural human relationship. Always there is a loss of a powerful lever for good conduct and a force in molding sound ideals where the sexes are separated in the larger areas of their activity. Thus coeducation should be the rule, the separation of the sexes the exception, admitted only where we believe the specific gain more than compensates for the moral loss.[1] Further, it is most important that children should be constantly in touch with both parents and influenced by teachers of both sexes, if the best moral results are to be attained.

It must be frankly recognized, however, that the separation from the whole of society of a group of individuals alike in age, sex and interest gives a tremendous stimulus to organization and activity. This in its bad form is the 'gang' spirit; in its good aspect it is the instinct that

[1] In advocating coeducation, I do not mean identical education for the two sexes; and I recognize fully the incidental harm that has followed the opening of men's courses to women without reference to the different needs and problems of the latter.

makes one desire to be a part of the time with one's peers or one's kind in the strict sense. A man needs some association with men friends into which the wives and children do not enter. A woman is greatly helped by some contact with other women apart from her husband and children. In the same way the boy or girl is helped by some regular contact with a group of his or her own sex and age. But to be helpful this special form of society must be kept in its place. It is the minor rather than the major element; the moment it becomes the main form of association its influence involves harm, since the moral atmosphere it creates is incomplete and becomes distorted.

One of the best examples of the good and evil of this form of segregation is found in the great English schools for boys. It is well known how strong an influence for good they have been. The boy goes away from home, becomes a member of a vigorous society of his peers, learns self-dependence, responds to the moral standards that prevail, and under a wise master is fitted for manly life. Yet how grave is the loss of contact with the home, with the general human society, and how artificial and sometimes false and harmful are the moral standards growing up in such a school. Ennis Richmond has stated this strikingly in *Through Boyhood to Manhood*, p. 21:

"I know many a boy who will take a bad 'hack' on the shin (is there any pain more thrilling?) in a football match as though for him pain did not exist, and yet who would not hesitate to make his whole family uncomfortable in the holidays if he has a cold or a headache."

The same author sums up the principle on p. 27:

"An education which is evolved from the laws and rules of a society which for centuries has based these laws upon

the contact of boys with boys is not enough unless it is supplemented, governed and controlled by some outside influence, unless this influence points to some infinitely higher and nobler standard than could ever be found in a society which bases the motives for its actions on the approval of the members of that society itself."

In our own country the most striking illustration of this form of social segregation is found in the boys' (and in lesser measure the girls') clubs that have sprung up so widely within a decade. These have proved masterly instruments for combatting the worst evils in the crowded districts of great cities, and have given the 'gang' spirit a healthy and helpful form of expression, furnishing as they do a natural outlet for the restlessness and enthusiasm of children and young people, within a healthy moral atmosphere. Indeed, the movement to form these clubs and the influence resulting from them assume almost the proportions of a moral and religious crusade.[1] To avoid harmful results, however, these clubs for special groups must be kept in close relation to the home and the larger human world. If they become substitutes for the home the result is disastrous, since the specific benefit is attained for the individual at the expense of breaking his basal natural relationships and dwarfing his power to give and to take helpfully in relation to humanity.[2]

[1] The work of Rev. William Byron Forbush, author of *The Boy Problem*, is one of the best illustrations of what is being done in this field, and the magazine of which he is editor, *How to Help Boys*, quarterly, Boston, gives full information regarding the movement.

[2] Compare Stanton Coit in his suggestive little book on *Neighborhood Guilds*, pp. 48-49:

"Nor have I any less misgivings as to the ultimate effects of young men's clubs in the Christian Associations when unconnected with clubs for sisters and fathers and mothers. The boy gets a wholly

Thus any measure or form of social segregation is justifiable only if its whole result is a stronger moral personality, more helpful to the whole human world. Any limiting of the broadest relationship to humanity, if temporarily necessary, should be renounced gladly at the earliest moment we can safely do so. We must limit, correct and supplement the influence of Nature, but we should never supplant her. We can teach the child democracy only by allowing him to practise it. Every special relation he sustains to a group or an individual must merge in the larger relation to the whole human world. He can learn to deal helpfully with humanity only by dealing helpfully with humanity.

Thus there can be no greater mistake than in over regulation of child life. This applies alike to work and play, government, discipline, the social atmosphere.[1] I

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perverted view of sociability, he soon regards it as a relation which only men with men are capable of; and after he marries, he will be so unaccustomed to the idea of comradeship and conversation with women that when he craves social pleasures of an intellectual type he will turn away from home to the political club or even the public-house. I have often visited the large gatherings of young men in the Young Men's Christian Associations, but never without alarm. Where are the sisters and sweethearts and fathers and mothers of these young men? And why are these men drawn off here by themselves evening after evening? Can there be a doubt that such institutions, in spite of their good intention, are hostile to the social life of the family and to the intellectual and moral companionship of the sexes?"

[1] "Suffice it briefly to remember that punctilious and constant supervision is burdensome alike to the supervisor and those he watches over, and is apt therefore to be associated on both sides with deceit, and thrown off at every opportunity—and also that the need for it grows with the degree in which it is used, and that at last every moment of its intermittence is fraught with danger. Further, it prevents children from knowing and testing themselves, and learning a thousand things which are not included in any pedagogic system, but can only be found by self-search. Finally, for all these reasons, the character which is formed outside the will of its possessor, either

read through not long ago one of the recent educational Utopias, with a sense of increasing depression. It was all so well arranged, every week of the year and hour of the day accounted for, the most skillfully devised and paternally kind system planned to make all the children 'nice' all the time; but somehow there was no chance for humanity to get in. No! one does not want to visit the kingdom of heaven on a 'personally conducted excursion.' Better the great, irregular, free, rough human world, with all the waste nature and freedom involve, than the most perfect Utopia where everything is done from above, and the children are manufactured, instead of being allowed under wise guidance and corrective supervision to *grow*. Even our supervision may easily meddle too much. Fights, swimming in dangerous places, playing marbles 'for keeps,' recklessly climbing trees, are all questionable; and yet just such experiences may coöperate in molding a good, sound, healthy manhood.[1] We must risk something if any good is to be obtained; wasteful as freedom is, nothing can compensate for its abrogation.

remains weak or distorted, according as the outlets which the individual finds be many or few."—HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, pp. 97-98.

[1] Compare HENRY A. SHUTE, *The Real Diary of a Real Boy*. Whether or not this little book is entirely what it purports to be, it is an interesting study of the effect of vigorous, largely uncontrolled boyhood, involving the active struggle of one with his equals, in molding strong character.

XIII

PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT IN HOME AND SCHOOL

More powerful in molding character than the relatively statical environment of the child is the government to which he is subjected. In fact, the direct control of the child exercised by those persons who have authority over him is the all-pervading force, guiding his work and play, molding, or at least modifying his environment, mediating between him and the universe of law. Thus this dynamic influence is the very centre of the whole problem of moral education. I wish first to consider the principles of this control in those institutions of which the child is a member—the home and the school—and then to study the problem of personal discipline.

Institutions are less perfect, just and unvarying than nature, since they spring partly from the imperfect and disturbing cause of human reason, but because human reason is consciously at work in them they represent nature carried up to a higher plane of expression. Institutions are natural just in so far as they are truly rational. It is difficult to separate the influence of institutions from other moral forces, since they have developed step by step with the evolution of personality. It would be impossible for any one of us to say what part of our tendencies in character comes from the institutions under which we live, but

surely a little reflection will show that the nature and spirit of those institutions has been woven into the very texture of our minds.

The supreme institution in government is the state; and it is very evident what different types of character tend to develop under democracy or monarchy, aristocracy or tyranny. Indeed, the chief reason for advocating one form of the state rather than another is this result in molding the character of the citizen. Children are born into the state, and are indirectly influenced by it from the beginning, but only with the growth into young manhood and womanhood is its influence directly brought to bear upon them, producing a conscious reaction. It is true, the lost children fall immediately into the hands of the state, but even they have no consciousness of the meaning of organized society; while for all normal children, certain other institutions mediate between the child and the state Two of these, the home and the school, are of supreme importance, acting upon the child as they do together throughout the period ending in manhood. I wish to reserve the influence on children of individuals in home and school for consideration in subsequent chapters, and to study first the effect on moral development of the home and the school considered as organic institutions, with the aim of discovering the principles that should regulate their organization and government.

First let us recognize that the moral effect of an institution is not determined by its material size, but by the principles on which it is based; therefore, if we find the principles in these lesser[1] institutions, the home and the school,

[1] In calling the home and the school "lesser institutions" I do not mean that they are less important than the state, but that they are smaller units contained within it.

to be the same as in the state, the moral influence on those governed by the institution may be equally important. Let us compare the principles in the state and in these institutions that most powerfully affect childhood. (1) The state is an organization existing for certain definite purposes. Without going into a discussion of the philosophy of the state, we may say that one recognized aim of all organized society tending toward democracy, is to guarantee each individual the greatest possible freedom in seeking his own life and happiness, so long as that freedom does not conflict with the same end for all others. (2) The just laws of the state are those that are necessary to its ends. For instance, from the aim just defined flow the rational laws with reference to property. In so far as these laws are just they are necessary to protect the freedom and activity of each individual, in harmony with the same freedom and activity on the part of all others. (3) Free citizenship in the state means voluntary and intelligent obedience to those laws which are necessary to the ends of the state, with a protest by every reasonable means against laws which are not necessitated by the purposes for which the state exists.

Do not these three principles apply fully to the home and the school? Each is an organization existing for certain reasonable purposes. In each the just laws are those necessary to the fulfillment of the ends for which the organization exists. May we add that free citizenship in home and school is voluntary and intelligent obedience to the laws necessary to the purposes of the institution? It may be said that children cannot understand the principles in the organization of these institutions. It is true, as we shall see, that there is growth into the full understanding

of them; but can we not say that the ordinary American child of six is as able to understand all the principles in home and school organization as is the average voting citizen the purposes and laws of the government his free exercise of citizenship helps to fashion?

It is not necessary to go into difficult philosophic discussion in order to see the end and laws of the home and the school. For instance, each member of the family is there to grow and be happy and to help all the other members to grow and be happy. To attain these ends we must all obey the following simple conditions: (1) Each must be clean and temperate. It is impossible to live habitually with those who are physically or morally unclean; and temperance is simply the positive side of cleanliness, meaning just proportion in our activities and in our relations to the things that serve us. (2) We must be cheerful and courageous. Sullenness is a deadly blight upon both happiness and helpfulness; and a certain glad willingness to strive and endure is needed for the two aims of the home life. (3) Each must show reasonable truth and justice. No group of people can carry on a common life without depending upon mutual trust and fairness. (4) Justice is not enough: beyond giving each his due, there must be loving helpfulness shown by each member of the family toward all the rest. (5) Finally, if the ends of the home life are to be attained, each individual must obey that most fundamental law of all joyous and useful living, earnest work.

These principles are so simple as to be within the comprehension of quite young children, if not intellectually at least practically, yet they are the great laws of human living. Fortunately, the basis of the moral life is not some

rare, exotic element possible only to a few, but is made of just these simple, universal virtues, if difficult of complete attainment, nevertheless open to the striving of all.

As the home is the more generic institution, the statement of its end and laws is inclusive for the school as well. Children are in the school, as in the home, to grow and be happy and help others to grow and be happy; and the same simple conditions lead to the attainment of the aim. It is necessary that the children should be clean, just, loving in school as at home. Yet the school has its own specific function in relation to the general aim, and particular laws flowing from that function. Here as well we need not go into difficult pedagogical discussion. Without considering the relative value of the different formulas proposed to define the end of the school, we may say that children go to school to learn and help their neighbors learn. To attain this aim the children must come to school (1) promptly and (2) regularly; they must be (3) reasonably quiet and orderly; they must give (4) careful attention, and (5) work earnestly at the school tasks.[1]

These conditions upon which the aim of the school directly depends are as simple as the more generic laws of the home, yet how important they are. Promptness is the least of them; but in any community, for every public meeting during one year to begin on time would mean a great moral revolution. Suppose all the people in a certain town were to become prompt and regular in business

[1] These principles are so obvious that they have been frequently stated in slightly different form. Compare Dr. HARRIS on The Relation of School Discipline to Moral Education, pp. 58-72, in the *Third Year Book of the National Herbart Society.* Compare also the report on *Moral Education in Schools* by the Committee of the National Council of Education, W. A. MOWRY, chairman.

and social life, reasonably quiet and orderly, and earnestly attentive to their work: would not the price of land double in the neighborhood and people move near to be as close as possible to the kingdom of heaven? Let me repeat: life is not made of rare, out-of-the-way elements; and as fresh air, sunshine and simple food give the life of the body, so the finest character is molded of the simplest virtues.

If therefore even quite young children can be brought to understand the aims and necessary laws of the home and the school, does not every argument for democracy in the state apply with multiplied force to the form of government in these lesser institutions? What is the true justification of democracy in the state? Surely not immediate results in good government. Democracy is, for a large part of its history at least, one of the most wasteful forms of government. It cultivates demagoguery and corruption, puts inefficient leaders into office, is wasteful of human energy and wealth. Yet in spite of that we believe in democracy. Why? Because we believe that only under free institutions is it possible to build up the most earnest, free and intelligent type of manhood and womanhood. In other words, the one justification of democracy is the education of its citizens; and we submit to the temporary waste and evil for the sake of that education. If then we dare to trust democracy in the state, is it not our duty to apply its principles to the government of children in the home and the school, where the whole aim is education?

In the state each form of government has its unique result in the character of its subjects. An arbitrary tyranny, for instance, tends to make two types of citizens, slaves and nihilists. I do not mean that all subjects of a

tyranny become one or the other, for powerful forces aside from the government check and counteract its effect; but in so far as the state does mold its citizens, a tyrannical government tends to build the two types of character mentioned. The weak people, those who like to respond to whatever authority happens to be present, become blindly submissive, more and more, to the arbitrary tyranny. The strong people, on the other hand, those who tend to question authority and who demand a reason for their obedience, become more and more blindly reactionary against the arbitrary rule that is over them. Now neither slaves nor nihilists are free citizens, so that the influence of a blind tyranny in the state is morally destructive both ways.

The same effect follows from a similar type of government in the home and the school, only there the result is far greater, because less counteracted by other forces. An autocratic rule tends to mold the children into the same two undesirable types of character. The weak children become wholly submissive to the will of the teacher or parent, responding to it without reason, merely because it happens to be present. Surely such children are not being prepared for helpful living in our world. Rather they become the most dangerous element in the community,—well-meaning, but so entirely submissive to whatever powerful influence plays upon them that they are easily molded clay in the hands of the demagogue.[1]

[1] "The child that seems good outwardly often is not good inwardly, *i.e.*, does not desire the good spontaneously, or from love, respect, and appreciation; similarly, the outwardly rough, stubborn, self-willed child that seems outwardly not good, frequently is filled with the liveliest, most eager, strongest desire for spontaneous goodness in his actions; and the apparently inattentive boy frequently follows a certain fixed line of thought that withholds his attention from all external things."—FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, translated by Hailmann, pp. 6-7.

On the other hand, the strong children, who resent any blind obedience, who have in them the making of the most effective men and women, react vigorously against an autocratic control. They may be quite submissive, apparently, while the adult's authority is immediately over them, but let the parent go away for a day, or the teacher leave the room, and like a rubber ball they rebound, and pride themselves upon any successfully disobedient act. Neither are these children fitted to live in the world we know, for their blind reaction against all control harms both society and themselves, until they are taught, through suffering, the necessity and meaning of rational obedience.

It is this second group who are wrongly called 'bad' children. They are no more bad than the weakly submissive are good. A really bad child is the hardened criminal, so dwarfed and distorted by evil heredity, environment and experience that he has come to hate the good and love the evil, so that our moral appeals seem lost upon him. Such children do appear, but they are few indeed in number; while the children usually called bad are simply strong individuals who have been misdirected, and have come to feel that any successful opposition to authority or escape from it is action of real manliness. Must we not add that if we have made the problem one of the struggle of our will and intellect with the child's, and he conquers, this is so far an evidence in him of strength and therefore meritorious? The pity of it is that we have called forth the strength along a wholly wrong line, which abrogates moral relationships, confuses moral distinctions and ends in disaster.

What these misdirected children need is not suppression, a powerful assertion of our authority that reduces their wills

to submission, but to be brought into line with reasonable ends. Our whole effort should be to win the child's coöperation instead of his enmity. His intelligence needs, not repression, but to be led to see the reasons for obedience. His will should be, not broken, but enlightened.

With the evil effects of tyranny let us contrast the practical working of democracy in home and school government. The object of democracy is exactly the opposite of tyranny. The arbitrary authority aims to produce unquestioning obedience; the aim of democracy is to develop free and intelligent response to the best, on the part of each individual. Thus in any institution the object of democracy is moral, never merely economic. Let me illustrate with a particular question of school government: every teacher has trouble with tardiness; how should he deal with the problem? It is easily possible for a forceful teacher so to dominate the school as to frighten the children into conformity with his will and thus eliminate most of the tardiness. But what is the result? Well, the children get to school on time, and that is of economic value. Moreover there may be some moral worth in the habit of promptness even when it is irrational and inspired by fear.[1] We shall see in the next chapter how little such habits are worth; and beyond this there is no moral value in such enforced conformity. Suppose, on the other hand, the

[1] "Obedience which is the result of fear, whether of natural penalties or arbitrary punishments inflicted by parents or others in authority, produces a servile habit of mind and is consistent with inward rebellion against the law which must be outwardly submitted to. But obedience which springs from trust and reverence, from belief in the child that the parent or his representative is wiser and better than himself, and which is, therefore, a willing submission, is the root of true morality; the recognition of a higher law which we *ought* to obey."—Emily A. E. Shirreff, *Moral Training*, p. 14.

children are taken into the teacher's confidence and brought to see the need of getting to school on time if they are to learn and help their neighbors learn: every act of obedience that is given voluntarily because the end is recognized and willed is a step forward in the development of independent moral character. Here is a child who must help his mother wash and wipe the dishes before he can come to school. If he does his work as quickly as possible and runs part way to school, because he sees it is necessary to the good work of the school and because he desires to coöperate in seeking the end that is right, his action is worth morally what no blind habit can ever mean. He is learning, not to respond to the accident of authority, but to take the moral initiative and choose and affirm freely what is best for him and for all.

Consider the problem of whispering, with which all teachers struggle. It is obviously possible for a teacher 'with a strong personality' to dominate a school-room and suppress whispering. There are rooms presided over by 'good disciplinarians' where the children are frightened into such an abject obedience that they actually do not breathe and move around enough for their physical health. Here again we have an economic result—good order—and a slight moral good, often accompanied with distinct moral and physical harm.

Why should not the child whisper? He needs a knife to sharpen his lead pencil, or he has failed to hear the announcement of the lesson. There is a good reason why he should not: he should have paid attention when the lesson was given; and if the children generally whisper when they think it necessary, the school quickly becomes so disorderly that good work cannot be done. Let the

children see and state this principle for themselves; win as much support as possible to the end in view; and then if the children are reasonably quiet, refraining sometimes from whispering when they would like to, they are growing in self-control and free obedience to reasonable law, and so the great end of moral education is being attained.

It is wonderful how the teacher's hands are upheld by such a spirit in the school when it comes to dealing with the refractory children who cannot be won to adhesion to the aim and free conformity to the conditions that lead to it. Public opinion is as powerful among children as among adults; and the children themselves will bring the largest possible influence to bear upon the reactionary individual when democracy is the principle of the government.

In general we may say that it is always better to secure adhesion to a principle without formulating it into a rule, and the rule should be given only where we have failed to solve the problem on the higher plane.[1] The children

[1] "I have seen Parents so heap *Rules* on their Children, that it was impossible for the poor little Ones to remember a tenth Part of them, much less to observe them. However, they were either by Words or Blows corrected for the Breach of those multiply'd and often very impertinent Precepts. Whence it naturally follow'd that the Children minded not what was said to them, when it was evident to them that no Attention they were capable of was sufficient to preserve them from Transgression, and the Rebukes which follow'd it.

Let therefore your *Rules* to your Son be as few as possible, and rather fewer than more than seem absolutely necessary. For if you burden him with many *Rules*, one of these two Things must necessarily follow; that either he must be very often punish'd, which will be of ill Consequence, by making Punishment too frequent and familiar; or else you must let the Transgressions of some of your Rules go unpunish'd, whereby they will of course grow contemptible, and your Authority become cheap to him. Make but few *Laws*, but see they be well observ'd when once made. Few Years require but few Laws, and as his Age increases, when one Rule is by Practice well establish'd, you may add another."—LOCKE, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, edited by Quick, pp. 38-39.

themselves can understand this. As long as the room is reasonably orderly there need be no rule about whispering. Persistent disorder may necessitate the formulation of a specific rule, and if so, it is well that the children should coöperate in its formulation.

The problem has been worked out in phases of modern university discipline. In the old-time college it was sought to bring the student under the control of rigid authority. Rules affecting all the details of his life were formulated and even posted on the wall of his room, thus directly challenging his disobedience. Just in so far as these rules seemed to the student an arbitrary expression of the power of his superiors, he naturally tried to get around them. Hence the tradition of college pranks which fills the old-time stories of school life. Today, university students are expected to be men and women with a reasonable knowledge of what is required in a moral society. Opportunities for disobedience are not suggested to them by the formulation of detailed restrictions. If they break the known laws of society, the ordinary system of justice must take charge of them as of other criminals, for the rest they are thrown largely upon their own personal honor and reason. The result is, it becomes very melancholy to steal pies from the dormitory or paint the professor's horse. No one pays any attention to you or makes a hero of you as long as the prank is childish, and when it becomes criminal you find yourself in the disgrace that attaches to all harmful social offenses. Under this régime even 'class rushes' seem more and more foolish to intelligent students, and tend to disappear, in spite of the century-long tradition that supports them.

Thus the question of the organization and government of

these lesser institutions, the home and the school, is always a moral problem, never merely an economic one. It is amazing how this fact is ignored in current education. The parent's government is often dictated by the interest of his own ease and comfort, the teacher's by the desire to get the work of the school done, or worse, to make a good showing when the principal or visitor enters, and so get the questionable reputation of being a 'good disciplinarian.'[1] Yet, like all other government, that of the home and the school will stamp itself indelibly on the character of the children and mold them in accordance with its principles; and far more in the home and the school than in the state, not only because children are so plastic, but because these institutions fill so much larger a place in the life of the child than the state does in that of the adult citizen. Unless we can recall vividly our own early life, it is difficult to realize how completely the child is absorbed in the little world of these lesser institutions. Therefore the reason for insisting on democracy as the principle of government in home and school is in no degree its effect in ease, comfort or economy, but the moral good of the children.

[1] "It is, therefore, no paradox to say, that order and silence and regularity may be maintained, in a school, by a course of discipline, which, while it seems to make a good school, shall, in reality, be a skillfully arranged process for making bad men."—Horace Mann, On School Punishments, in *Life and Works of Horace Mann*, vol. II, p. 362.

XIV

THE PROGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF DEMOCRACY IN HOME AND SCHOOL GOVERNMENT

We have seen that the aim of all government in home and school is the moral development of the children, and that therefore it is our duty to base our control of children as far as possible on the principles of democracy, to foster the free, self-directing type of character. This does not mean, however, that complete democracy should be introduced at one point. That has not been possible in the history of the race and cannot be attempted without danger in the life of the individual. Historically we can trace the development of organized society from simple patriarchal rule, through all forms of monarchy, oligarchy and aristocracy, with the perversions represented by tyranny and mob-rule, toward a constitutional monarchy that in turn gives way to some form of democracy. The process has been a long and slow one, and even today there are but few races capable of living within the forms of political democracy with reasonable safety; and among the most advanced of these how imperfectly the principles of democracy are carried out in practice. Where groups of the population are quite unfit for self-government, even though the political forms be democratic they break down in reality, and another type of government supervenes,—

as monarchy, in the case of the 'boss' governing industrially as well as politically a mass of ignorant henchmen, or oligarchy, as in certain southern portions of the United States, where the white population, though distinctly a minority, has succeeded in concentrating all political power in its hands. The true principle of democracy in the state is, not to establish offhand a certain political system we theoretically hold to be highest, but just so far as is consistent with public safety and progress to give every citizen the largest possible freedom and self-control, industrially, socially and politically. We can afford to err on the side of freedom, since responsibility, even when partly misused, educates as can nothing else. The real difference between democracy and other forms of organizing society is that they seek to further the interest and power of a class, a group or an individual, while democracy aims at the best life, freest initiative and largest self-direction for all.

As democracy is a process and not a statical fact in the state, so should it be in the home and the school. Other forms of government in these institutions aim at the interest, ease or authority of parents and teachers, democracy aims at the best life, freest initiative and largest self-direction for each child. To attempt the introduction of a certain type of democracy at a single stroke in home or school is as dangerous as the similar experiment in the state. The very young child is not beyond the patriarchal stage, and from that point to complete personal freedom on the basis of wisdom and self-control, the form of government must vary in principle for the individual as historically for the race.

If this is recognized it will be seen at once that those

experiments which seek to reorganize the school-room in imitation of a city or state government do not form the main application of democracy to the school. Some admirable work has been done in this direction through the "School City" planned and carried out by Wilson L. Gill.[1] In certain schools the discipline has been placed in the hands of the pupils, they have elected officers, punished offenders, and carried out the main legal, judicial and legislative functions of the state. It is needless to point out how very valuable is the direct instruction in the functions and duties of citizenship that results from thus practising them. For the older pupils, in advanced grammar and high school grades, this type of organization may justify itself for a time on the ground of the instruction in citizenship alone. Moreover, all the children undoubtedly receive some moral training from such a system. Certain of the more difficult cases can be dealt with successfully on this plan. I need only point to the splendid record of the George Junior Republic to show how, *under an inspired man*, such a plan can be carried out with wonderful results for the children who are in a measure social outcasts.[2]

[1] See an article on Self Government in Schools in *The Literary Digest* of August 8, 1903, reviewing the work done under Mr. Gill's leadership.

[2] Mr. F. W. Richardson, of Auburn, N. Y., one of the trustees of the George Junior Republic, has furnished me the following data: Of the one hundred and sixty-four 'citizens' who had gone out from the Republic up to November 1902, only fourteen are regarded as unsuccessful. The other one hundred and fifty have entered society as good citizens and give promise of remaining so. Compare these figures with the results of a good high school, dealing with the best material of human nature, and the wonderful success of the Republic is evident. The *Annual Reports* and other pamphlets published by the George Junior Republic (Freeville, N. Y.) give full information concerning this most instructive educational experiment.

It is to be questioned, however, whether such a method of organization is to be advocated as the wisest plan of discipline generally with reference to the direct results in moral culture. The scheme stands somewhat aside from the immediate problem of moral education and demands a great deal of time in proportion to the results attained in character. Any one who has dealt with young children knows how slight and how slow in developing is their conception of law; and it may be questioned whether, for the younger children, the measure of guidance and instruction from above they would require in order to carry out the scheme would not mean its practical emasculation.[1]

Valuable as the experiment of the school republic has proved itself to be in application to special situations, the general problem of government in home and school is to introduce democracy progressively, as fast as the children can respond to it. In the beginning it is the personal will of the adult that must rule: first blind obedience, then rational and free obedience as fast as possible. It is as much an error not to demand the unreasoning response to authority before reason is possible, as to repress the rational attitude when it awakens. Very young children obey us, if at all, largely from emotional causes. They love, respect or (sadly enough) fear us, and therefore respond, without seeing its reason, to the personal will that is over them. Respond they should, nevertheless; for to leave little children quite uncontrolled, as so many American parents do, is not only to multiply the difficulty in the problem of moral education, but to render the child himself

[1] See the two suggestive studies on Children's Attitude Toward Law by Estelle M. Darrah, in *Studies in Education*, edited by Earl Barnes, vol, I, pp. 213-216, 254-258.

most unhappy. Little children are never so gladly at peace as when they are quietly and firmly held day after day to what is best for them; and never so restless and dissatisfied as when they are left quite to their own devices, not knowing what to devise. Thus from the beginning of the child's life and during its earliest years the parent should exercise a quiet, gentle, patient, but insistent authority, demanding only what is reasonable, but demanding it unvaryingly.[1]

Very early, however, comes the child's questioning of authority. At the age of five or six he is already beginning to ask why he should obey.[2] Sometimes this questioning comes with a sudden flood, at other times reason awakens very gradually. How shall we treat the child's question when it comes? In so far as it is merely impudence, obviously it should be suppressed. We do our children no kindness to let them grow up impudent; for the world will not tolerate their impudence, and it is a grave harm to children to let them develop a fault which will bring painful experiences. Much of the questioning, however, is not impudence but expresses a real desire to know. Is it wise to suppress this? Would not sup-

[1] "A child must at first rest in authority; his very preservation depends upon it; and if he is well trained, he comes to feel the satisfaction of strong and secure support. A dogma in fields where he does not know—and there are few fields which he does know—is as restful to his eager, searching mind as his father's strong arms are to his body."—Earl Barnes, The Child as a Social Factor, in *Studies in Education*, vol. I, pp. 355–356.

[2] "It will perhaps be wonder'd, that I mention *Reasoning* with Children; and yet I cannot but think that the true Way of dealing with them. They understand it as early as they do Language; and, if I misobserve not, they love to be treated as rational Creatures, sooner than is imagin'd. 'Tis a Pride should be cherish'd in them, and, as much as can be, made the greatest Instrument to turn them by."—Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, edited by Quick, p. 60.

pression mean choking the nascent reason that is so essential to wise living? The form of education that sought to 'break the child's will' strove also to check the development of his reason, thus struggling to continue the type of obedience that is mere blind response to authority.[1] Yet surely we need forceful will for the work of life, only it must be balanced by clear reason, or it results in obstinacy. Similarly, we need an ability to reason clearly and discriminatingly, but it must be balanced by a vigorous power of action, or it loses its connection with life and dissipates in mere speculation. Thus we should welcome the serious questioning of authority and the grounds of obedience, just as every wise teacher welcomes the similar questioning in reference to the facts and laws of nature. In either case the child's awakening is our educational opportunity.

Our problem is, therefore, to transform the obedience to personal authority into a free and intelligent response to law just as rapidly and naturally as possible. What, after all, is the ultimate ground for parental authority over little children? Is it not that we mediate between the child and the universe of law, holding him to conformity with the latter for his best good? If so, the more the mediating authority is able to withdraw, as the child comes to a conscious recognition of law, the better.

Thus the two forms of obedience have very different

[1] "Those who grow up merely passive, as obedient children, have no character when they are released from supervision. They give themselves up to their hidden longings and to circumstances, now when no one has any longer power over them, or when any power, which can still perhaps be exercised, affects them in but a crooked manner, and must either drive them off at a tangent or crush them altogether. Unfortunately, every one can relate sad experiences enough of this kind."—HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 219.

moral values. The earlier unreasoning response to authority, on emotional grounds, is of value chiefly as forming habits of obedience to what is best. From Aristotle[1] to Professor James[2] the most acute philosophers and wisest teachers have insisted upon the great moral value of good habits, sometimes going so far as to identify morality with them. Therefore we need not take time to show the importance of this element in the moral life. Regular habits of right action established in the little child, before he becomes conscious of the grounds and aims of his conduct, are of great value. Indeed, if a child grows up to be seven or eight years old without forming any such habits of obedience to the right, the loss is almost irretrievable.

[1] "Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intellectual and partly moral, intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered mainly by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time. Moral virtue on the other hand is the outcome of habit, and accordingly its name is derived by a slight deflexion from habit."—ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by J. E. C. Welldon, p. 34. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1892.

[2] "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again."—WILLIAM JAMES, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, p. 121. Compare also the same chapter, p. 127:

"The hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone."

Let it be noted, however, that we can establish such habits lastingly only with some coöperation of the child's will and desire. If a child is forced repeatedly to an action he resents, it is true a path is established and the action becomes easy to him; but if every time he has merely obeyed a superior force, the moment the compulsion is withdrawn his opposite desire tends to prevent his traveling the path we have made easy for him; and what we supposed was a fixed habit may disintegrate in an amazingly short time. I do not mean that compulsion is not necessary; it is often required, and the child must learn very early that, whatever his desire may be, there are certain things he must do, regularly and unquestioningly. Still, to get the value of good habits, we must succeed, sooner or later, in winning the will of the child to some measure of affirmation of the right action.

On the other hand, psychologists have not seen clearly enough how indifferent habits are morally. Almost any habit may be utilized for bad ends as well as good. Take, for instance, the habit of cleanliness and order. How excellent it is as a basis of sane living. We must learn to put things in their places automatically and be clean without thinking about it. Yet even this admirable habit may be brought into the service of all the powers of darkness, as when a mother allows her habit of order to stand in the way of the reasonable activity of her children, or when her habit of cleanliness results in dressing them up like artificial puppets and preventing healthy outdoor play. So the habit of order in any person living much alone is apt to become a still more serious handicap to good living, resulting in real slavery to things.

Again, it is a good habit to eat one's meals regularly and

have a sufficient amount and variety of well-cooked food. Yet everyone can recall individuals who are so tied to their three good meals a day that they make themselves and everyone else miserable the moment their habits are broken into by circumstances. Let me choose as a further illustration a habit still more definitely moral in import—that of frank and regular truth-telling. Surely it is one of the most valuable habits we can foster; yet, unsupervised by reason and good taste, it may give unnecessary hurts and mar one's whole relation to other people.

Thus habits are distinctly not morality, though it is easy to see how the superstition arose that they were so. They are simply wonderful instruments, to be utilized and supervised by conscious reason. Up to a certain point they economize nervous energy and are thus a means of freedom, beyond that point they directly enslave us. Professor James says, in one of the most brilliant passages of his widely quoted chapter on Habit,—a passage he himself values so highly that he repeats it in his *Talks to Teachers*:

"The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work. There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work are subjects of express volitional deliberation."[1]

All would give most cordial assent to the general prin-

[1] *The principles of Psychology*, vol. I, p. 122, also in *Talks to Teachers*, p. 67.

ciple Professor James expresses. Yet the very illustrations he uses suggest the limitation of that principle. It is exactly the 'cup' and 'cigar' that need constant supervision by conscious reason. The man whose habit of smoking has become so automatic that he smokes a good part of the day without knowing it, loses the pleasure of smoking, just as he loses the taste for excellent tobacco. While the man who smokes occasionally, with a conscious sense of new experience each time, keeps the habit in control, and at the same time gets far more pleasure out of it. It is just those unnecessary luxuries that are on the margin of healthy living that need most of all to be kept under the control of conscious reason. To allow the use of them to become blind habit is to be enslaved by them.

Thus it is as necessary that one should be able to break the routine of habit for adequate cause, as it is that one should relegate much of life to the "custody of automatism." There are really two different elements in our adaptation to the conditions and laws of life. Through automatic habit we become adapted to the more permanent and statical elements of environment, through conscious reason and control we are adapted to the new and dynamic factors. The first principle means economy, the second progress, and thus the latter is distinctly higher in import. Our life may depend much more on our ability to resume conscious control of an action and break the continuity of habit, than upon the strength of the latter. For instance, it is widely noted how beneficent is the provision that walking becomes automatic, one foot after the other being lifted and put down with no consciousness on our part. Suddenly one finds one's right foot lifted over an open cellar door: safety and even life itself may depend upon the vigor

and quickness with which one can regain control of the function and put the foot down otherwise than the automatism of habit would demand.

Consider a young man who grows up in a morally healthy American community where a certain type of conduct toward women prevails. He naturally forms the habit of that type of conduct. Suppose him to be suddenly transported as an art student to a continental European city. He finds himself in an environment where a totally different attitude toward women prevails. His conduct will depend somewhat, but not mainly, on the basis of habit he has formed. As that habit was built up by a past environment, it will tend gradually to be replaced by another echoing the new environment. The young man's moral welfare will depend far less on habit, than upon his own independent ideal of life and the strength of his conscious self-control in obedience to it.

Habits are therefore distinctly not morality, but the tools of morality, or the material which can be utilized for moral ends. To live well we need to form good habits, but it is even more necessary that these should be constantly controlled and frequently revised by conscious reason. The habits may be as mechanical as possible if they are kept in their place, but to trust to the mechanism of habit alone is to invite moral atrophy or disaster.

Therefore, as it is necessary to insist upon obedience to personal authority from the beginning of the child's life, thus establishing a basis of moral habits, brain-paths to right action, so it is necessary to transfigure that obedience into free and intelligent response to law as early and as rapidly as possible, thus bringing the blind mechanism of habit under the control and guidance of free and conscious

reason. It is wonderful how early this can be done in some measure, thus making possible a considerable degree of democracy in government. The wise parent will have done something, even before the child reaches school age, to make him aware of the reasons for obedience, and from the beginning of the school period the growth into independent action can be very rapid. Still, until the period of young manhood or womanhood is reached, absolute democracy can rarely be safely introduced. The parent or teacher will resemble a constitutional monarch rather than a democratic president, holding always a large part of the judicial as well as the executive authority, and coöperating in all legislation, whether definitely formulated or not; but holding this unique attitude: anxious to let his authority slip from his hands as rapidly as is consistent with the safety of those over whom it is exercised, and as fast as they can intelligently take it up for themselves.

Thus it is necessary for parents and teachers to plan definite opportunities for conferring with the children about the aim and principles of their common task of government. With a little care this is not difficult to accomplish in the home. In school, the teacher should have at regular periods talks with the pupils (not *at* them) about the questions of school organization and discipline. The children should be encouraged to see and express for themselves the simple aims and laws of the school, that a public opinion in support of the latter may be built up. It is wonderful how much these talks, wisely managed, can do to transform blind obedience into the free and intelligent response to law that is the end of our government.

There is one further difficulty we must overcome in thus

attempting to introduce democracy progressively in home and school government: it is often hard for us to grant the increasing freedom so necessary to the child's moral growth. This is apt to be difficult for us just in proportion to our own moral strength and earnestness. The more deeply we are interested in the child's welfare and the more vigorously we have tried to help him, the more we realize the superiority of our own judgment over his, and so regret to see him make mistakes in the clumsy exercise of his freedom. So we tend to draw the reins tighter until we are in danger of becoming a veritable martinet, holding the child back with a multitude of petty restrictions. When this happens, he not only fails of the desired growth into free and intelligent action, but is in danger of violently reacting against all authority.[1] There is a current proverb that "ministers' children turn out badly." Of course it is not true; but the greater moral interest and care that ministers are apt as a class to give their children, makes it more difficult for the parent to let go increasingly of the reins and grant the measure of freedom necessary to the child's safety as well as growth.

In general it may be said that the greater the moral force in parent or teacher, the greater is the need for reserve in its assertion.[2] As a father who is powerfully intellectual

[1] "I augur better of a child, a youth who is wandering astray on a path of his own, than of many who are walking aright upon paths which are not theirs. If the former, either by themselves, or by the guidance of others, ever find the right path, that is to say, the path which suits their nature, they will never leave it; while the latter are in danger every moment of shaking off a foreign yoke, and abandoning themselves to unrestricted license."—GOETHE, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels*, translated by Carlyle, vol. II, p. 98.

[2] "Parents must not bear the children's burdens for them so long and so completely, that the children acquire no strength wherewith

may so overburden his children as to prevent their fullest intellectual unfolding, so a father or teacher who is unusually strong morally may exercise a similarly overshadowing influence in that aspect of the child's growth, and thus check or crush the child's moral originality or initiative.

We must then learn that hardest form of self-sacrifice, the denial of our own instinctive desire to help the child, and let him strive to help himself, even though his efforts are clumsy and imperfect. Only through the increasing use of freedom can he be prepared for freedom. If our government of him furthers the normal process of converting his blind obedience into free and intelligent response to law, he is being fitted for the functions of good citizenship under free institutions, as well as for life in this human world, where each is free to choose the best and live or the worst and die. We may reasonably hope that such government will lead our children to recognize the great ends of human life and the laws which lead to them. Without passing through any period of harmful capricious reaction, they should be able to pass naturally from the little world of the home and the school into the larger opportunities and duties of human life, recognizing that the same laws to which they have learned intelligently and freely to respond are the conditions of happiness and helpfulness in the great world.

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to bear their own. A mistake that a boy makes himself, and corrects himself, is often better than a dozen right answers furnished for him ready-made by an over-solicitous father or mother."—WILLIAM DEWITT HYDE, *Practical Idealism*, p. 173.

XV

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF CORRECTIVE DISCIPLINE

In carrying into practice the principles of government I have outlined, each child presents a fresh problem; and I must now consider the difficult question of the use of punishments and rewards in rendering our control of children effective for moral culture. No matter how kind and loving government may be, until the plane of free response to law is reached, its authority must be enforced by the use of some kind of corrective discipline. No child acts constantly in harmony with the best; and it is part of our duty to utilize forces which will help the child over his mistakes and bring him into willing response to the law it is necessary to his welfare he should obey.

This use of corrective discipline is obviously only a fraction of the problem of control. The main exercise of our authority should be in establishing conditions of moral health in the ways already indicated: regulating the work and play of children, and utilizing the influences of good environment in art, nature and humanity. As physically light, air, food and exercise are far more important than medicine, and if rightly used will relegate the latter to a place of relative insignificance, so in the moral world, nourishing and guiding the positive growth in love and reason, establishing good habits by the gymnastic of con-

stant exercise, are our main problem in governing children, and in so far as we succeed with it we obviate the need of punishment.

Therefore any theory of education is wrong which emphasizes punishment as the chief means of moral culture. The most conspicuous recent example of such a theory is found, rather unexpectedly, not among the theologians, but among the scientists, in Spencer's admirable little treatise.[1] With his usual incisiveness Spencer strikes at the heart of the subject from the side upon which he attacks it, affirming that the chief moral function of the parent is to see that the child experiences, in a measure not dangerous to life or health, the natural consequences of his actions.[2] This obviously leaves us to enforce the consequences of good as well as bad actions; but Spencer's whole emphasis is placed on bringing home to the child the result of his misdeeds that he may learn a prudential respect for the law he has violated. Such prudence is a valuable element of moral life, but our study so far has shown how much more is demanded in any adequate education for good living. Our main task is to awaken the positive moral life. The method of moral education must be as positive as is its aim. Evil is overcome less by struggling against it than by affirming the good of which it is the negation or distortion. We conquer evil habits by building good ones; we overcome evil desires by falling

[1] HERBERT SPENCER, *Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical*, part III, Moral Education.

[2] "Is it not manifest that as 'ministers and interpreters of Nature' it is the function of parents to see that their children habitually experience the true consequences of their conduct—the natural reactions: neither warding them off, nor intensifying them, nor putting artificial consequences in place of them? No unprejudiced reader will hesitate in his assent."—SPENCER, *Education*, p. 178.

in love with something above ourselves. The anchorite in the desert is tortured by sensual dreams; the man living sanely in the world, absorbed in the pursuit of some worthy objective end, can hardly understand the other's temptation.

The Greeks, who believed so thoroughly in the positive view of life, have given us the clue to the right method of moral culture in the old story of the Sirens. Both Ulysses and Orpheus passed the Sirens, escaped falling victims to the allurements of evil, but how differently. When Ulysses realized that he was near the Sirens he had the ears of his sailors stopped, and caused himself to be bound to the mast. When he came within hearing of the Siren music he was charmed by it and struggled to free himself, calling loudly to the sailors to release him that he might go to the sweet singers. The sailors, not hearing, were untempted, and they rowed him by. They rowed him by! That is all one can say. It was small credit to the moral character of Ulysses, though much to his prudential foresight. On the other hand, when Orpheus came within hearing of the Sirens, he played so sweetly upon the instrument he had invented and sang so wondrously that he was not tempted to leave the ship, nor were his comrades. It is symbolic of the whole problem of moral living: to waken from the instrument of one's own life such music that one is untempted by the Siren song of evil.

Still, if corrective discipline is but a fraction of the problem of government, it is an indispensable part; and as with all other aspects of our control of children its whole aim is the moral welfare of the child. This fact is not well understood by many parents and some teachers at the present time. The old notions of punishment still prevail

and determine our treatment of children in critical moments of their moral growth.

The oldest notion of punishment, historically, was narrowly retributive and born of the instinct of revenge.[1] It held that the offender should be given the same kind and amount of pain he had inflicted on others: "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Undoubtedly there is a certain natural basis for this principle: deeds do return to the doer, and the tendency of the universe is that the evil you do you shall suffer. Moreover, we can within strict limits utilize this natural tendency for purposes of discipline, in some cases bringing home to the consciousness of the offender the meaning of what he has done by repeating it upon him. Yet such discipline should be given for the purpose of reforming the offender; and surely punishment should never spring from either the passion or the idea of vengeance. Is the spirit of revenge ever today other than a hindrance to the right, a clouding of the moral atmosphere? Therefore, is not all punishment for revenge a survival of what should be obsolete? Whatever we hold with reference to the state, certainly such punishment should be obsolete in the discipline of children.

Following the punishment of revenge there came historically a period when punishment was used by the state to deter the criminal and his fellows from the commission of further crimes. Clearly the duty of self-protection gives society the right to use such deterrent punishment, could it only be used wisely. In fact, much of our present penal system rests upon this principle. The tendency

[1] See the excellent discussion of different theories of primitive justice, in W. W. WILLOUGHBY'S *Social Justice*, chapter X. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1900.

in all civilized lands, however, is to soften increasingly the terrible puishments which were given in the earlier applications of the deterrent principle, since severe punishments have proved so ineffectual in preventing crime. For instance, thieves were never more abundant than when hanging was the punishment meted out to their crime together with most offenses, and thieves were then certainly more murderous. Moreover, even were it possible to avoid the terrible abuses into which the state has fallen in the application of the deterrent principle, the result would still be economic rather than moral. A criminal is not made into a good man by being frightened out of his crime. Our aim in the discipline of children is not to protect ourselves from their misdeeds, but to lead them to love and will the best. It is true, there are parents who utilize punishment merely to gain their own comfort. They usually claim that they have a 'right' to punish their children because the children are their own. Such parents do not belong in our civilization; they should have lived—and died—in the old Roman days when the child was legally the father's property. The *right* to punish your child because it is your own? Say rather, the duty to give it the treatment that will help it to the best human development.

What, from the point of view of human society, are then the moral reasons for punishment? They are two, and they can be very simply illustrated. If you had a gangrened finger you would go to the best physician you knew and seek to have it cured. If it could not be cured, you would have it amputated, in the hope of protecting your whole body from the disease. A criminal is a gangrened member of the commonwealth: it is always

our duty to cure him if we can; if not, to amputate him from the social whole to protect it from the infection of his crime.

Thus, morally considered, just punishment is one of two things: it is moral medicine or moral surgery; and under these two heads really falls whatever is just and helpful in the way of deterrent punishment. In dealing with a society of children the element of moral surgery sinks into relative insignificance. There are children so hopelessly spoiled that no appeal we can make will reach them, and we must resort to their separation from normal children for the protection of the latter. At times, expulsion from the school, or sending the child to an institution for reform is the one solution. Such cases ought never to come in the home and they are very rare in the school. Thus the problem of corrective discipline, as it presents itself in our government of children, is mainly to give each child the moral medicine that will correct his faults and help him to moral health.

Is it possible to go beyond this principle and prescribe generally the moral medicine in advance? Spencer thinks so, holding, as we have seen, that the one beneficial form of punishment is the natural consequence of the child's misdeed. To take the universally cited illustration: as the child learns that fire is a dangerous plaything by being burned one or more times, so he should experience the inexorable and inevitable consequences of all his actions that are not in harmony with law, and thus learn to keep his conduct within the limits Nature so rigorously establishes. Nearly the whole of Spencer's treatise on Moral Education is devoted to expanding and illustrating this view. Obviously it is but a modern, more scientific development of a part of Rousseau's theory; but the authority of Spencer and the ripeness of the time have given it wide acceptance.

This theory of Spencer's in reference to moral discipline is not unlike the dreams of Hahnemann in medicine. It may seem strange to liken the rigorous, anything but gentle reactions Spencer would utilize, with the attenuated medicines of the German mystic; yet the two theories result in similar influences. As the "*similia similibus curantur*" and "in mildness is strength" of Hahnemann profoundly modified the older empirical science of medicine, making its treatment gentler and its procedure closer to nature, so the distinctly allopathic theory of Spencer tends to eliminate the arbitrary and therefore harmful elements of punishment and to give the order and unity of natural law to our discipline of children. As Hahnemann wrote in opposition to such arbitrary methods in medicine as the traditional 'bleeding' to cure all diseases, so Spencer writes in conscious protest against the irrational and arbitrary character of our habitual treatment of children; and certainly the parent who indiscriminately whips or scolds a child for every fault, and even for the chance arousing of the parent's impatience, needs the chastening reasonableness of Spencer's view. To give any kind of medicine without reference to the state of the patient and the nature of the disease is in most cases to do grave harm; and scolding contends with whipping for the rank of being the worst of all forms of moral medicine to give indiscriminately.[1]

[1] "As Children should very seldom be corrected by Blows, so I think frequent, and especially passionate *Chiding* of almost as ill Consequence. It lessens the Authority of the Parents, and the Respect of the Child; for I bid you still remember, they distinguish early betwixt Passion and Reason: And as they cannot but have a Reverence for what comes from the latter, so they quickly grow into a Contempt of the former; or if it causes a present Terror, yet it soon wears off, and natural Inclination will easily learn to slight such Scarecrows which make a Noise, but are not animated by Reason."—Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, edited by Quick, p. 56.

It would thus be difficult to exaggerate the value of Spencer's clean-cut theory in clarifying and rationalizing our discipline of children. Is he not, however, in error in advocating a single type of punishment as the sure cure for all moral diseases? There are many cases where the natural working out of a misdeed is the most effective medicine, or at least a part of it, for curing the child; there are many other cases where it is distinctly not so. A tardy child may well be left behind when one goes driving; a careless child should be refused opportunities to do mischief, though practice in carefulness is even more necessary to his cure. On the other hand, it is not enough that a child who is lazy should suffer the parent's disapprobation and the failure to attain ends that are worth while; he needs to be held quietly but firmly to the regular fulfillment of assigned tasks, until he has learned to master his inertia. Again, the natural consequence of slovenly table-manners is exclusion from the society of the family at meal-time. Often a child likes nothing better; and, surely, to allow him to be as slovenly as he pleases alone is not to cure him of the fault, but to deprive him of just the example of good manners that may finally impress itself upon him. So the gluttonous child needs, not to be allowed to gorge himself and then to suffer the natural consequences,—physical discomfort and ultimately disease, with the increasing disgust of those about him,—but to be held persistently to rigid self-denial until the habit of controlling his appetites is formed. The child who is personally dirty needs to be held to regular habits of order and cleanliness, the over imaginative child to definite and exact statement of reality: thus often the corrective discipline that will be most effective in curing the child of

the fault is the exact opposite of the working out of the latter.

Dante, with so much vaster insight into the human spirit, understood far better than Spencer the nature and effect of corrective discipline. In the Inferno, where the souls hate the good, all the punishments are the natural consequences, as Dante sees them, of the various forms of sin; and, with the attitude of hate in the sinners, these punishments are in no degree reformative. In the Purgatorio, where the souls love and seek the good, Dante uses at times the punishment that is the natural working out of the sin, as in the case of the proud who are loaded down with the weight of their pride, the angry who are blinded with the smoke of their own passion, or the licentious who are burned with the fire of their desires. At other times he uses the discipline that is the direct opposite of the sin, as in the case of the slothful who are running to overcome the inertia of their wasted yesterdays, or the gluttonous who are schooled to self-denial and endurance in the presence of the objects of their desire. The point is, not only that each of the two types of punishment may be curative for certain diseases, but that the effect of any kind of moral medicine will depend upon the attitude of the patient.

It is this element of moral attitude and intention the relation of which to the effect of punishment Spencer so signally ignores. To do wrong, and hate the good, and suffer, is to grow worse; to do wrong, and love the good, and suffer, may mean to grow into nobler life. Thus the same form of suffering will often deepen the hate of one and chasten and sweeten another. "All things work together for good *to them that love God*,"[1] never to the others.

[1] *Romans*, chapter VIII, v. 28.

If a soul in Dante's Hell could be turned around and made to face toward God, it would be spiritually in Purgatory, and the suffering that only deepens its hate might educate. Thus the whole moral result of any action depends partly upon the spiritual intention of the doer. If you put your hand into the fire, the fire burns it; if you lie to me, I may or may not cease to trust you. If I see that you are repentant and honestly struggling toward the truth, I may trust you the more because of the bitter experience we have passed through together. Thus while the natural consequences of any action, that is, the results depending upon its modification of the physical order, are inevitable, the moral consequences, though equally law-abiding, are partly determined by the attitude of the doer and will be altered by any change in that attitude.

I need hardly insist on this truth to any teacher or parent who has had thoughtful experience with children. It is far less important what punishment we give a child than what his attitude is toward being punished. I have seen children quite as violently enraged over receiving the entirely natural consequences of their misdeeds as they could possibly be over any purely artificial punishment. Indeed, cannot one recall men and women of whom the same statement is true? To be sure, the rage of the one punished does not prove the punishment bad, but corrective discipline does little for moral reformation unless we can win the reason of the offender to assent to its justice, if not his will to its reception.

It would perhaps be captious to point further that the word 'natural' may mean anything, and so is the source of great confusion. Spencer's use of the word is surprisingly loose in the light of his usual scientific exactness of

statement. It is 'natural' for an irritated parent to scold and for a self-controlled one to deal gently and patiently with a child. Which is the natural consequence that should be allowed to follow and so teach the inexorableness of law? Further, if the whole function of discipline were to allow the child to suffer the natural consequences of his deeds, our office would be purely negative, consisting merely in keeping our hands off, a conclusion so extreme that even Spencer does not accept it.[1]

No, the purpose of the punishments we give children is just to save the waste of nature, to correct the fault before it has worked out its natural consequences in the spirit and life of the child. Sin is death; and if the individual sin long enough and deep enough he will find it out—by dying. The function of corrective discipline is just to avoid that result, to check the disease and if possible cure the child before the sad conclusion of death comes to any capacity of his spirit.

[1] The best criticism of Spencer's theory I have seen is that by Emily A. E. Shirreff, in a pamphlet entitled *Moral Training: Froebel and Herbert Spencer*. This brief pamphlet is full of wisdom and helpful suggestion. If somewhat over zealous for Froebel, it nevertheless presents clearly the limitations of Spencer's view, and shows how complementary that view and the one usually held in the kindergarten are to each other.

XVI

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIVE DISCIPLINE

If corrective discipline should always be regarded as moral medicine, given to reëstablish moral health in the child, how shall we proceed in order to administer it wisely and successfully? Does not the parallel physical case throw light on our problem? If your child is ill in body you do not go to the drug-store and buy some patent medicine and feed it to him—not if you have some glimmerings of intelligence. You call in a trained expert, who examines the child in detail: feels the pulse, takes the temperature, considers the bodily habit and condition for days past, and thus makes his diagnosis and prescribes. Is moral diagnosis easier? And yet intelligent(?) educators continue to advocate some specific moral medicine—whipping, keeping in after school, reasoning with the child, or whatever the proposed remedy may be—as the cure-all for every disease! When a difficult case of moral disease arises should not our method of treatment be similar to that which we consider wisest in dealing with bodily illness? We need the counsel of every available expert—school principal, minister, physician or other wise friend; and the time is not far distant when in our public school system we shall make regular provision for such expert consultation. Meantime every parent and teacher must

strive for all the wisdom and training possible in dealing with difficult problems.[1] The moral diagnosis is surely more subtle and difficult than the physical. We must make it with the help of all the wisdom and skill we can bring to bear upon the special case; and then with equal thought and care the needed moral medicine must be administered.[2] There is no way of deciding beforehand what that medicine should be; it must be adapted to the special state of the individual, and can be most wisely selected only when all the factors bringing about the abnormal condition are understood. That is why much of the discussion of corporal punishment, pro and con, has been so futile. There is no meaning in asking whether or not corporal punishment should be used. There are cases where a good, strong dose of quinine is prescribed by an intelligent physician as the best medicine for the child's body. So there are cases where a good, straight infliction of physical pain will best meet a child's specific moral condition.[3]

Whether the right to administer such a medicine can safely be entrusted to the average teacher is another question. Strong medicines are dangerous for general use

[1] "The best humored woman in the world, if she is stupid, is not fit to have the care of a child."—M. and R. L. Edgeworth, *Practical Education*, vol. I, p. 138.

[2] "I confess that I have been amazed and overwhelmed, to see a teacher spend an hour at the blackboard, explaining arithmetical questions, and another hour on the reading or grammar lessons; and, in the meantime, as though it were only some interlude, seize a boy by the collar, drag him to the floor, castigate him, and remand him to his seat,—the whole process not occupying two minutes. Such laborious processes for the intellect, such summary dealings with the heart."—Horace Mann, *The Life and Works of Horace Mann*, vol. II, pp. 359-360.

[3] "The view which sees in the rod the panacea for all the teacher's embarrassments is reprehensible, but equally so is the false sentimentality which assumes that the dignity of humanity is affected

in exact proportion to their effectiveness in rare cases. The careless use of strong remedies has done infinite harm; and to whip for every moral fault is exactly on the plane of medicine when it bled the patient for every disease. To administer any medicine, physical or moral, as the one cure for all possible diseases, is to do positive harm to the vast majority of cases. But leaving aside the difficult question of the measure of authority in using strong remedies which may safely be accorded to this or that person, certainly any medicine or method of treatment may be best for some special case, and the problem of prescription is wholly individual.

This does not mean that we have no principles to guide us in prescribing: were that true, our art of moral discipline would degenerate into the merest artifice, and there would be no meaning in our attempt to study it. Again the comparison with medicine holds. Definite principles of treatment are laid down for dealing with disease in its various forms. So morally we are guided by the great principles already implied: (1) Corrective discipline should aim

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by a blow given to a child, and confounds self-conscious humanity with child-humanity, to which a blow is the most natural form of reaction, when all other forms of influence have failed."—ROSENKRANZ, *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 41-42.

"It will be in vain to try and do entirely without corporal punishments, which usually come in when reproofs are of no further use. They ought to be so rare, however, that they are feared as something in the distance rather than as actually carried into effect."—HERBART, *Letters and Lectures on Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 123.

Compare further the discussion of punishments, corporal and other, by President G. STANLEY HALL, in Moral Education and Will-Training, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. II., pp. 72–89.

See WILLIAM HAWLEY SMITH, *The Evolution of Dodd*, chapter V, for a case where a sound whipping was the best possible moral medicine.

solely at the eradication of the fault and the establishment of moral health in the child. (2) It should utilize punishments which are as natural as possible, logically flowing from the fault, and therefore teaching respect for the laws of life and prudence in the presence of the rigorous limitations Nature sets to human action. (3) It should enforce the discipline that gives self-control and the power to resist wrong desire. (4) It should waken love and pursuit of the virtue of which the fault is the distortion or negation. Yet, when all is said, the prescription in every case must be individual; and we must never forget, as Arthur Giles says in the best sentence of his little book on *Moral Pathology* (p. 3), that "In moral, as in medical pathology, the patient, and not the disease, must be treated."

Let me take a few characteristic cases of moral discipline to illustrate the fact that while we must be guided by certain large principles, the application of these must be individual in every instance. Consider the problem of the lies which so many children form the habit of telling somewhere between the ages of seven and fourteen. Sometimes this habit of telling what is not true comes merely from an over active imagination. In such cases we need to bring the child into contact with reality in nature and history, limit somewhat the opportunities for the play of his fancy, and hold him persistently to making the careful distinction between what is or was, and what men believed or he fancies might be. Usually the patient application of this discipline will cure such cases.[1]

By far the larger number of children's lies spring, how-

[1] See a brief article by President Hall, classifying children's lies under seven distinct heads, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, pp. 211–218.

ever, from a different cause. The child's play of intellect develops in advance of his consciousness of moral relationship and his love of being true, that is, real. So he tends to use his growing wit to get out of unpleasant situations; and this tendency is greatly accentuated by the premium parents carelessly put on lying. The child has been allowed to go to a neighbor's with instructions to get back at five o'clock, and returns at half-past six. You ask why he is late, and he responds that he forgot, or Mrs. Brown did not tell him at the right time. Whether these statements are true or false, they tend to palliate your treatment of the child and thus to let him more easily out of an unpleasant situation. So the habit of stating his case in its best possible light, making excuses that are not quite true, grows on him, until to our grief we discover we have a case of deliberate and undoubted falsehood on our hands.[1] The problem is serious, but we can easily take it too seriously. It does not mean total depravity nor does it mean what a deliberate lie would be for us. Some children are saved from this fault by a kind of dogged hold on reality, others by a lack of clear foresight and care for consequences; but just those children who are brightest intellectually, unless this quality is balanced by unusual moral strength, are the ones who develop the fault in its most obstinate form.

[1] "To speak truth there must be moral equality or else no respect; and hence between parent and child intercourse is apt to degenerate into a verbal fencing bout, and misapprehensions to become ingrained. And there is another side to this, for the parent begins with an imperfect notion of the child's character, formed in early years or during the equinoctial gales of youth; to this he adheres, noting only the facts which suit with his preconception; and wherever a person fancies himself unjustly judged, he at once and finally gives up the effort to speak truth."—Robert Louis Stevenson, *Virginibus Puerisque*, p. 77.

It may be worth while to ask: Why should the child not lie when that will save him from an uncomfortable situation? There are just two reasons why he should not: (1) Lying is in itself ugly and bad, and leads to the destruction of one's power to see and know the truth. (2) Lying is a violation of the moral relations we sustain to others, leads to their distrust of us, and in the end makes living with them impossible. Thus our problem in dealing with this fault in children is, not to suppress the intellectual activity, but to direct it into right channels and accelerate the balancing moral growth.[1] There are three phases of treatment we can adopt: (1) We must treat the particular misdeeds of the child as less bad and harmful than the deceit by which he seeks to avoid their unpleasant results, and thus cease putting the premium on lying.[2] (2) We must foster in every possible way the child's love of truth, that is, his desire to be real and not a sham. (3) We must do all in our power to waken him to a recognition of the moral relation he sustains to us and to others, make him realize the meaning and consequence of breaking that relation, and so develop his sense of obligation to be true to it.

How shall we do this? The principles we have outlined are sufficient to establish conditions of good moral hygiene and to indicate the general method of treatment; the moment we raise the question of specific prescription no for-

[1] "The habitual gratification of all a child's wishes indirectly cultivates mendacity, for truth requires a robust and hardy self-sacrifice, which luxury makes impossible."—President Hall, Children's Lies, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, p. 218.

[2] "Above all things, an invariable rule in moral education is not to throw a child upon self-defense. The movement towards defending one's self and making excuses, is worse than almost any act of overt wrong."—Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, *Guide to the Kindergarten*, p. 56.

mula can be given. We must work with the individual on the basis of the principles just outlined. Sometimes we can waken the child best by persisting in trusting him, even when he violates our confidence, thus seeking to touch his more generous instincts and shame him out of his error. The natural consequence of his fault, suspicion and distrust on our part, is usually harmful rather than helpful, unless carefully utilized to teach a specific lesson. In rare cases it may be wise to promise something to the child and then deliberately not fulfill the promise, thus enforcing the lesson of what his breaking the moral relationship means, by giving him a painful example from our side. This expedient is obviously very dangerous, and would succeed only in a few cases and where most circumspectly carried out. With every child erring in this way, we may seek to establish the habit of truth-speaking by insisting, without being a martinet, on exact statement in all matters, intellectual as well as moral. One great value of natural science is that it demands invariably exact statement; that is one reason it has done so much to cultivate the religion of truth in modern times.[1]

My point is that always a multitude of expedients is at hand: our problem is to select and adopt from them those that will reach the individual case. Only, however, as we foster the positive moral growth in love of truth and

[1] "Habits of truthfulness are best cultivated by the use of the senses in exact observation. To see a simple phenomenon in nature and report it fully and correctly is no easy matter, but the habit of trying to do so teaches what truthfulness is, and leaves the impress of truth upon the whole life and character. I do not hesitate to say, therefore, that elements of science should be taught to children for the moral effects of its influence."—President Hall, The Moral and Religious Training of Children and Adolescents, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, p. 201.

appreciation of human relationship can we permanently conquer the fault, by excluding its possibility.

Let us consider the treatment of another characteristic vice—sullenness—than which none is more blighting to the individual nor more destructive to the happiness of the home. The worst is that this vice tends peculiarly to feed upon itself. This is true in a measure of every vice, since each expression deepens the fault; but sullenness shuts the individual up within himself, and at the same time creates an aversion to those about him, thus separating him from the best influence to help him—the persistent kindliness of others. Dante represents the sullen people as sunk in the mud of the river of hell, ever "gurgling in their throats:"

> "We sullen were
> In the sweet air, which by the sun is gladdened,
> Bearing within ourselves the sluggish reek;
> Now we are sullen in this sable mire."[1]

Dante simply shows the sullen come to consciousness of what they are,—people who prefer to cover themselves with the mire of Styx rather than to smile joyously in the sunshine.

In dealing with this exasperating fault it is evident that its natural consequence, the expression of irritation and disgust on the part of those about the erring person, serves only to deepen the fault. What then is to be done? Again we can only outline the general method of treatment, leaving its specific application to be worked out on the basis of a sympathetic study of the individual. First

[1] *Divine Comedy*, Longfellow's translation, Inferno, canto VII.

of all we should strive to waken the child to the beauty of cheerfulness and the joy of being helpful to others. Second, we must appeal to his ambition for self-mastery, welcoming and encouraging the slightest effort he makes to conquer himself. Third, we should make him see that his vice unfits him for living happily and helpfully with others. Fourth, there are times when we may send the child off alone to fight out his problem, provided we can win him to accept this temporary isolation not as a resented punishment, but as an opportunity for getting control of himself. Lastly, we must express in our conduct toward the child the exact opposite of the behavior sullenness tends to produce in those who are annoyed by it, showing him unfailing courtesy and kindliness; for the least echo in us of the child's sullenness adds fresh gloom to his mood. Rare indeed are the cases where we may dare to give the strong purgative of our vigorous expression of annoyance at his conduct.

Thus in all application of corrective discipline our central aim must be to waken the positive moral life of the child. His discouragement may be a serious blight,[1] as the non-consent of his reason and even the opposition of his will may be a dangerous obstacle to the good result of the punishment. At the same time we must beware of sugar-coating our moral medicine. While the child's courage and enthusiasm are the most helpful allies we can enlist, there must be a rigid backbone in our discipline. I have pointed out the folly of trying to trick a child into obedience: let me emphasize the fact that, if often econom-

[1] "Dejection which becomes habitual is consumption of the character."—HERBART, *Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 213.

ically helpful, such a procedure is usually morally worthless. As it is well that a child should know that he is obeying and conform because it is right, so it is well that he should recognize that he is receiving moral medicine, often bitter and distasteful to him, but which is necessary to his best life and given that he may attain it.

It remains to say a word about the use of rewards—the most misunderstood element in the whole problem of discipline. People speak of 'rewards and punishments' as if the two terms were entirely correlative; but they are not so. The reward which in the nature of things follows good action,—joy in the doing, the loving appreciation of those who are helped by the deed, the positive benefit of the deed to oneself and others,—is, like food and sunshine for the physical organism, a wonderful nourisher and quickener of the moral life. The element of it most within our control is the warm expression of our love and appreciation for every good action on the part of our children. This should be given in fullest measure. Not only do children need it and benefit greatly by it, but many an adult life is half-starved spiritually for want of just that generous expression of appreciation which should be one of the most natural consequences of moral action and endeavor. Nor is there often in this regard any subtle problem of personal adjustment as in the case of punishment. While we must beware of praising too openly the child who is rather consciously virtuous, it is rare that a human being can receive too much sunshine in either the physical or the moral life.

The specific and arbitrary rewards, on the other hand, which we give children over and above these natural results of their good conduct, are directly comparable to

physical stimulants. It is well known what happens when stimulants are *substituted* for nourishing food; and if in the moral world the adventitious reward takes, in the child's thought, the place of the natural consequences of good action, the result is a flabby, ill-nourished character, unable to stand erect, and craving an extra and increasing stimulant for every action in harmony with law.[1] Thus there are ample grounds for the vigorous modern reaction against this sort of rewards; indeed, that reaction is one of the most hopeful signs in present education. There is no reason why a child should regularly be given candy for sitting still, or be promised a drive for ceasing to tease his brother; nor is there any reason why a student should be given twenty dollars for getting his lessons honestly. To work merely for the prize is like eating a meal for the sake of a teaspoonful of "Beef, Wine and Iron" at the end.

Yet there are cases physically where a good physician would unhesitatingly prescribe a stimulant to rouse into action some abnormally torpid function. So morally, a sluggish nature may need just the stimulus of an appeal to the instinct of emulation and rivalry, which has a sound value in human life when rightly expressed and duly subordinated to higher motives. Thus even prizes may have a place, though a small one; and we should allow neither the frequent abuse of them nor the modern reaction against

[1] "No less detrimental to the attainment of human life is the predominance frequently given in religious instruction to the promise of reward for good deeds in a future life, if they seem to go unrewarded in this life. Brutal minds who hold sensual pleasure highest are not affected by this; boys and human beings generally, with a normally good disposition, do not need it. For, if our life is pure, if our actions are right and good, no reward in a future world is needed, even though in this world all may be lacking that seems valuable to the sensual man."—FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, translated by Hailmann, p. 244.

their use to obscure for us their occasional therapeutic value. To have this value they must be given as rarely and carefully as a physician prescribes a physical stimulant, and we must never let them be substituted for the real nourishment of the moral life. Moreover, their use is helpful, not when they are given for superior natural endowments, but when they are used to stimulate sincere effort. With these restrictions, it is possible to make them a temporarily helpful if an altogether subordinate element in furthering moral growth.

I have spoken, in previous chapters, of the danger of over-regulation of child life: nowhere is that danger greater than in the whole problem of administering corrective discipline. It is always true that too much medicine is worse than none at all. In moral discipline nagging is worse than futile, and the ceaseless commands of a martinet lose all effectiveness.[1] Thus we must learn to distinguish between what is essential and what is not. It is fatal to take everything a child does on the same plane of seriousness; and a sense of humor, which enables us to regard as amusing childish incongruities, what otherwise

[1] "Are not the constant, and often quite needless, thwartings that the young experience—the injunctions to sit still, which an active child cannot obey without suffering great nervous irritation, the commands not to look out of the window when traveling by railway, which on a child of any intelligence entails serious deprivation—are not these thwartings, we ask, signs of a terrible lack of sympathy?"—SPENCER, *Education*, p. 168.

"Parents should use consideration in their commands. If a child is absorbed in an occupation, the mother might well think twice before she asks him to leave it to get her a glass of water. Should he not hear her voice at once, this is a good sign, not a bad one. The quality of attention to the work on hand, that concentration which forgets all outside distractions, is a most desirable trait and should be encouraged."—SUSAN CHENERY, *As the Twig is Bent*, p. 35.

we should treat as annoying faults, is indispensable to the wise control of children. One value of sending the child away from home for a time is that we thereby gain perspective with reference to his faults, and so can concentrate our energies on helping him over those which are really important. Some measure of vigorous expression must be allowed children even when it is awkward and annoying.

This principle is the more important since so many of the faults of children belong to stages of their development and are wholly or in part outgrown after a time. Take for instance the exasperating tendency to tease younger children which develops in nearly every child at some period of his life. This offensive disease passes much like measles or whooping-cough, and many a brother and sister who have it in severe form are afterwards tenderly devoted to each other. We should, nevertheless, not neglect these more transient faults; if we do they are apt to leave permanent evil effects in the moral life of the individual. The need is that we should recognize that the fault is characteristic of a phase of growth and treat it as such, not as a permanent perversion of the child's spirit.

Even wise restraint and correction should never occupy the chief place in the relation of the parent or the teacher to the child. If a father sees his children little except at meal-times he would better let many a fault in table-manners go uncorrected rather than give his children the notion that his main function is to reprove them. The wisest self-restraint is necessary in all expression of authority in corrective discipline.[1]

[1] "Do not educate too much; refrain from all avoidable application of that power by which the teacher bends his pupils this way and that, dominates their dispositions, and destroys their cheerfulness." —HERBART, *The Science of Education*, translated by Felkin, p. 106.

Thus the problem of corrective discipline is one of fine proportion; clear as are the great principles involved, their wise application is possible only on the basis of a careful and sympathetic study of each child. We must seek to understand his peculiar tendencies and characteristics, the phase of development through which he is passing, and every disturbing factor that influences his reaction. Especially must we recognize the intimate relation of mind and body and the immediate effect of any physical disturbance on conduct. Nervousness tends to irritability and mischievousness; physical depression gives a gloomy and irresponsive mental attitude; indigestion makes the child peevish: thus every physical condition is a modifying element in behavior. To be sure, the child needs to learn to control himself even under physical illness; but we who seek to give him moral medicine must recognize every factor in his disease. We must learn to utilize physical training in the discipline for moral uprightness, bodily cleanliness as an influence for personal purity.

As the child is then a unity, so must be the treatment he receives. We have been considering in turn different means of moral education, we must see that, after all, the practical value of each one depends upon its relation to all the rest. Every detail of discipline must be interpreted in terms of the entire circle of treatment the child receives. That is why full and unvarying coöperation with each other, on the part of all who are dealing with the problem of the child's culture, is so indispensable. If the mother's decision is reversed by the father, family discipline becomes a farce. If the child plays teacher and parent off against each other, receiving sympathy from one for the punishment given by the other, the result is con-

tempt for all authority. How discipline is paralyzed by the mutual suspicions of parents and teachers, each regarding the other as a kind of natural enemy and resenting any effort at inquiry and assistance as an intrusion into his own sphere! Frequent meeting together on the part of all who share in the control of the children, with full, frank, trusting coöperation, is the necessary basis of all helpful discipline.[1] The physician of the body and the physician of the soul may well be invited to join with those who, whether parents or teachers, must be both in one.

The needed coöperation must involve on the parents' part the concession of some measure of real authority to the teacher and the withholding of any interference with the authority conceded. There must be real authority, in order to gain the child's respect and make the discipline effective in educating him to obedience to law. The withdrawal of real authority from teachers in certain highly cultivated communities has led to much of the adventitious 'managing' which we have found to be so harmful morally. To concede authority to the average teacher involves risks, I know; but little good can come unless we are willing to risk something; and think of the measure of authority the order of life concedes to the average parent! If Nature has dared to trust us so fully, surely we owe some measure of the same trust to those who are fellow-workers with us in the moral culture of our children.

[1] HARRIET A. MARSH, in A New Aspect of Child Study, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. V, pp. 136–145, describes a typical and successful experiment in bringing mothers and teachers together to discuss their common interests.

XVII

PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF PARENT AND TEACHER IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILDREN

We have now considered the various aspects of the problem of government in home and school. It is necessary to recognize further that the personal character of those exercising the control will be the power behind all others in determining its moral effect upon the children governed. Personal influence remains a great force throughout human life; but it is far more powerful with children than with adults, not only because of the well-known imitative tendency of children, but because the child's world is distinctly a personal world. The activities of nature and the order of human society are alike conceived by him in terms of the personal will and desire he is conscious of within himself. Thus the parent and the teacher, who mediate between the child and the universe of law, have an opportunity to give the crowning influence for moral education.

Moreover, the control of children is much more personal than is government in adult society. It is true the element of personality enters also into government in the state. The safety and progress of any society must depend in part upon securing men and women of earnest and true character to exercise the various governmental functions. Yet in the

state we have a constitution and a definite body of law; while in the home and the school, within loose limits, it is only the conscience of the one in authority that can guide his action. Moreover, in the state we carefully separate the three functions of government, at least in theory, and make one a check upon the others. We would not dare to trust even a Washington or a Lincoln with the permanent exercise of all three functions of government; yet in the home and the school these are united in a single person. It is true, the individual teacher is limited by the principal, superintendent, school board, and by the law of the community, while much more vaguely the parent is subject to the restraint of law and public opinion. Still, in all the ordinary affairs of school and home life, the parent and the teacher exercise all three functions of government: laying down the law for the child, deciding when it is obeyed or disobeyed, and executing it over him. Thus paternalism, which we question in the state, has undoubtedly its place in the government of children. Moreover, in home and school, the one holding authority is often at once judge and aggrieved party, so that great love and care are demanded if power is to be used solely for the good of the child. Thus, in all the little elements of home and school, the parent and the teacher can influence children for good or evil to a degree not equaled in any of the relations of mature life.

There are striking differences in the equipment of teachers and parents respectively for this difficult task. We complain justly of the inefficiency of our teaching force today. We have not begun to educate and select our teachers as we shall when we pay, as President Eliot wisely insists we must, four or five times as much for our public

schools as we do now.[1] Meantime, even today teachers are a highly selected class in the community. They receive a degree of both liberal and special culture far above the average of their fellow-citizens; and there is no class, not excepting the ministry, more consecrated to its mission. On the other hand, almost any kind of a human being, even a physically and morally diseased one, is apt to feel that he has a perfect right to be a parent if he wishes. The way public conscience on this problem halts behind its general development is really amazing. The most powerful of all single influences we can exert is that of direct heredity; yet we leave its action to chance and personal choice, while carefully restraining the individual in his treatment of the child after it has appeared upon this scene. I realize that I am repeating a very old complaint; and the reason we are slow to act upon it is partly that the action of heredity is so mysterious and unaccountable. Moreover, heredity is not the grim ogre it seemed in the *Elsie Venner*[2] days when the great applications of biological discoveries to humanity were first made. We know that the influences of environment and education can modify the stuff of humanity, physically, mentally and morally, in simply a marvelous degree. Still, these forces can work only with the material given by heredity; and where the chances are large that the offspring will be feeble-minded or insane, if the individual is not moral enough to refrain from reproducing himself, it would seem that society as a

[1] Compare the admirable addresses by President Eliot in *More Money for the Public Schools.*

[2] Oliver Wendell Holmes's novel of that name is an interesting illustration of the older theory of heredity from which, happily, science has receded.

whole should restrain his freedom of action.[1] I take the extreme case for illustration: what is needed is an awakening of conscience, both individual and public, in reference to the problem.

Not less necessary is an awakening of conscience in reference to the vocation of parenthood. Certainly that office demands as much preparation as the profession of teaching; yet how heedlessly we undertake it. There is some recent progress toward better preparation, it is true. Mothers are beginning to see that their vocation requires a considerable measure of both liberal and special training. Mothers' clubs are helping to develop this more earnest attitude. On the other hand, the profession of fatherhood (even the phrase sounds strange) is practically undiscovered. Most fathers feel that they have done quite well by their children if they have won for them the measure and kind of food, clothing and shelter demanded by the social standard of their group. Men are under a terrible economic pressure, it is true. The tension of the industrial struggle has never been so severe for all classes as it is in our America today. Yet what fathers need to understand is that food, clothing and shelter, luxurious or simple, can never compensate to the child for loss of the father's companionship; that it would be better for the child to get on with less material comfort and even suffer some physical

[1] An astonishing bit of data was recently given me by the principal of a school for the feeble-minded: he said that one of his difficult administrative problems arose from the frequent desire of attendants to marry inmates of the institution. He cited a case that had just occurred, where a nurse had written the parents of a feeble-minded ward asking them to have their son sent home that she might marry him. Of course she was discharged, but she succeeded in marrying the youth. A physician who was present when the incident was narrated remarked grimly, "Well, at least she will know how to take care of her children!"

hardship, if by so doing he could have some direct contact each day with his father, when the latter's helpful influence might be exercised over him. It is interesting that often fathers with some margin of economic success are the most careless, while one of the compensating elements in the life of the poor is the frequent close family companionship.

It should never be forgotten, however, that the parental instinct, while it does not usually awaken in time to give the best preparation for the vocation of parenthood, is a tremendous force driving the parent to the fulfillment of his task when it has come to him. If a teacher is usually far better trained for his profession than a parent, he can only stand in silent awe before the infinite patience, tenderness and self-forgetfulness a mother characteristically shows. The peculiar intimacy of the bond between parent and child, a bond established in the most fundamental instincts of the organism, brings to the fulfillment of the parental function an amount of loving care and devotion unmatched elsewhere in human life.[1] That is why almost any kind of a home is better for children than any kind of a "Home." Philanthropical societies for the protection of children have done good work in removing children from homes that have become so degraded, such a travesty on the word, that the children's physical as well as moral

[1] "Another thing makes moral education, according to Froebel's view, especially a home task, and it is that with young children education works so directly through feeling. It is parental love that gives the moral influence, apart from and adding to parental authority, on which so much of the right cultivation of feeling and motive and conduct depend. The teacher can only follow afar in the track of those parents who understand and are fit for their holy office."—EMILY A. E. SHIRREFF, *Moral Training: Froebel and Herbert Spencer*, p. 7.

life is endangered; but well-meaning societies often err on the side of over-interference. It is doubtful if a single grave moral fault in the parent is as harmful as the deadening hand of an institution;[1] and certainly economic failure under industrial conditions like ours is never enough to justify the enforced breaking of "the bond that Nature makes." Protect children in every possible way, but, except as a last extreme measure when all others have failed, do not disrupt the home and so abrogate the one supreme influence in molding a strong human character.

Thus there are striking inequalities in the fitness of parents and teachers for the performance of their respective functions. On the one hand, at least half the burden under which the public school struggles today is work that should have been done in the home and has not been accomplished there. On the other hand, the better training of the teacher gives him frequently an arrogance leading him to disdain the judgment of the parent, which, less intellectual, is based upon long-continued physical and moral intimacy with the child. Meantime, both parents and teachers are engaged not merely in a profession, but in a *mission* to save childhood—to save by calling forth and developing the best implicit life. It is no excuse for one that another's task is unfinished or mismanaged. Our business is not to fill an economic measure: each one who is alive to the need must do his own work and as much of the unfinished work of others as possible. Since so large a part of all the personal influence to which children are subjected is accidental and often harmful, there is the more need for

[1] Compare Father HUNTINGTON'S searching analysis of the evils of institutional life for children in pp. 171-182 of *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, by JANE ADDAMS, *et al.*

consecration on the part of the parents and teachers who are awake.

As the child needs the influence of both father and mother, so he needs the influence of both men and women teachers. One of the gravest problems of our public system of education is the almost complete exclusion of men from teaching positions below the high school. The reasons for this movement are economic and evident; but children need contact with teachers of both sexes in order to develop the most rounded and healthy moral life. We must waken public sentiment that will enable us to pay whatever is necessary, in money and otherwise, to secure men teachers as well as women in all the process of education.

It is what the parent or teacher *is*, not what he pretends to be, that influences children. We hear it said that parents and teachers should be models to their children: nothing can be more disastrous than to attempt that. Few if any of us are worthy to be models, and to try to stand as such is to think more and more about how we appear, and less and less about what we are—which is the highroad to hypocrisy. What we need is not to pretend the virtues necessary to helpful influence over children, but to struggle toward those virtues with all our might.

We can easily discover the needed elements of character by asking what virtues make the personality of the head of the state helpful to all the citizens. What, for instance, were the qualities that made the character of Lincoln so uplifting to every American citizen who understood him and sympathized with his aims? They were: first, sincerity—intense, even sombre sincerity; second, uncompromising justice; third, love or humanity, that is, a

loving of the best for all. We cannot love all people in a personal way, but it is possible to love and desire the best for each one; and such a love was the crowning element in the character of Lincoln. It was these three virtues that gave moral power to Lincoln's personality, winning him the lasting reverence of those who misunderstood and opposed, as well as those who followed him. It is just these three virtues that are so necessary in the character of the parent and the teacher if our government of children is to be morally helpful, only we must multiply many times their importance in an executive of the state to realize their power in the home and the school.

Of these virtues, sincerity is the most fundamental, since it is the very basis of character. Indeed, one's sincerity is simply the measure of one's moral reality. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this quality in all our relation to children. They are far more sensitive to sincerity or its absence than are we, owing to the measure of habitual lying present in our business and social life. It is not a very dark kind of lying, this that we practise in saying what we do not mean—both speaker and listener are vaguely aware of the falsehood—but its cumulative result is to dull the edge of our instinct for truth. Thus we tend to lose something of our power to distinguish between the real and the unreal. Children have not yet come into the world where good manners and business success are supposed to demand habitual untruthfulness. Their lies fall into another category, and they are even annoyingly frank in expressing just what they feel. It is therefore they are so keenly sensitive to moral reality. They may not know why they dislike a certain teacher, but they are repelled by insincerity; they may not understand what

draws them to this other, but a real human being, who means something, always attracts them.

I suppose we recognize this sufficiently in purely intellectual matters. The parent does not hesitate to confess his ignorance when the child questions him. This is more difficult for the teacher, since to know is his business. It is hard to stand up before a class and say "The answer I gave to the problem in arithmetic yesterday was wrong," or, "I was mistaken in the date I gave in the history lesson;" yet, if the mistake has been made surely every wise teacher recognizes that honest confession is the only safe way out. Of course, if the teacher has not the background of larger knowledge necessary to his work, and continues to acknowledge his mistakes, in the end he loses his position. But in such a situation this is just what is best for the teacher as well as for the children. It is ruinous to try to continue in a position one is hopelessly unfitted to fill. One can keep hold only by using something else than character and intelligence; and when it comes to a question of losing one's situation or losing one's soul no sensible person would hesitate long at the choice.

Unfortunately the identical application of the principle to the moral world is not so clearly seen. If a parent has punished a child unjustly it is hard to say "My child, I did wrong, and I am sorry for it;" yet if the mistake has been made is there any other safe way out? "Oh!" it is exclaimed, "if we apologize to our children, they will lose their respect for us." Now, it may well be questioned why we should demand that our children reverence us; but aside from that, is it true that a frank apology will lessen the child's real respect for us? Let me give an illustration: I remember speaking severely to a five-year-

old child who was misbehaving at the table. She answered quite discourteously. On being asked why she had spoken so, she said: "Oh, I only wanted to show you the tone of voice you used!" Impudent, of course; and we have seen how necessary it is to the child's welfare that we should suppress his impudence. Yet in the case in question I had done wrong; and the child, recognizing the fact, seized, with the quick wit children often show in emergencies, upon the easiest way to divert attention and escape from an unpleasant situation.

Suppose one were to use one's force of moral and physical personality and simply suppress the child: the child is silenced but despises the parent who had to resort to his superior size. Suppose, on the other hand, the parent acknowledges his fault and apologizes for it: when he turns to the further question of the child's impudence his hands are strengthened. He meets the child on the plane of moral equality in reference to right action, the only plane on which any moral question can be solved. The child straightens up; it is no longer five years old or three feet high, but a human spirit to whom you have said—by your action, not in words—"My child, I see in you a spirit entrusted through some mystery of the universe for a little time to my care, and I recognize it as my earnest duty to give you whatever treatment will help you out into the sanest and sweetest life."

It is in the latter case that the real respect of the child is kept,—not the notion of our supposed infallibility, sure to be shattered sooner or later, but the reverence that comes from seeing more and more clearly that, through all our mistakes, we have been striving, not for our ease or comfort, but for the child's welfare. To try to keep in the

child's mind a notion of our infallibility is dangerous in the extreme. We are not infallible, and the child must discover the fact sooner or later. To make the discovery suddenly in the period of transition to young manhood and womanhood often gives a moral shock that does permanent harm. It is our business to save the child from such shocks. Moreover, it is not our imperfect, blundering personality we should wish the child to reverence, but the order of the universe we are striving to interpret to him, those

> "Unwritten laws of God that know not change.
> They are not of today nor yesterday,
> But live forever, nor can man assign
> When first they sprang to being."[1]

The earlier the child's respect can pass from us to those unvarying laws, the better for both, and the more surely will the deeper reverence for the parent's sincerity of aim and effort be retained into mature life.

Thus the adult deserves respect, not as an arbitrary authority, but as a mediator: to secure the child's reverence for law the parent himself must be law-abiding. Froebel recognized clearly this common subserviency of adult and child to the law ruling over both, and stated it finely in a passage of *The Education of Man* (Hailmann's translation, pages 14-15):

"Between the two, between educator and pupil, between request and obedience, there should invisibly rule a third something, to which educator and pupil are equally subject. This third something is the *right*, the *best*, neces-

[1] SOPHOCLES, *Antigone*, Plumptre's translation.

sarily conditioned and expressed without arbitrariness in the circumstances. The calm recognition, the clear knowledge, and the serene, cheerful obedience to the rule of this third something is the particular feature that should be constantly and clearly manifest in the bearing and conduct of the educator and teacher, and often firmly and sternly emphasized by him. The child, the pupil, has a very keen feeling, a very clear apprehension, and rarely fails to distinguish, whether what the educator, the teacher, or the father says or requests is personal or arbitrary, or whether it is expressed by him as a general law and necessity."

Thus there can be no helpful control of children without entire sincerity in the parent and teacher. Not only can we afford to risk frankness and truth in our government of children: anything but sincerity is a sure road to moral disaster.

As children are more sensitive to moral reality than we are, so they feel more keenly justice and injustice; and for a similar reason. As adults we live in a world involving some measure of moral compromise. The ideals we start with in life are difficult to harness in the world's work. We make concessions to expediency here, and compromise with conditions there, until the middle-aged man wakens to wonder where his ideals have gone. Whether such compromise is ever admissible, or always wrong, is a question I cannot undertake here; its presence as an almost universal fact of human life must be acknowledged. Children have not yet come into this world of moral compromise; they have no baffling experience to give them a philosophy of expediency, and thus in so far as they think at all they are uncompromising rationalists, seeing the pure law and

applying it with no consciousness of possible exceptions.[1] Many a father has been shamed out of some dishonorable action by his child's simple assumption that if you think a certain deed is right, of course you will do it. All reformers who have held to the absoluteness of the moral law have been simply grown up children, men and women who have kept the child's moral rationalism.[2]

Therefore little actions of justice and injustice make a far deeper impression on children than on older people. We must struggle to be scrupulously and patiently just in all personal discipline. Any element of favoritism or unfairness will be a sad obstacle to all that we are trying to do for the child's moral culture. However, let us ask what we mean by justice. We continue to hire sculptors to make statues of a blindfolded goddess with scales in her hand, which we erect on our court-houses and in our public squares. We demand that Justice shall be "no respecter of persons," weighing deeds objectively without reference to the personality. Is that the conception of justice we need in relation to our children? I think not. Obviously, what we mean by our insistence that Justice shall be no respecter of persons, is that all human beings should be equal before the law, that adventitious elements such as clothes, money, family, social and political position shall not affect the administration of the laws. Such a

[1] "I find that children's minds are remarkably suggestive, that they display a truly wonderful command of illustrative material, and that their moral perceptions are exceedingly acute. I am constantly amazed at the fine distinctions which they are capable of drawing, and in this respect they seem far to excel their elders, whose moral sensibilities have been blunted and whose moral judgment has been warped by the degrading influence of the struggle for existence."—Felix Adler, *The Moral Instruction of the Young*, p. 5.

[2] Compare Earl Barnes, The Child as a Social Factor, *Studies in Education*, vol. I, pp. 355–360.

demand is right, and we should fulfill it with children as scrupulously as with adults. It means, again, merely that we should exclude elements that are arbitrary and whimsical and be law-abiding in the exercise of our authority. Yet whatever we hold with reference to the state, Justice in the home and the school must go far beyond that demand and be in a very deep sense a respecter of persons.

Let me make the problem clear by an illustration. Suppose you are a public school teacher into whose room comes a boy from what we should rightly call a good home: that is, a child who has been taught by every lesson of his experience hitherto that if he will only do the best he can everyone is anxious to help him. He commits some fault. Beside him sits a boy who comes from what would be ineffably dignified were we to call it a home, who has not been humanly born into the world, but merely spawned and left to survive as he might, who has been taught by each lesson of his bitter experience hitherto that every man's hand, yes, and sadly enough, every woman's, even his mother's, is against him, so that if he wants anything he must take it for himself. He commits the same fault. Would you punish the two children in the same way? It is said, "If you do not the school will exclaim that you are showing favoritism." Doubtless the school would, indeed it is to be hoped so, for if you jump suddenly from a plane of purely arbitrary punishment to a moral plane, you cannot expect the children to follow you at once, and their demurring is an evidence of some judgment.

What, however, would be the temptation to the ordinary teacher? I do not mean the Christ-like teacher who has overcome all the common weaknesses, but just the average human being who teaches school,—interested in the chil-

dren, but glad when the term is over; liking to teach school well enough, but anxious for pay-day to come,—what would be the temptation to such a teacher? With the good child one may easily sympathize; he is clean and attractive. It is pleasant to take his point of view and appreciate that he is only a thoughtless child. So you incline to say, "Well, never mind, you will not do it again."

It is neither easy nor pleasant to enter into the other child and take his point of view. He is dirty, physically and morally, and it is impossible to love unclean people, unless we begin by loving the potential and marred humanity that is in them. This child will not look you in the face; he smells bad; the words he speaks are vulgar and offensive to you—how could they be otherwise, poor child! he has heard no other. You probably seat him immediately in front of you where you can get your hand on him easily, or else in the far corner of the room where he can do little harm and be least offensive. It is easy to stand apart from this child and say, "We are sorry for you, but the law must be enforced and you must take your punishment."

There is no rule for dealing with these two cases; yet should not our treatment of the two children in general be opposite to that which the unthinking teacher is tempted to follow? The good little boy, who has learned from all his past experience that everyone is anxious to help him if he will but try, needs one more lesson: he needs to learn that *he must try;* and we often make so-called 'good' children into moral weaklings by not teaching them that lesson. The other child!—If you cannot waken the poor, frozen atom of what should have been a human heart into something like humanity, how can you give him any moral

medicine at all, any treatment that will not simply make him hate you, the school you teach, the society you represent, and the law you are trying to interpret to him?

Thus the Justice we need in the government of our children, far from being no respecter of persons, must have a heart of tender, loving appreciation of the spirit and attitude of the individual child whom we would help. Hence the crowning virtue needed by parent and teacher in all control of children is love. Love is the doorway to all personal appreciation; it makes it possible for us to enter the spirit of another and see the world from his point of view. It alone supplies the infinite patience, care and tenderness through which we learn to see into the hearts of our children and to bring to bear upon them the influences that will correct and chasten and mold into harmonious life. Force, physical or mental, knowledge, reason,—necessary as they may be,—these are ineffective instruments compared with love in building the character of our children. We can love them into a beauty of spirit to which we cannot force or reason them. If, ever, it should be difficult for us to love the children entrusted to our care, we can put ourselves in the way of loving them and strive to love the best for them, and that in the end leads to personal love.

The love that is so necessary is not opposed to justice; on the contrary, it is the heart of the justice the parent or teacher needs. Justice without love becomes cruelty, as love without justice degenerates into sentimentality and moral weakness. Thus the two virtues must be fused into one, and this higher union of the two is what is so necessary in our relation to children. Our love must have an element of iron in it. It must be willing to give pain

to the loved one where that is necessary to his moral health. Parents who say, "I love my child too much to punish him," either mean by punishment merely whipping, or else love, not the child and his welfare, but their own ease and comfort. It is far easier to say, "Never mind, let it go," than to say, "My child, let us sit down together and try to understand what you have done and how you can be helped over your mistake," and then to give the moral medicine that is needed. Thus the earnest strength of justice and the tender appreciation of love must unite in us, on the basis of sincerity, if our personal influence is to serve the child's best moral development through all the functions of government we exercise, as parents and teachers, over him.

XVIII

MORAL TEACHING BY EXAMPLE

It is not only in the direct government of children that they are influenced by the personal character of the parent and the teacher; whether we wish to do so or not, we are constantly teaching by example, because of the child's direct imitation of our behavior. We frequently have cause to regret this tendency of the child to echo the example we set before him, since we realize painfully the unworthiness of the example; but no tendency of child life is clearer, and we must recognize it as an unavoidable element of the problem. Indeed, the recognition of this fact is one of the most helpful influences in the moral education of the parent. Perhaps nothing else can so spur us to self-control as to hear our carelessly vulgar language echoed back from the mouths of our children and see our sullen and irritable behavior reflected by them. Thus every adult associated with children must take account of the fact that they are influenced by the standard of behavior he sets before them and must see to it that the standard is as worthy as possible. I do not mean that he should overshoot the mark and fall into hypocrisy by seeking to appear better than he is: I mean that he should strive to *be* as worthy as possible.

Just here one of the most perplexing questions meets us. In many things the right standard for the adult differs

somewhat from that applicable to the child. Shall the adult follow the standard that is suitable for children, or shall he follow his own and seek to make the child understand the difference? In general, I think the latter. Certain things to eat are healthful for the parent, but injurious to the child. It is not best to give them up, nor to exclude the child from the table when they are upon it, but to accustom him from the beginning to recognize that as a child he must forego certain pleasures which he may enjoy in maturity. In the extreme case all must admit this principle: surely there is no reason why the parent should go to bed at seven or the child sit up until eleven to bring the two standards of behavior together.

The question becomes difficult, however, just in that margin of our behavior where habits which are relatively non-moral so easily slip over into what is positively harmful. Smoking is perhaps the best example. All physicians are agreed that the habit of smoking is injurious to a growing child or youth. Many physicians hold, however, that smoking, kept rigidly within limits, and used as a means of relaxation and not as a stimulant to work, is not appreciably injurious to an adult, and may add greatly to the pleasure of social intercourse. What, then, should be the attitude of a father or schoolmaster in this connection? Should he renounce the habit as setting an example he does not wish his boys to imitate, even though he believes it entirely right for himself; or should he continue to live to his own conviction, and trust to making the children understand the difference in standard for youth and maturity? I believe the main key to the solution is this: Is the father or teacher convinced that the habit is one he would be glad to have his boys acquire in maturity

just as he practises it? If this question can truthfully be answered affirmatively there is no direct reason for foregoing the habit; but if the father or teacher has a half-confessed sense that he would answer the question negatively, it means he is not really living to his own highest standard and would better turn around.

There may be indirect reasons for self-denial, even when there is no direct one. The current social practice may so abuse a habit, pushing it over from the non-moral to the immoral field, that an example of more rigid abstinence is necessary as a corrective. Still, such an example may be misconstrued, and lead to contempt instead of imitation. Temperance is always harder than abstinence and is usually better. Life means a sane balance of activities; and an example of harmonious self-control, putting everything in its place, may be far more effective than one of asceticism assumed for didactic purposes. There is a further corrective principle, however. Where one man errs in exaggerated self-denial, a dozen sink into the slough of self-indulgence. Sensualism and asceticism may be equally failure, but the former is the common danger. Especially is this true where the mastery of material conditions is such that desires can be easily gratified and there is little need of struggle. Then asceticism becomes a sound instrument of education, and some measure of even unnecessary renunciation is an effective element of moral discipline. There is great need to teach this truth to children in well-to-do families in these days; and the teaching by example is more effective than any other.[1]

[1] "As a final practical maxim, relative to these habits of the will, we may, then, offer something like this: *Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every day.* That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every day or

A further complication enters the problem of teaching by example where there is a difference of conviction between two who share in the control of children. Take, for instance, the case where one parent, perhaps without the least sense of wrong-doing, practises something of which the other morally disapproves. What is the disapproving parent to do? He (it is usually she) desires to teach the child the highest moral standard, yet to waken conscious condemnation of the other parent not only involves disloyalty but injures the child. We touch here one of the most subtle and difficult of all problems of moral education—the teaching of the dangerous but indispensable lesson of moral toleration. The child must be led to see that equally earnest people may differ vitally on the serious questions of life, and that it is one's duty to live unswervingly to one's own highest standard, yet cordially welcome the same attitude in others, even when it leads to actions of which one disapproves. Obviously there must be rigid limits to this moral toleration. Excluding those whose earnest conviction is merely pretense, there are actions so positively harmful to others that they must be repressed even when flowing from conviction. Yet how difficult it is to decide wisely upon these limits; and children need the

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two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and goods. The tax does him no good at the time, and possibly may never bring him a return. But if the fire *does* come, his having paid it will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast."—William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 126–127.

emphasis placed upon living to one's own highest standard, yet refraining from condemning those who are striving in their own different way to do the same. The true proportion is hard indeed to attain; thus, clear as are the great principles of conduct, their application in practice demands earnest effort and constant revision in the light of growing experience.

There is one phase of the teaching by example that is of peculiar importance in moral education. The most difficult virtue of character to teach directly is love, just because it is not a virtue of conduct but of the spirit behind conduct. The two great commandments of love tell us, not what we should do, but how we should feel, that good action may flow ceaselessly from the right loving heart. Yet if love is a virtue of the spirit, it tends to wear an outer garment; and *the behavior of love is courtesy.* By courtesy I do not mean etiquette—that is courtesy gone to seed; but the natural expression of a loving heart that seeks to put others at their ease and give them joy. Thus it is possible to teach the virtue of love by wearing habitually its garment, courtesy, and so to lead children from an imitation of the behavior of love to an initiation into its spirit. We sometimes feel that children are too small to deserve the little courtesies of life: quite apart from the fact that courtesy should come from within and not be dictated by the condition of the recipient, we cannot be too scrupulously courteous to children, since this is the most effective means of inculcating the highest virtue of character.

It is most important that this garment of courtesy should be worn habitually in the life of the home. Nothing is more paradoxical than that perversity of human nature which leads us to be scrupulously courteous to the

stranger within our gates, while we feel that we are excusable for expressing all our meanness and irritation to those we know and love best. It is true we ought to be able to rest in those who love us, and not need to keep up a manner foreign to our spirits; but we should see to it that the manner natural to our spirits is the unvarying courtesy that clothes a loving heart. We should be able to wear our every-day clothes at home, but they should be just as appropriate and beautiful in their way as any other garments. We ought never to appear in moral undress before those we love. In fact, the need is to make of courtesy, not a garment we remove and put on for different occasions, but rather a living and harmonious body to clothe inseparably the loving spirit within. Yet if we cannot be courteous all the time, would it not be better to spend our weariness and irritation on the stranger within our gates, who comes and goes and cares very little, and save every element of exquisite courtesy for those whose lives are lifted or broken by our slight words and deeds? Courtesy will transfigure the hard realities of life like a beautiful atmosphere giving distance and perspective.

As we ourselves seek to wear unweariedly this garment of courtesy that children may feel the inspiration of love behind it, so we should hold them steadily to the same type of behavior. Especially should we insist that they show unvarying courtesy toward those whom they may be tempted to regard as inferiors. They must wear habitually the garment of courtesy to be initiated into the spirit of humanity.

There is a still deeper phase of the teaching by example that is not often recognized, and that should comfort every earnest but discouraged teacher or parent: we teach not

only by what we do, but by what we try to do even when we fail. It is possible, fortunately, to teach lessons above the level of what we are in conduct, though not higher than what we want to be and strive to be. The ideal we are struggling toward teaches above our halting and imperfect action. Thus children tend to imitate not only our conduct but, deeper than it, the spirit that inspires our conduct. That is why pretense is so futile, and why every attempt to wear a garment of virtue merely for effect is apt to lead to an imitation, not of the assumed virtue, but of the hypocrisy that inspired its assumption, as, for instance, when our behavior is conventionally proper but with no love behind. Children pierce through what we do to what we mean to be and do; and the influence of the ideal toward which we are struggling is in the end more powerful than the changing accident of the day's life.

Thus the true teaching by example is through a kind of contagion of the ideal that passes from soul to soul even when the ideal is far beyond us.[1] This has always been the supreme force in education. It is only a student who can awaken the student spirit in others; and one must strive earnestly for noble aims to be able to touch others into the same kind of life. Agassiz was perhaps the greatest teacher of natural science our country has seen, and yet his judgment was wrong on certain of the most important problems of modern science. Wherein lay his

[1] "A life whose ideal value has been perfectly established in experience never aims to serve as model in its form, but only in its essence, in its spirit. It is the greatest mistake to suppose that spiritual, human perfection can serve as a model in its form. This accounts for the common experience that the taking of such external manifestations of perfection as examples, instead of elevating mankind, checks, nay, represses, its development."—FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, translated by Hailmann, p. 12.

greatness as a teacher? Not in his knowledge, but in the fact that he was the leader of his students, a step in advance of them and inspiring them to his own endeavor for truth. It is the same quality that shows in all great teachers: Socrates, Arnold, Horace Mann, St. Francis of Assisi, Froebel. It is not whether we arrive, but whether we earnestly strive, that determines our lifting power over our children. Thus, even though we may not dare to hope that our lives may be able to influence others through the 'contagion of a great soul' that is so supreme in education, still in our sphere in home and school, if we are devoted servants of ideals that lift away from the plane of merely selfish life, we may hope that, even in failure, some of the radiance of the ideal will flow from our spirit and touch the children we love into sane, sweet, earnest moral life.

XIX

DIRECT ETHICAL INSTRUCTION

We have now studied the great means of moral culture—action and environment—in the various forms in which we can utilize them. The work of these influences needs to be reinforced by ethical instruction. I have already shown how absurd it is to regard the problem of teaching ethics to children as coextensive with that of moral education, or even as the most important part of the latter; yet ethical instruction is a necessary part of our task. It should serve two aims: (1) To waken consciousness of life and its problems, and develop an organic view of the laws of life; (2) To rationalize habits already formed and give independent guidance and control of them. In other words, ethical instruction aims to furnish the individual a definite body of knowledge and ideas, and to organize this into life and make it fruitful in conduct. It will be noted that it is the second aim which justifies the first. To give a body of ethical knowledge that is not made effective in life may be worse than useless, since it leads to a fatal divorce between thought and action. To go on reasoning ethically without living morally is as fatal as to receive continual emotional stimulus without expressing it in vigorous action; the result in both cases is dissipation of the moral energies and deterioration of character. Thus the element of ethical instruction is distinctly subordinate to moral

living and must be made to serve directly the latter. The chief function of ethical instruction, therefore, will be to bring clearly into consciousness principles that have already been built into character, thus transforming the basis of moral habit into a clear-sighted, independent morality.

There are two different methods by which we may undertake this work of ethical instruction. We may study directly the problems and laws of ethics with our children; or we may utilize the material furnished by history, literature and other subjects of study, and do our ethical teaching by indirection. Probably we shall find some combination of the two methods most helpful, meantime let us consider them in turn.

The direct ethical instruction of children must be guided by certain definite principles and conform to some rigid restrictions:

1. It is indispensable to avoid 'moralizing.' Didactic preaching ever has small effect upon character; and perhaps children resent it even more than we do. "Be good, and you will be happy:" How true (sometimes), and how futile to say it! Probably no one ever was made good by the reiteration of such moral commonplace. I have puzzled much over the question why moralizing is so bad as well as ineffective. I think it must be because its obvious generalities get more and more detached from experience, till in the end they become almost hypocritical, since they are repeated with no real thought behind them.[1]

2. Therefore our teaching must take immediate hold of

[1] "Most of our pocket wisdom is conceived for the use of mediocre people, to discourage them from ambitious attempts, and generally console them in their mediocrity."—Robert Louis Stevenson, Crabbed Age and Youth, in *Virginibus Puerisque*, pp. 81–82.

the child's experience. It is always possible to accomplish this, since all the great principles of human living are present in the child's world. While certain phases of later experience cannot come to children, the laws of happy and helpful living are as completely exemplified in the child's world as in our own. Earnest effort, self-control, generosity, fidelity: the child needs these as we need them, and the same results follow them in both cases. Thus we can give ethical instruction a real meaning to the child only by beginning where he is and bringing him to see the implications of the experience through which he is passing.

3. At the same time the teaching must be generic, that is, the child must recognize the principle behind the concrete case. If we lose the law in its application, the aim of our instruction is defeated. We want the children to realize, not merely that it is mean for this particular child to carry tales to the teacher about his classmates, but that tale-bearing is mean; not only that it was wrong for this other child to tell his mother a lie, but that lying is ugly and bad. Beginning with the concrete act and making our teaching take hold of the child's experience, we must nevertheless bring him to a clear recognition of the law that applies to the multitude of cases.

4. To escape the semi-hypocrisy of didactic moralizing it is not only necessary that the teaching should relate itself to the child's experience, it is also indispensable that the teacher should be true. The same sincerity or moral reality which we found was the necessary basis of helpful government is needed for our intellectual teaching of the child. The curse of ethics in all ages has been the tendency of ethical teachers to impart what they considered morally useful, instead of what at bottom they believed

to be true. If a high form of expediency, this is expediency nevertheless, and as debauching as that curse always is. Its first result in this form is to destroy the teacher's power to discern the truth, its second is to produce a revolt from the teaching in the learner.

A flagrant illustration of this error has appeared recently in the making of text-books in physiology to suit the opinions of a portion of the population, and then securing the legal enforcement of this teaching as science. In some instances public school teachers are required to give to their pupils, as proved truth, statements regarding the effects of beer, wine and tobacco which are still in debate among scientific experts. Well-intentioned as the people are who have secured such legislation, its effect is simply vicious, defeating the very aim they have in view. Omitting the children of parents whose views coincide with the teaching, the child is at first shocked, and then disgusted, as he finds his parents and others whom he respects regard the instruction he has received in school as untrue. If he escapes this fate he is made into the moral prig who attempts to reform his parents before he has any ability to pass judgment on their conduct. Usually the final result intellectually is to dull the child's instinct for truth and confuse his moral sense, while practically he frequently reacts against the teaching and so goes to a disastrous extreme before he learns that the path of indulgence is not the path of life.[1] I do not mean to say that a teacher

[1] Compare President Eliot in *More Money for the Public Schools*, pp. 27-28:

"In an attempt to use the schools as a means of promoting total abstinence from intoxicating drinks a grave injury has been done to the teaching of all the sciences in the schools; because many statements about alcohol, which are not known to be true, and which are

should never teach a conviction which others reject: often it is his duty to do just that; I do insist that he should always distinguish what is, from what he believes. Science—exact and organized knowledge—should be taught as science; opinion and belief, even when rising to lofty conviction, must be recognized as such and never confused with undoubted fact. With the public schools we may go farther than this and say that the schools supported by all the people should never be used for any kind of sectarian propagandism, whether prosecuted in the name of morals or religion.

The illustration I have used is but one of many that are available; it is the general principle I wish to emphasize. We dare never tamper with objective facts for the sake of anticipated ethical results: if we do, we defeat our aim in every instance. Unvarying sincerity in facing the facts and laws of life is the necessary basis of all helpful ethical instruction of children—or adults.

5. While we must thus be true in our teaching, it is necessary to adapt it to the period of development of the

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apparently contradicted by the common observation of the children themselves, have been forced into the schools. This mode of combatting the tendency to use alcoholic drinks has been devised and executed by conscientious women; yet it would be hard to imagine a less intelligent mode. The public schools ought to have made it impossible that benevolence and devotion should be so misdirected."

See the digest of Laws Relating to Temperance instruction in the *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1902*, vol. I, pp. 315-338. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903. Compare further the various articles and reports on Temperance Instruction, in the *Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1900–1901*, vol. I, pp. 1027-1050. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1902. The article by Superintendent Ferguson (pp. 1032-1040, reprinted from the *Educational Review*, March, 1902) gives examples of the false and questionable statements in the 'indorsed' text-books on physiology.

child. That is, we should conform to the same principle in instruction which we obey in government and discipline. As simple obedience to personal authority precedes any conscious response to law, so the child can be taught intellectually the reason and meaning of the one type of virtue before the other. Similarly, when the instinct of personal possession strongly awakens within the child, the time has come when he can be taught respect for the property of others. To take a larger illustration: the self-affirming tendencies of character appear before that of self-sacrifice. Children are strong egoists; and while this egoism needs to be checked and corrected, they can understand the virtues of heroism, self-reliance, endurance, effort, long before they can appreciate the sublimity of forgiveness and the beauty of non-resistance.

There is no question here of teaching a false standard and then replacing it by a true one: nothing could be more disastrous than that. I have shown in an earlier chapter that a standard or ideal which is the highest that can be recognized upon a certain plane of development is absolutely binding upon that plane. The hills are just as real as the mountains, and heroism is as much a virtue as self-sacrifice. The principle for which I am contending is but a more thorough-going application of the law that our teaching must take hold of the child's concrete experience. Since the function of our instruction is to illuminate what the child is living, the teaching must rise to new problems and larger horizons as the child grows into them.

It is evident, then, how futile must be the attempt to organize the subject-matter of ethics according to a purely logical system of duties and feed this to the child. We have seen that ethics has been nearly the last of the sciences

to receive the impulse of the modern spirit, and therefore this false method has survived more generally in ethics than in any other field. Few indeed are the text-books, designed for the ethical instruction of children, which escape the fault of being based entirely upon a logical analysis of the subject-matter, instead of upon an appreciative recognition of the process of growth in the child.

6. Finally, the work of ethical instruction is incomplete until the individual reaches a comprehensive view of the whole field of the laws of life. While the teaching must follow his experience and conform to the steps of his development, sound living demands an organic view of the whole of life and its problems. Thus, before we are done, we must see to it that each child has attained this completeness of view.

Obviously it is no easy task to teach ethics to children and obey these six hard conditions. Shall we help ourselves by the use of a text-book we can put into the hands of the child? Were an ideal text-book in existence this question would be less difficult; but we have seen that those available are based on a wrong principle. Better than anything in English are certain of the French manuals prepared for use in the state schools.[1] While introducing much concrete matter and adapting their material somewhat to the stages of the child's development, they still show in greater or less degree the fault mentioned. The best books in English, of which Professor Adler's *Moral*

[1] Compare: MÉZIÈRES, *Éducation morale, et Instruction Civique à l'usage des Écoles primaires;* LIARD, *Morale et Enseignement Civique, à l'usage des Écoles primaires;* LALOI, *L'Année Préparatoire d'Instruction Morale et d'Instruction Civique,* and *La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique.*

Instruction of Children stands first, are for teachers rather than children, even when going beyond the outlining of principles to the presentation of a considerable body of concrete material for instruction, as Professor Adler does.[1]

Even were the ideal text-book available there would be some question as to its use. If we must begin where the children are and follow the lead of their experiences day by day, we can follow no prearranged logical series of lessons. In geography or other aspects of nature-study it is possible to plan what the experience of the child shall be; but we cannot determine his ethical experience, and only in the most general way can we foresee what it will be. Thus here, even more than in other subjects of study, the better the teacher, the less need is there for a text-book, and the greater is the value of working independently of such a guide. Every teacher knows how much easier it is, in history for example, to follow the outline of a text-book or give a formal lecture, than to put books aside, face a class on one's feet, follow the suggestions that come from the questions and thoughts of the pupils, and yet in the end have covered the ground of the lesson. Nevertheless every wise teacher knows well how much more effective the second method is than the first. It is most of all in ethics that we need to apply this wiser method, since we cannot assign ethical experience, but must deal with what life brings forth. Therefore the need of wise, well-trained teachers is greatest just in the field of ethical instruction

[1] Among representative text-books available in English for the direct ethical instruction of children are the following:

J. N. Larned, *Primer of Right and Wrong;* C. C. Everett, *Ethics for Young People;* Gilman and Jackson, *Conduct as a Fine Art* (intended rather for teachers than to be put directly into the hands of the pupils); W. J. Shearer, *Morals and Manners.*

where, hitherto, least attention has been given to their preparation.

Thus for a capable teacher the best method of ethical instruction will be talks with the children concerning the ethical laws and problems into contact with which their experience brings them, using the best books as guides to the teacher rather than as texts to be put into the hands of the children. I have used the word teacher throughout because in giving ethical instruction the parent as well is fulfilling the teacher's office. The parent must, no less than the school teacher, obey the six conditioning principles I have laid down; but in the home it is possible to go further than in the school in uniting the instruction to the child's immediate experience. The texts for the parent are the situations and problems that come up in such numbers daily. The child's quarrel, the room left untidy, the inexact statement of what has happened, the opportunity for generosity or self-denial: these and countless similar events in the child's experience furnish the best of opportunities to drive home the ethical lesson. While a moral problem is on, its treatment falls under the head of discipline; but when it is settled and the child can see it in some perspective, he needs to recognize intellectually the principle and lesson involved. Perhaps half the good of discipline is often lost because parents will not take the further time thus to bring home to the child's intellect the lesson of the experience through which he has passed. Parents are over busied, and protest that their hands are more than filled with the work of careful discipline. They need to see that the time given to the further task of ethical instruction associated with the child's concrete experience will not only double the value of the discipline to the

child, but will greatly lighten the work of discipline in situations arising afterward.

The average parent will be much more sure to carry out his part in the work of ethical instruction if he assigns some regular time daily for it. If he trusts merely to the chance conversation with his children many of the best opportunities for ethical instruction will be lost. Perhaps the twilight or evening hour is the best of the day to use for such a purpose. In that hour the work and play of the day draw away; it is not difficult to see the day's experiences with calmer spirit and in wider relation; the drawing down of the night brings to everyone a certain quiet and meditative solemnity. Thus if the parent can consecrate even a few minutes each evening to quiet talks with his children, sometimes with all together, sometimes with each alone, over the events and actions of the day, the work of ethical instruction will grow apace and the results at the end of a year will amaze one who has not previously tried the plan. I do not mean that the larger part of the time a parent has for companionship with his children should be thus devoted to ethical instruction: that would be fatal, since it would tend to put the parent on another plane than the child, thus defeating the great ends of our comradeship with them. Whether or not a specific time is thus dedicated for ethical instruction, no parent should ever let a critical moral experience pass into the child's dim yesterdays without seeing to it that the meaning of the experience has been brought home clearly to the intellect of the child.

The relation of the parent to the child may always be more intimate than that of the teacher dealing with groups of children, and it is usually unwise to attempt in the school so close association of the ethical teaching with the con-

crete experience of the individual child as is possible in the home. The private school teacher, especially with boarding pupils, may do this more than the public school teacher; and in so far as any teacher has time and opportunity to talk quietly with the individual child he may bring home the lesson of a particular experience just as is possible in the home. To attempt this in teaching a group of children, however, may mean to focus undue attention on the individual most concerned and thus partly to defeat the aim of the teaching. Moreover, the school may obviously attempt a more complete and systematic plan of instruction than will be usual in the home. Therefore, in the school, it is more necessary to hold regular talks with the group of children. There is still something to be said against assigning set periods for such work. If we do so there is danger that the instruction may become too formal and lose its living quality. Moreover, it is peculiarly true in ethics that much of the best instruction comes by the way. Since, as we have seen, every fact and experience has its ethical implications, the events of school life and the lessons in its ordinary course furnish more opportunities than we can utilize for bringing home the great ethical lessons to the child, without in the least falling into the vice of moralizing. We shall see in the following chapters how precious are these opportunities for ethical teaching by indirection, and a good part of our best results will come through utilizing them.

Nevertheless, there are strong reasons in favor of assigning a definite period for direct ethical instruction. If we do not the pressure of school work tends, for the ordinary teacher, to crowd out the ethical element, and the results of the teaching by indirection, if priceless, are apt to be

incomplete, failing to give that comprehensiveness of view we have found to be so necessary. Moreover, children love directness and it is a mistake to go beating about the bush. Indeed, next to insincere moralizing, grown people or children alike resent most of all being tricked into listening to ethical instruction in the guise of something else. It is again the mistake of 'sugar-coating' which we found defeated the end of discipline. Since ethical problems are more deeply interesting than any others, the ethical element can stand alone and does not need adventitious adornment. Thus we resent the moral tacked on to the novel or poem, and are not drawn to the minister's Sunday evening picture show, unless it be a sincere use of art, bringing home its human, and therefore ethical, meaning.

On the whole, then, in addition to all the ethical instruction which can come through the ordinary work in history, literature and other subjects, I believe it is wise to assign certain periods, say twenty minutes daily, or a half-hour three times a week, for talks by the teacher with the school, on the ethical questions in which the children are interested and which are related to their experience. The teacher must guard constantly against formalism, and keep before him the fact that these discussions furnish but a fragment of the ethical instruction that should be given. He must also realize constantly that the suggestions and thoughts which he can succeed in getting spontaneously from the pupils are worth more than the best ethical solutions he can give them. The value of the work will come only as the children are actively thinking, for the object is not to give them ready-made solutions to the problems of life, or impose certain maxims and precepts upon them, but to develop the habit of thoughtfully deliberating upon

moral questions, and awaken a recognition of the great principles implicit in human life.

On the other hand, we must beware of making children moral casuists. The inexperienced mind loves to try its strength in playing with those subtle problems where the intellect with equal facility can attain a solution in either direction. That there is something in such detached reasoning strongly appealing to immature minds is evident from all early history of philosophy, especially among the Greeks. It was this tendency of the unfledged intellect to casuistry Plato perceived in the pupils of the sophists, leading him to the view that philosophy should not be studied by the young, and that experience and hard science (mathematics in his thought) should alone qualify for admission to her portals.[1] Plato was entirely right: philosophy should follow and not precede experience. Philosophy does not furnish positive knowledge; its function is to classify and organize what has already been learned through experience or positive science.

It is the ignoring of this principle that makes so many university courses in ethics and philosophy disintegrating to the character of the student and paralyzing to his moral action. He studies, without the balance of large experience or hard science, system after system, each exclusive of all the rest. Each seems satisfying while he is within it,

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[1] Compare PLATO'S *Republic*, Jowett's translation, third edition, p. 243:

"There is danger lest they should taste the dear delight [of dialectic] too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them."

but rarely does any one stand out as finally absolute.[1] Thus since every idea and course of action may have its theoretic justification, he finds it more and more difficult to choose any one. "Thought expands, but lames; action animates, but narrows" said Goethe.[2] To the immature neophyte in philosophy action seems terribly intolerant, since it affirms but one idea out of the multitude the reason recognizes as possible. Yet the antinomies of the intellect can be solved only in practice. Life is the marvelous solvent that fuses in its mystic fluid, elements which to the intellect seem irreconcilably opposed. To escape the confusion and negation which result from processes of detached thinking, through which almost anything can be made to seem true and right, we choose in action the one thing we believe to be best.

Thus we must return to our initial thought in this discussion: all ethical instruction must be carefully subordinated to moral action and made directly contributory to the latter. Only thus can it be helpful, or indeed safe, since only so can we avoid the vice of moral casuistry, alluring in proportion to the immaturity of the learner's mind. There is obviously a fine balance to be attained here: the reason is to be cultivated and trained, yet held to its regular function and never allowed to become a means of moral confusion. The child must be brought to recognize clearly those great underlying principles of happy and helpful conduct upon which we may all agree without moral casuistry. The teacher must, therefore, choose the subjects for these ethical discussions with direct reference

[1] If one system does seem absolute to the immature student he is apt to fall into the opposite error and become a slavish adherent of it.

[2] *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, Carlyle's translation, vol. II, chapter V, p. 126.

to the opportunities of the children in moral action. Many of the talks may well deal with those questions of school organization and government discussed in chapters XIII and XIV; and thus not only contribute to the order of the little society, but aid greatly in developing the independent, self-directing type of moral action. Further, the incidents, laws and characters studied in the ordinary work of the school in literature, history and natural science furnish an inexhaustible fund of material for extending and vitalizing these ethical talks.

To carry out such a program of direct ethical instruction as I have outlined demands wisdom, time and thought on the part of parents and teachers. It is the old story: "nothing great without effort;" in proportion to the good that may come from the work is the severity of its demand in preparation. If, as I have shown, it is undesirable to follow the logical outline of the ethical subject-matter in the discussions with children, it is the more necessary that the parent or teacher should have such a complete logical organization of the material in the background of his own consciousness. He must not only know what he may hope to accomplish and have a clear conception of the method by which he should set about it, he must have come to terms with the universe intellectually and have formulated in some measure a conscious philosophy of life. He must see intellectually the great ends of human conduct, the path by which those ends may be attained, and the laws that condition us in following the path. That the thought and study, necessary to our preparation for the ethical teaching of our children, are illuminating and educative to ourselves in the highest degree, is another truth, aside from our problem, though greatly comforting.

XX

ETHICAL INSTRUCTION THROUGH OTHER SUBJECTS: HISTORY

I HAVE outlined the most direct form of ethical instruction, that which is given by talks with children in home and school. The work thus done must be supplemented and its results multiplied by the use of other subjects of study. Indeed, the vitality of our instruction will depend mainly upon our wise use of these less direct sources. Beyond the moral discipline which comes from doing intellectual tasks honestly and accurately, almost every subject of study has some ethical implications. Take, for instance, so non-moral a subject as mathematics: the ideal accuracy of its statements and the absolute universality with which its laws may be applied tend insensibly to cultivate reverence for truth and appreciation of the unity of law. Much broader is the ethical instruction resulting from the study of nature. Whether as organized science, or as the simpler, more general study possible to childhood, it is this phase of our school program that furnishes our best opportunity to teach an intellectual recognition of law and a reverence for law. Thus the study of nature accomplishes for the intellect in ethical instruction exactly what we found active contact with nature did for the cultivation of the habit of obedience. It is true, higher laws appear in human life than we can discover in nature, and the prin-

ciples that govern alike man and beast may be transfigured in their application to the actions of human beings; nevertheless, the great, simple conditions of existence are revealed in their most direct and impressive form in nature. The necessity for constant struggle, the sure setting in of degeneration the moment positive effort ceases, the remorseless demand of obedience to the order of the universe, the growth and harmony that result from such obedience, the kinship of all living beings and the unity in the moral problems of life: these ethical lessons can be driven home through the study of nature as in no other way. To prove this, one need but point to the vastly wider acceptance of these teachings among adults today as a direct result of modern physical science.

In teaching nature to children it is as necessary to avoid moralizing as in other forms of ethical instruction. Drawing moral and intellectual lessons from nature in the old *Sandford and Merton*[1] style is not desirable, though there are many worse books than *Sandford and Merton*. The need is to waken children to a recognition of reality, that is, of fact and law as these appear in the nature world. If we can bring children to understand the inexorable sequence and appreciate the regular harmony of nature no further sermon need be added.

Clearly, only the more simple and universal laws governing human life appear in the study of nature. The highest laws, those most important in the human field, can be discovered only by studying that field. Therefore it is a grave error to depend solely upon nature for ethical

[1] See THOMAS DAY, *The History of Sandford and Merton*—"a book replete with information and of unimpeachable morality," as it is characterized in the preliminary sketch of the life of Thomas Day.

instruction. Her morality is merely prudential. She sanctions absolute conformity to the accident, as well as the permanent elements, of environment,—conformity gained through every kind of deceit. If in brute motherhood she rises above the coarsely egoistic plane, this is only through blind instinct. Conscious love, justice and self-sacrifice, the willingness to stand heroically for principle and be out of harmony with the accident of environment for the sake of obedience to underlying law, the morality that is not merely prudential but springs in obedience to lofty, integrating aims: these phases of moral life appear only in humanity. Thus ethically speaking, "the chief study of mankind" must always be "man;" and for the purposes of ethical instruction, nothing else can approach in value the expressions of human life. Indeed, the neglect of the humanities,—as the studies dealing with man's thought and action, rather than rhetoric and the languages, should be called,—and the great development of physical science during the last fifty years, are partly responsible for the hard materialistic temper and the adhesion to the principle of brute struggle and the survival of the materially powerful, which mark certain aspects of our civilization.

Thus in teaching children we should err gravely if we utilized nature as the main source of material for indirect ethical instruction. It is the expressions of human life we must use chiefly; and two subjects in the curriculum below the high school are especially available. These are: history and literature; and we shall find them singularly complementary to each other for our purpose. With the modern expansion of the course of study, other expressions of man's life have been admitted, as material from painting, sculpture and music, social and economic science.

History and literature, however, are almost always available throughout the curriculum, and they of all humanistic subjects alone are so; thus they must furnish the main opportunity for the study of human life. Moreover, as they show fully the ethical value of all humanistic studies, we may well focus our discussion upon them.

History is the record of what men have done. It may be interpreted so broadly as to include all expressions of the human spirit, but usually we limit it to the deeds of men in private and public life and the development of political institutions. Thus interpreted let us consider the different aspects in which history is of value for ethical instruction and moral culture.

1. History shows the moral law in action. There are no accidents in the rise and fall of nations, even if we take extreme cases where a people seems to suffer from the greed of others, as in the rise of Napoleon or the partition of Poland. Always the victim coöperates in his doom. In all the past every element of manhood, self-control, heroism, fidelity has made for life; and every element of brutal selfishness, capricious sensuality, cowardly expediency has made for death. We do not need to preach about history to bring home its moral teachings. To draw pleasant, little, Æsop morals from the great movements of the past—the ebb and flow of the tides of life—would be to degrade the noble material we are studying, like making a lion do petty tricks in a cage.[1] The need is

[1] "No practical application need be added, no moral brought out; the related incident of life, in itself, in whatever form it may appear, in its causes and consequences, makes a deeper impression than any added words could do; for who can know the needs of the wholly opened soul, of stimulated, wholly self-conscious life."—FROEBEL, *The Education of Man*, Hailmann's translation, p. 308.

that the student should appreciate the past and recognize the laws that prevail in it. Surely history teaches its own ethical lessons to every one who sees its facts and laws. The steady advance of Rome while resting on an heroic type of manhood and womanhood, the rapid disintegration of her empire with the rotting of personal character, the persistence of tiny, freedom-loving Switzerland in the lap of the empires of Europe, the flowering of English literature with the unifying of English sentiment and patriotism in the days of Elizabeth, the springing of America from the devotion of a few small groups of earnest men and women: surely we do not need to moralize about these facts to give them an ethical value. The student needs only to see them in relation to law; and to seek to abstract the implicit moral meaning and set it apart as a 'lesson' is like cutting up a man to find his soul: with Descartes we might isolate the pineal gland; but the soul—!

2. Besides the ethical instruction that comes from perceiving the laws ruling in past life, history contains innumerable heroic incidents which show the principles of noble living in concrete form. Not only do these teach children the meaning of virtue in the most impressive way, they present examples for imitation and inspire the learner to follow. The behavior of Socrates before his judges or of Giordano Bruno at the stake, the conduct of the Lacedæmonians at Thermopylæ or of the American farmers at Bunker Hill, Sir Philip Sydney dying, offering the cup of water to the wounded soldier beside him, or Sir Thomas More going to his death for the sake of conscience: incidents like these reveal the depth of the moral life of mankind as flashes of lightning illuminate a dark forest at night. They not only show what is noble action, but

touch us with the contagion of heroic deeds, thus making for moral culture as well as ethical instruction.

3. Heroic incidents are but fragments in the life of man or nation; more significant than they in moral value are the great personalities of history, the men and women in whom the tendencies of the past find their highest expression. Without agreeing with Carlyle that history is the work of great men, certainly we must recognize that all movements of humanity find their expression only through the medium of personality. After all, history is made of the entire sum of the deeds of the countless men and women; and among them all, the great individuals, rising on the waves of popular tendency and in turn molding the multitude who lift them, are the best keys to the life of the past.

Among these great individuals are many who serve in a greater or less degree as types of the moral ideal, thus giving concrete form to our conception of noble living, and inspiring imitation—the true imitation of the spirit, not the form, of lofty action—far more powerfully than can single incidents. Indeed, the power of great personalities in history to touch the child with that marvelous contagion of the spirit, is surpassed only by the personal influence of the individuals with whom the child is immediately associated.[1]

4. It is not only the good men and women who instruct us ethically, however. In the lives of those who have done much evil, moral laws are no less clearly expressed. There is widespread misunderstanding in regard to teaching by

[1] See a suggestive article on The Use of Biography in Religious Instruction, by Professor F. M. McMurry, in *Principles of Religious Education*, by N. M. Butler, *et al.*, pp. 193-211.

example. It is said that we should never teach by base examples. The comparison with expression in language is cited; and as children acquire good speech by hearing nothing else, so it is said they should come into contact only with examples of good conduct. The analogy holds up to a certain point, but is misleading unless carefully interpreted. It is true, the problem of instruction in the mother tongue is much lightened if young children hear only good language; and so our moral problem is greatly simplified if the people, young and old, associated with children, are positively good. On the other hand, when an individual arrives at the age when it is possible for him to understand the principles of language theoretically, those principles will explain at once good and bad usage for him, and the correct and false syntax will be defined, if not in terms of each other, at least in relation to each other. So in the moral world the tree of knowledge is one of knowledge of good *and evil*. An intellectual conception of either will involve a conception of the other, since they limit each other. Thus the law is revealed as clearly in its violation as in an act of obedience to it. When evil is portrayed in its native ugliness and hideous consequences it is instructive to the intellect without being attractive to the sensibility. It is only when evil is dressed out in an adventitious garb of false beauty that it becomes seductive, because misleading to the emotions. Thus the student can safely consider the evil deeds and characters of the past if he considers them only in the proportion they sustain to the good, and if they are seen in their true relation to the whole of life. In so far as their place is exaggerated or the perception of that relation is lost will they become dangerous. Herbart understood this better than most educa-

tional philosophers, as is evidenced in the following passage from his *Science of Education* (Felkin's translation, p. 88):

"Show the bad to children plainly, but not as an object of desire, and they will recognize that it *is* bad. Interrupt a narrative with moral precepts, and they will find you a wearisome narrator. Relate only what is good, and they will feel it monotonous, and the mere charm of variety will make the bad welcome."

Returning to the thought later in the same treatise Herbart wisely applies the principle to the relation of the youth to his contemporaries (p. 227):

"How ever extreme the necessity may be that a youth should never become *familiar* with the bad, protection of moral feeling need not be carried so far (at least not continued so long) as to make youths amazed at men as they are. Bad company is certainly infectious, and almost as much so is a pleasing lingering of the imagination on attractive representations of the bad. But to have known men in early life, in all their many varieties, ensures an early exercise of moral judgment, as well as a valuable security against dangerous surprises. And vivid representations of those that *were*, give doubtless the readiest preparation for the observation of those that *are*, only the past must be sufficiently illuminated, so that its men may appear men like ourselves, and not beings of another species."

It should be noted, however, that humanity is not made up of characters that are entirely good or bad; on the contrary, the majority of human beings are of mingled character, showing good and evil together. The element of evil mixed up with the good is instructive just as in a

character typically bad. Nevertheless, if evil reveals the laws governing life hardly less instructively than good, it is the positively good life, or element of life, that alone exercises the inspiring influence upon us.

5. There is one aspect of this positive moral influence that is particularly important, namely, the cultivation of reverence for moral leadership, that is, an appreciation of the character and service of those men who have been not merely great, but who have dedicated themselves to the service of humanity. This spirit is in a democracy at once most necessary and most difficult to cultivate. Democracies are notoriously fickle and usually irreverent. With a low admiration for men who succeed, merely because they succeed, without asking how they won power or for what ends they use it, democracies show a jealousy of the true moral leaders because such men rebuke us by the character of their lives. *In the end* the people come to recognize the true servant of humanity. Already we know the place of Washington and Lincoln; but in their day what misunderstanding, calumny and abuse they had to endure. Yet it is just in free societies that moral leadership is most necessary, otherwise the demagogue and selfish time-server can render futile or even destroy the most cherished institutions. Thus in any democracy, the opportunity the study of history gives for cultivating reverence for moral leadership is of the highest significance in developing the type of character necessary for the stability and progress of free institutions.

6. Closely akin to this moral result is the value of national history in cultivating true patriotism. One hesitates to use the word patriotism since, like that other good word, love, it is used for so many wrong attitudes

that one must define it anew. True patriotism does not mean enthusiastic speeches and shouting when the soldiers come home. It does not 'go with the country' under the inspiration of the mob's passion or the popular hero's guidance, without asking whether the country is right or wrong. It is as ready to weep over a national crime as to exult in national heroism, to rebuke the passion of the mob or the selfishness of the demagogue as to move with the people when 'the voice of the people' is indeed 'the voice of God.' It is sober, quiet, thoughtful, including not only love of country, but an appreciation of the ideals for which the nation stands, and an understanding of the measure of success *and failure* in realizing those ideals hitherto. Such patriotism is more necessary in times of peace than in times of war; for in war-time everyone's pulses are stirred with the need of the nation, but in times of peace, when the high call rings less clear and the pressure of private interests is intense, then indeed the spirit of unselfish public service is most needed.

Such patriotism is cultivated not by talking about it or urging it upon children, but by bringing the child into appreciative contact with the instructive and uplifting expressions of the national spirit and ideal. Among these, the great characters and deeds of the nation's past are of first importance.

7. There is a nobler spirit than patriotism, great and good as that is. As the history of the national spirit in all its expressions, whether in the movements of the people or the lives of men and women, is our best means of cultivating true patriotism, so the history of the human spirit, interpreted in the same broad way, is our opportunity to cultivate that larger cosmopolitan and human-

itarian spirit so much needed for the next movement in the life of mankind. We in America, especially, if we are to fulfill our mission, with no loss of love for our country, need to rise to the true conception of human brotherhood, recognizing that there can be no good for one nation, any more than for one individual, that is not in harmony with the good of all. As the national history is a great means for cultivating true patriotism, so the larger history of the human spirit, incarnated in the men and deeds of many nations, is one avenue through which we may develop the true humanitarian attitude. One who has followed the enthusiastic awakening of Germany, listening to the call of Fichte and the stirring songs of Schiller, will recognize the unity of German life and aspirations with deep elements of our own. One who has wandered through Italy with Dante, or accompanied Giordano Bruno on his world-pilgrimage and heard his ringing words at the stake, who has listened to the teaching of sweet Saint Francis and the terrible prophecies of the dark Florentine patriot, Savonarola, can hardly despise the poor Italian who lands upon our shores, but will love him for what he might have been.

To make history morally educative in the different ways I have outlined, it is essential that the student should come to have a realizing sense of the past. Every teacher knows how difficult it is to awaken this. Often the characters of history are to us dim phantoms moving across a white mist and the great deeds of the past are no more real and human than the faint figures in half-forgotten dreams. If the laws that rule in history are to teach their ethical lesson, if the great characters are to lift, inspire and instruct us as they may, we must appreciate

the past as alive, realizing that every recorded deed sprang from human beings like ourselves, moved by the same hopes, aspirations and fears, thwarted by the same weaknesses and failures. Herein is the worth, in the hands of a wise teacher, of all the little and great expressions and associations of personality. A portrait, a photograph of some historic place, a letter or fragment of the hero's diary, even a relic, as the sword of Washington or the tree under which he stood, will at times suddenly transfigure the past and give its dim phantoms pulsating life, one with our own. It is then, as Lowell says, that

"The statue shrined and still
In that gray minster-front we call the Past,
Feels in its frozen veins our pulses thrill,
Breathes living air and mocks at Death's deceit.
It warms, it stirs, comes down to us at last,
Its features human with familiar light,
A man, beyond the historian's art to kill,
Or sculptor's to efface with patient chisel-blight."[1]

Thus we come to see that all great movements of history are resolvable into elements of which the unit is the individual life. So the chapters of the past are read in terms of the persons who make them up, and its teaching is brought home to us as individual human beings.

There is one other important need if history is to fulfill its function in relation to moral culture. We must utilize the subject more widely and interpret it more broadly than is done today. It is unfortunate that history is so often limited to the record of wars and political

[1] *Under the Old Elm*, canto II, stanza II.

changes. These are important expressions of the human spirit, but there are many others at least equally important if history is to interpret life in relation to law and bring the student into contact with the great personalities in the past. We must not only deal much more with biography, especially in the earlier period of education, but with the biography of leaders in other fields besides war and statesmanship. Since one moral function of the study of the great lives of the past is to inspire children with lofty ideals, surely we do not want them to think that ideal service is possible only in those two public vocations. For instance, in American history we teach the career of General Grant. He was a man of iron will, and such will is needed in the service of society. Yet is it not equally necessary, if a child's reverence is to be developed for what is really worthy of imitation, that he should know something of such an American citizen as Emerson, not as a writer merely, but as a man, who lived consistently to his own ideal throughout a quiet but publicly useful life?

Is it not, moreover, a pity that our histories deal so exclusively with men, ignoring the contribution of women, except in those rare cases where women have been prominent in war and politics? It is true, the contagion of noble living is effective above the plane of sex or vocation. Girls may be wakened to ideal effort no less than boys, by the lives of great men; since always it is desirable, let me repeat, not to imitate the form of the action but to rise to the spirit behind it. Still, as children of both sexes need the influence of men and women alike, in home and school life, so in the study of history they should be brought into appreciative contact with the lives of both women and

men, in all possible forms of human service and moral heroism.[1]

Thus history, interpreted in this larger, more human way, should have a place in the curriculum from the beginning to the end of the school work. Only so can we utilize it fully, not only for ethical instruction through the study of human life, collective and individual, in relation to law, but for the higher end of moral awakening and development through vital contact with noble men and heroic deeds.

[1] Compare, with reference to the whole problem of utilizing history and literature for molding ideals, the following inductive studies: Estelle M. Darrah, A Study of Children's Ideals, *Popular Science Monthly,* vol. LIII, pp. 88-98; Earl Barnes, Children's Ideals, *Pedagogical Seminary,* vol. VII, pp. 1-12; Earl Barnes, Type Study on Ideals, running through nine numbers of *Studies in Education,* vol. II. The last is a particularly illuminating study.

XXI

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF MYTHOLOGY AND FOLK-LORE

THERE is one body of material that is at once history and literature, yet not strictly either, and which has a special value in moral education, namely, the expressions of primitive life in mythology and folk-lore. This material deserves separate consideration not only because of its importance for moral culture, but because its place and meaning have recently been obscured and misunderstood. The discovery of the biological parallel between individual and race development led to extreme and unwarranted educational applications, while the reaction against these extremes has disgusted many thoughtful teachers with all attempts to make use of the material of primitive life. This material comes to us in the shape of the earliest written literature, taken down and given final form by poets, after being passed on from generation to generation through centuries of time. Thus it is never the work of an individual, but the refined and condensed product of many generations in the race life. Their mythology was not only art and religion to primitive men, but, as far as they possessed them, science and philosophy. Events of history and operations of nature were alike transmuted into the body of poetic legend, the one storehouse of thought, feeling and imagination in primitive times.

As the one great intellectual and artistic expression of life, this body of mythology was naturally regarded with deep and increasing reverence. In the early period of their formation, legends would be treated with much freedom by minstrels and poets who sang and told them, even by grandmothers who related them to children about the hearthstone; but as the sanctity of antiquity gathered about the stories, they would be changed less and less, only a slight refining and polishing coming in later ages. Thus the legend would keep its integrity, but gain in artistic truth and beauty. Moreover, primitive men stood closer to nature and the simple realities of human life than do we. They depended for their existence immediately upon the orderly activities of nature—the sunshine, the rain, the regular succession of the seasons. They rose when the morning was gray, and the mystery of the birth of light, as the rosy-fingered dawn spread over the sky, was an ever-present miracle to them. Their work was in immediate contact with the objective forces of the universe, no garment of convention obscured the simple, if sometimes dark, meaning of their love and worship.

Thus the expression and interpretation of their lives in the simple art of mythology was naturally true and vital in content and form alike. Their senses were keen and true, the basal elements of human nature were powerful in them. They thought, as all poets do, in concrete images, not arbitrary symbols, and thus, relating what they saw and heard, their phrase flamed with material metaphor. All early language is metaphorical, all words applied to the mind and spirit had originally an immediate physical meaning; it is the receding of the tide of imagination that compels us to do in a phrase what primitive

language accomplished in a single word. Thus the art in primitive mythology, if instinctive rather than conscious, is nevertheless art of a high kind. It drives home the heart of the story, proportions the other incidents about this centre, uses repetition for dramatic emphasis, seizes the illuminating metaphor, associates its conceptions with a natural music that is their emotional counterpart, utilizes nature as a living language to clothe the conceptions of man's heart. To find the equal of this art in *vitality* we must turn to the literature of the great individual masters of later times.[1]

Equally strong is the *truth* of primitive art in expressing and interpreting simple human experience. There are two different meanings to the word "truth:" the truth of history is the truth of incident; the truth of poetry is the truth of character.[2] History tells what happened; art shows what, given a definite character and certain circumstances, must have happened. Thus there can be a true fairy-tale or a false. A false fairy-tale is one that merely presents a jumble of imagined incidents, interesting enough

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[1] "Upon the whole I conclude with this: the wisdom of the primitive ages was either great or lucky; great, if they knew what they were doing and invented the figure to shadow the meaning; lucky, if without meaning or intending it they fell upon matter which gives occasion to such worthy contemplation."—BACON, Preface to *The Wisdom of the Ancients* (translated), *Works of Francis Bacon*, edited by Spedding, *et al.*, vol. XIII, p. 80. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, no date.

[2] Compare ARISTOTLE, *Poetic*, translated by Buckley (George Bell & Sons, London, 1890), chapter IX, sections 2 and 3:

"For an historian and a poet do not differ from each other, because the one writes in verse and the other in prose. * * * But they differ in this, that the one speaks of things which have happened, and the other of such as might have happened. Hence poetry is more philosophic, and more deserving of attention, than history. For poetry speaks more of universals, but history of particulars."

perhaps in themselves, but with no order or inner connection among them. A true fairy-tale takes a definite character, puts him in unusual circumstances or annuls certain ordinary limitations of time and space, and then asks, and answers truly, "What will the character do?" Primitive mythology is filled everywhere with this ethical truth of character. The unnumbered poets, through the spectrum of whose intelligence and feeling this expression of early life has come to us, recognized instinctively the simple laws of life, carried out truthfully the great typical characters of whom they sang. Thus Brunhild and Siegfried, Pallas and Apollo, Thor and Odin, Helen and Agamemnon, have this ethical vitality, and the stories told of them are true with the higher truth of poetry. Is it any wonder that artists of later ages, in the over-refinements of civilization, when the senses are artificially stimulated until dulled to natural appeals, when the realities of man's life are covered over with a garment of convention, should feel the need of returning to the breast of the race-mother to gain new vitality through saturating themselves with the simple expressions of primitive life? Sensitive Tennyson amid the refinements and shams of English aristocratic culture, Wagner, a late-born Siegfried, yearning back from the gloom and convention of a mechanical age to the fresh laughter and wild spirit of his Valkyr bride, have alike felt this thirst for primitive reality, and have given us their greatest works in consequence.

Thus primitive mythology is good nourishing food for the intellect, imagination and emotions, sound in ethical content, beautiful in simple artistic form. We need to give enough food to children; and one of the worst mistakes of the old education was in giving such starvation diet to the

inner life. Moreover, mythology has a peculiar charm and value for children because it springs from a plane of life having so much in common with their own. The fact that the general parallel in development between the individual and the race has been so overstated and misinterpreted by educational extremists should not blind us to the fact that the parallel exists and is of great educational importance. As the embryo of a higher mammal passes through the typical stages in the evolution of organic life, so the individual human being passes through the great phases in the unfolding of historic humanity.

There are severe limitations to this general unity of development. The child of civilized parents starts well on in the line of life; many chapters, struggled through with bitter pain by the race, are quite suppressed in his growth-process; phases which were worked out only through ages of slow change in the race life may spring suddenly from potential to active being in the child, under the influence of a single stimulus, because of the inherited capital gathered up in him as instinct and capacity. Moreover, the slow process of evolution is never advance in a straight line, but through action and reaction the development of the most widely differentiated forms, growing toward higher adaptation. The different civilizations of the past do not rise one above another in simple chronological order, as Hegel falsely represented them,[1] but grow out in all directions from the tree of life. The strength of one is often the weakness of another, while through them all is slow progress toward the higher. Thus while each of these

[1] Compare HEGEL'S preliminary Classification of Historical Data, *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree, pp. 103-110. The Colonial Press, New York (copyright), 1900.

historic civilizations has its own lesson to teach us, it is a mistake to try to make children live in one after another of them in chronological succession. To do that would be to hang them like monkeys successively to different branches of the tree of life, instead of helping them as naturally and rapidly as possible up the main line of the trunk.

Still, while general and not specific, the parallel between individual and race development holds; and thus early childhood and primitive life have much in common. In both, the imaginative and emotional life is powerful, all forces are conceived in terms of personality, the interest in the world is generic but expressed in concrete images, and children and primitive men alike stand at the beginning of the twofold process of moral evolution,—action being largely an immediate expression of desire, and sympathy extending little beyond the bounds of the individual organism. This strong community of character between children and primitive men gives mythology its now well-recognized powerful appeal to the child, and the ethical truth and artistic vitality it possesses make it an admirable supplementary tool for moral culture.

It is objected, however, that if we recognize, as we must, an historic process of moral evolution, surely we do not wish to give to our children material springing from a plane ethically far below our own. This is the one strong argument that can be urged against the use of expressions of primitive life in education, and it deserves our most careful consideration. It is true there are elements in mythology which are morally bad. The attitude of Æschylus and Plato toward their own Greek inheritance may well serve to guide us. It is best not to emphasize the legends of the

amours of Zeus, though young children are not hurt by these stories because they do not understand them. Similarly, the frequently recurring cruel stepmother of German folk-lore is not good for children, because untrue to average human nature. It is well to omit stories making elements of cruelty and brutality too prominent, though an error on that side is better than effeminacy. Thus it is not a sufficient ethical guarantee of our material that it comes from primitive times: we must use rigorous and intelligent selection, omitting those legends that are morally harmful.

On the other hand, if we are to use mythology at all, we should have for it something of the same reverence primitive men showed it. I have no patience with the facile retelling of these great expressions of race life by all sorts of feeble-minded people to suit their own ethical and artistic whims. This is one of the many expressions of that prevalent notion that any one who can talk nonsense glibly can write books for children. To write books for children all the insight and skill are needed which go to the creation of literature for adults, and something more—the ability to take the child's point of view and speak in terms of his experience. Even when the 'fixing-up' of the legends to suit our ethical notions, or those of our time, is done by men and women of real moral insight and artistic skill, the effect is almost always to emasculate the material of the very human vitality, the reality of race experience, that gives it worth as an instrument of moral education.[1] I remember the pain and grief the late Professor Hermann Grimm expressed over such a retelling of those unmatched

[1] Professor ADLER'S admirable book on *The Moral Instruction of Children* seems to me open to criticism in regard to the liberties he has taken with stories, drawn from folk-lore and especially from the Bible, in retelling them for ethical purposes.

German legends gathered from the life of the people by his father and uncle, the Grimm brothers. The remolding of the stories had been done by certain ethical teachers, with the aim of making the material more helpful morally; but Professor Grimm said that all the life had been taken out of the legends and that in their 'ethical' shape they were quite spoiled. He was right: these condensed and refined expressions of generations of earnest living are far too precious to be subject to the whim of every educator who has a particular ethical lesson to inculcate. If we use primitive material let us use it reverently; if certain stories seem to us harmful let us omit them wholly, not mutilate or emasculate them in the daring attempt to improve them.

I question, however, whether much harm can be done even by the worst elements in mythology, since the positive ethical worth outweighs the occasional flaws. Moreover, there is a distinct advantage for moral education in the fact that primitive mythology springs from a plane morally earlier than that reached in present civilization. Moral evolution is not only from the lower to the higher, but from the simple to the complex; and children are prepared to respond to the simpler ethical standards of mythology before they can even safely meet the complex riddles that fill the literature interpreting modern life. It is not a question here of relative and absolute standards, or of lower and higher ones, but of teaching moral elements before their intricate combinations, and moral principles earlier than the complexities of their applications. Read Ibsen and Goethe, and the great problem is to distinguish the good from the evil. Every bad situation has some redeeming element, while every good action seems

stained by some marring selfishness in the motive. In primitive mythology the good is usually all on one side, and the bad on the other, the good conquering, as it should, in the struggle between them. The *tendency* in life is for the good in the end to overcome evil, but in the detail of human experience that tendency is often thwarted or unfulfilled. It is necessary for our moral safety that we should recognize the great trend of law before we are brought face to face with exceptions and failures in its fulfillment. Thus children should study primitive mythology long before they can safely read Ibsen and Goethe.

One may choose a myth at random to illustrate this simplicity of ethical problem and standard in the expressions of primitive life. Take, for instance, such a story as that of Perseus and Andromeda: On the one hand is a young and beautiful maiden, made as human and attractive as possible. Opposed to her is a great, misshapen monster from the deep, more repulsive than an ordinary beast, and thus as remote from our human sympathy as possible. The innocent maiden, through no fault of her own, is to be destroyed by the monster. Between the two comes in Perseus, representing human strength, courage and the defense of innocence, armed with the Gorgon head of power. He destroys the monster and releases the maiden. So the story ought to end in a good world; so we believe it must end in the ultimate working-out of life. Meantime, in what we see of human life, how often the innocent Andromedas go down before the brute monsters of evil; but before a child can safely recognize that fact, he should see that the issue ought to be the other way, and it is his duty to make it so if possible.

If a Greek myth, chosen at random, expresses this simple

opposition of good and evil, how much more the gloomier, more earnest mythology of the northland. There, human life was a perpetual struggle with the brute forces of nature. Norse mythology is simply a transfigured interpretation of that struggle with its ethical implications. On the one side are the bright gods, Thor, Odin, Balder and Freya, representing the human will and intelligence in various aspects; on the other are the Fenrir Wolf, the Midgard Serpent, the Jötuns of ice and snow and the Demon of destructive fire. This northern mythology expresses, moreover, a further lesson that children need to learn before they can safely meet the complexities of modern life. It is true, good sometimes goes down before evil; but it is possible to go down with colors flying; there is a way of defeat that is the greatest of victories. It is this lesson to which the Norseman continually returns. He did not ask victory, but only to die fighting heroically on the field of battle, and in the end to share the last tragic conflict of the gods against the unleashed brutality of the universe.

A little later the same spirit takes form in our own Anglo-Saxon legend of Beowulf, who fought with Grendel under the sea and was chosen king of a people whom he ruled and protected for fifty winters. In his old age, a new danger menaced his people: a monster "worm" or dragon, guarding a hoard of treasures, made nightly onslaughts and devastated the land with fire. So Beowulf went out to fight the monster as a king should; but his thanes failed to support him, and fled to the wood in terror—all but Wiglaf, of Beowulf's own kin. With his one faithful comrade Beowulf fought and killed the monster, but was himself wounded unto death. And to Wiglaf

Gray with care:
* * *
'Bid the renowned in battle
After the bright flames,
It shall be to remind
High-rising
That it the sea-farers
Beowulf's tomb-hill,
Over the flood-mists
He took from his neck
The valorous war-chief,
To the young spear-warrior,
The ring and burnie—
'Thou art the last remnant
Of the Waegmundings;
Of my kinsmen
The earls in their strength:
That was of the old man
Of his breast-thoughts,
The hot hostile waves:
His soul seeking

"Beowulf spoke,
* * *
* * *
a grave-hill make
at the cape of the ocean;
my people—
on Hrone's point—
afterward may call
when the ships
from afar drive.'
the golden ring
to the thane he gave it,
the gold-colored helm,
bade him use them well:
of our race,
all Wierd has swept before,
at the Creator's will,
I after them shall go.'
the last word
before he the fire sought,
of him from his breast went
the doom of the sooth-fast."[1]

This is the other lesson: to go down like a hero and find victory in defeat. I have never read Tennyson's matchless *Passing of King Arthur* without thinking of Beowulf and realizing how deeply this lesson is in the moral consciousness of the Anglo-Saxon race. The two poems are utterly different in artistic form: in *Beowulf* metaphors are poured out in a wild flood, rugged words arouse the sensi-

[1] Translated from *Beowulf*, edited by Harrison and Sharp, lines 2793-2821. Ginn & Co., Boston, 1888.

bility with harsh alliteration; in Tennyson the images are carried to thoughful completeness and every syllable yields its due melody to the cadence of the line. Yet differing thus in form, how at one the two poems are in moral content. As Beowulf is left with one faithful thane, so King Arthur is alone in the end with Sir Bedivere. As Beowulf goes, not knowing the issue, confidently to meet whatever "doom" is meted out to the loyal, so of King Arthur is repeated the weird line:

"From the great deep to the great deep he goes!"

Tennyson may have been consciously influenced by the rude poem at the beginning of his race's history; but whether that be true or not, the lesson of moral heroism in disaster is deep in the life of the race, making modern England, like ancient Rome, most to be feared when in utter defeat.

Thus the virile expressions of race life carry the simple masculine virtues that must always underlie the moral subtleties of civilization if life is to remain sound. If refinement is not to mean degeneration, it must be a strong, forceful life that is refined. If the development of appreciation is not to mean the loss of moral fibre, the character must be firmly based in those simple principles whose application will prove so intricate and confusing. Primitive mythology may be therefore a peculiarly helpful influence in early moral education, since the wise use of it will do so much to establish those basal elements of character without which the refinements of later cultivation would mean disaster.

XXII

THE VALUE OF LITERATURE FOR ETHICAL INSTRUCTION AND INSPIRATION

History records the actions of men; art expresses their thoughts, emotions and ideals. Thus art reveals, as it were, the soul of history that has woven its material garment of facts and institutions. Therefore art is the most ideal of all expressions of human life. Less influenced by partisan feeling than religion, freer from conditions of utility than ordinary action, more directly expressive of the spirit than institutions, art is the garment to which we must turn if we would read the soul of human history.

Each of the fine arts has its own peculiar excellence in revealing the life and spirit of man. The greatness of literature is its universality. It cannot reveal and impress an imaged conception so forcibly as sculpture and painting, it cannot appeal directly to the emotions with the sweep of power belonging to music, but it unites something of the functions of both types of art, and goes beyond either in the range and many-sidedness of its expression and interpretation of life. Literature is, moreover, by far the most accessible of the fine arts. We are doing much by mechanical invention to bring the material of the other arts within the reach of students everywhere, yet we can never succeed in rendering them accessible as is literature. To read the history of the human spirit as painting and sculpt-

ure reveal it, we must go beyond the study of reproductions of works of art and have opportunities of visiting the great museums of Europe. Music must be recreated every time it is enjoyed, and to hear it adequately given, one must have opportunities of culture open to very few. On the other hand, the great literature of the world is accessible to everyone. The masters speak to us just as they spoke to their contemporaries centuries ago. No one is so poor that he cannot have access to a few great books; and many are not needed: it is loving and repeated contact with those loftiest spirits in whom humanity is so wondrously revealed, that gives the real value of literature. Think what it would mean if we could spend an hour each week in the Sistine Chapel with Michael Angelo, or hear every day a symphony of Beethoven or an opera of Wagner. Yet the Wagners and Angelos of literature lie on the table of our own room; since we may turn to them any time, we rarely enjoy them at all, and people even go through the world and die without ever climbing the mountain of purification with Dante or sharing the world vision of Goethe.

Thus the universality and accessibility of literature as a fine art give it a unique place as a supplementary instrument of moral education. Moreover, it has a range of ethical values not equaled by any other fine art. Therefore I shall consider the art of literature as the one best expressing the value of the fine arts for purposes of ethical instruction and inspiration.

1. The first value of literature in molding character comes from its content of thought, feeling and imagination. Literature is filled with noble thinking on the permanent ethical problems of human life, expressed not for

the trained specialist, but for the ordinary thinking man and woman. Moreover, thought in literature is never expressed alone, but always transfused with emotion and exalted by imagination. The result is an appeal not to a fraction of man, the understanding, but to the whole personality, deepening thought, awakening imagination, refining feeling and touching the will into action. The resulting education is morally of the highest value since the different aspects of the spirit are cultivated in that harmony which gives each right relation to the whole of life.

2. All literature, even the most objectively dramatic, is in content and form alike an expression of the life and character of its author, and often the best thing in a book is the man who wrote it. In *Sartor Resartus*, better than its burlesque humor, its heavy German philosophy, even than its flights of inspired poetry, is the earnest hater of shams and preacher of the gospel of work, Carlyle himself; and to feel the vigor of his spirit is to get the heart out of *Sartor Resartus*. Thus, gradually, through loving contact with a writer's thought the student grows into an appreciation of his spirit, until Emerson and Lowell, Dante and Goethe, become more real than the imagined figures of drama or novel, and nearer than the people we meet in the street. It is impossible to estimate too highly the moral value of thus making the great masters our intimate friends, touching their thought across the centuries and over the leagues of space.

3. In a different way literature is quite as valuable as history in presenting life in relation to law. History has the advantage of reality. Our interpretation of its facts may be utterly wrong, nevertheless the facts are there, with their implicit lesson, waiting for a true reading. Litera-

ture, on the other hand, is life put through the spectrum of some man's spirit, and there may frequently arise a suspicion that he has misinterpreted his material. This questioning in itself, however, is positively helpful in ethical instruction. The student is driven to compare his author's presentation of life with what he knows through experience and observation, and thus tends to formulate his own ethical interpretations. Much more important than this is the advantage literature possesses in that it can present the tendencies of life carried to completion, the laws fulfilled in application. Herein is the prophetic function of art: it shows the completed circle of which experience presents a fragmentary arc. The moral vision of the poet perceives the curve of the arc and his imagination completes it to the perfect circle. The *tendency* of every fact of the spirit is to become a fact of the external world; but as Plato taught, matter is resistant and the forces of the spirit are never completely carried out in it. The tendency is that "murder will out," but many a murderer dies with his crime undiscovered. The tendency of a beautiful spirit is to mold its body into a beautiful garment, yet the features of Socrates were the laughing-stock of his contemporaries. Thus it is to art that we must turn to find the laws of life carried full circle, the deed returning upon the doer. This is one phase of the ideal element present in all true art. Art never merely photographs life, but interprets it; and the greatness of an artist is tested more by his ability to reveal the meaning than to imitate the form of life. In the drama there must be five full acts, carrying the ethical forces assumed in the early scenes to their final fulfillment in the last; in life the curtain may fall at any point, even in the first scene. In life,

not all mad ambition crushes its Macbeth, not all unfounded jealousy is goaded to Othello's black doom, nor is a balance of the will between opposing forces sustained to the disaster of Hamlet; but in the tragic drama it must be so, for the last fatal conclusion is in germ in the opening scenes and characters. In life the tangled threads are spun but a little way, then Atropos cuts them, and how they may be woven out behind the impenetrable veil we cannot see; but the artist must see: it is the harmoniously woven garment, with its gold of love and its purple of grief, its light threads of joy and youth, and its heavy black strands of disaster, all fused in the living whole, we demand of him. Thus with never a word of moral preaching, Shakespeare is one of the profoundest ethical teachers in all the world, and Dante, for purposes of ethical instruction, outweighs all the great philosophers.

4. It is evident that what was said of the value for ethical instruction of 'bad examples' in history applies even more forcibly to literature. A bad man may conceal his real nature and dress his vices in an attractive garb, at least for a time; art unmasks its villain, and when it deals with evil makes it as ugly in form as it is revolting in spirit. No student of *Othello* was ever led to imitate Iago, and the examples of Goneril and Regan never tempted a child to ingratitude. Indeed, another test of true art is the way it mates the body to the soul in portraying moral perversion. Literature that makes vice attractive and arouses a sentimental interest in it is not true art but a low pandering to decadent sensibility.

5. By its portrayal of noble characters literature has a power, unequalled by other studies, to waken and mold lofty ideals of life. An abstract statement of a high aim

is ineffective compared with the power of a concretely imaged ideal. Since a primary function of art is to make its material live with vivifying imagination and emotion, the writer of histories must be an artist in the highest sense to give his work as great a value as literature possesses in inspiring ideals.[1] Review in thought the group of Shakespeare's noblest heroines: think what it would mean for a girl to dwell with such companions. If then her ideal could be transfigured with the light that shines in the face of Browning's Pompilia would it not be radiantly complete?

6. Literature has further a power to deepen and refine the life of appreciation. This is true of our relation to the many-sided and ever-changing beauty of the nature world. It is by sharing the keener vision of the poet that our response is deepened to the thousandfold beauties of the world that is about us. One who has been stirred by Matthew Arnold's *Self-Dependence* will always feel more deeply the majesty of the "intense, clear, star-sown vault of heaven" and the restless motion of "the lit sea's unquiet way." One who has listened to the sounding music of Sappho's

"Hesperus all things thou bringst, which the early-born
Dawn afar scattered,
Thou bringest the goat and the sheep, to the mother
thou bringest her child;"

and has watched with Byron the evening hour "Sink o'er the earth so beautiful and soft," must ever find a deeper

[1] See the inductive studies in children's ideals by Darrah and Barnes, referred to above (p. 235).

meaning in that hour of meditation and of love. As poetry transfigures the earth in describing it, it becomes a medium of our response to the beauty and sublimity of the world.

7. In all natural literature, however, nature is never a direct object of description, but a language for the expression of the thought and emotion of human life. Thus more important than the wakening to the beauty of nature is the function literature fulfills of unsealing our eyes to the dignity, comedy, tragedy, romance in the drama of common human life. All the mystery of Hamlet is wrapped up in the least of us; Dante's Heaven and Purgatory and Hell are in the humblest village in the land. It is through the interpretation of life in literature that we come to appreciate the human world in which we live.

It is strange how we still fail to see the necessity of the right cultivation of feeling and imagination.[1] Our failure to follow the Golden Rule comes less from lack of good intention than from inability to put ourselves in imagination into the place of others and appreciate how they would feel under given circumstances.

Not only this large appreciation of character, but the saving quality of ethical good taste, which helps us to distinguish the morally congruous and incongruous, results from this cultivated sensibility and imagination. The people without that indefinable but priceless virtue called 'tact,' the 'cranks' who cannot see things in relation but are dominated by a single idea, the fanatics who can-

[1] "D'une manière générale, on peut dire qu'à la source de toute grande vertu, de toute action morale de haute portée, comme aussi au fond de tout grand dérèglement, soit durable soit accidentel, on trouve l'entraînement bon ou funeste d'une imagination puissante."—MARION, *De la Solidarité Morale*, p. 68.

not tolerate the unessential, but spend their lives fighting it, so that they are powerless (or powderless) when the real conflict comes, the people who cannot laugh at themselves, but take their whims for their conscience—all these are melancholy examples of the absence of that cultivation of feeling and imagination which in its negative aspect gives the saving grace of humor, and in its positive the appreciation of moral harmony. One is tempted to say that it is impossible to live a moral life without a sense of humor! Except wide human experience, I know no channel through which ethical good taste, the sense of moral proportion, can be so well cultivated as through wide and appreciative contact with all phases of human life as these are portrayed in the world's greatest literature.

To gain this education in appreciation the student must not stop with the artistic symbol, but must return from it to what it symbolizes. It is possible to shed so many tears over the imaginary characters of novel and drama that one's eyes are dry in the presence of the miseries one might alleviate. This result is due to the dangerous form of dissipation which is present when the emotions are allowed to effervesce with no expression in action.[1] When the circuit between feeling and action, reception and ex-

[1] "Even the habit of excessive indulgence in music, for those who are neither performers themselves nor musically gifted enough to take it in a purely intellectual way, has probably a relaxing effect upon the character. One becomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without prompting to any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterward in *some* active way. Let the expression be the least thing in the world—speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic offers—but let it not fail to take place."—William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, p. 126.

pression, is complete, all stirring of the imagination and emotions to an appreciation of the characters of literature is a means of responding more sensitively to the human beings of the real world. The value of this culture for moral living can hardly be exaggerated, since only as we possess the power to enter appreciatively into another's spirit can we estimate his life justly and act helpfully toward him.

8. There is a further phase of this education in appreciation which is of crowning importance. The world in which we live is apt always to seem commonplace. The mass of submerging details surges in upon us day by day with no principle of selection. Only the rarest insight can distinguish that which is essential from the crowd of meaningless incidents which die with the day that gave them birth. Literature has power to give us a certain spiritual perspective with reference to daily life by revealing the divine in the commonplace, the ideal meaning present in the humblest situation. If it rests us to go out from the dull circumstances of our own lives into the imagined characters of the drama and the romantic situations of the novel, we return to our daily routine with a new sense of the infinite possibilities of life gathered up in our own humble personality and circumstances. After all, life has always been commonplace to commonplace people, it is made sublime only by living sublimely. Literature helps us to see that every cause which ever challenged the support of men demands our service today, that the ideal of which we dream will be found, if at all, only by living nobly the seemingly humble duties of our daily existence.

9. Finally, literature shares with all art the power to calm and exalt the spirit, thus giving that balance and

serenity so indispensable to noble living. This influence, indeed, is the supreme function of beauty in relation to the human spirit. If it be wisdom to 'see life steadily and whole,' virtue means living life steadily and whole: not piecemeal, in fragmentary disjointed parts, but each element lived quietly and sanely in harmony with all the rest. Thus the art which develops in us that serene wisdom contributes in the most direct way to noble living.

XXIII

THE PRACTICAL USE OF HISTORY AND LITERATURE FOR ETHICAL INSTRUCTION

It is evident that the subjects of study most available in supporting and enlarging the work of ethical instruction are of value not only in giving knowledge, but often much more in forming ideals, awakening appreciation and inspiring action. Thus the task of ethical instruction cannot be separated from the work of moral inspiration. That is why courses carefully graded to give ethical knowledge so often hamper the best use of history and literature in influencing character. The moral value of these subjects comes less through a series of formal lessons with a distinctively ethical import than through a wide and generous contact, under good guidance, with the material the subjects present.

Moreover, the simplest expression of life may appeal to the youngest student and the wisest philosopher. A grasshopper should interest a child and Darwin. The lives of noble men and women are helpful in every stage of the student's growth. Literature that is simple and artistic comes home to us with fresh meaning at every step of our experience. Indeed one of the best tests of a masterpiece is its ability to grow with our growth, revealing a deeper truth as we bring the key of enlarged experience to unlock its treasures.

Thus our use of material drawn from human life must follow the hint of life itself. The typical experiences come to us in different form over and over again, with new meaning on more mature planes of life. Similarly we need to return again and again to the material expressing and interpreting humanity, and wide and frequent contact with the best of it is far more helpful in molding character than is the formal study of any narrow series of selections chosen for a specific moral import. The organization of the material must come more in the mind of the student than in the curriculum.

Moreover, as the ethical interest is central in human life, so it is central in every expression of life. Therefore, to secure the ethical value of history and literature we do not need to study them in any unusual way. If we study history as history, and literature as literature, their moral contribution will be fully gained. It is only when their meaning is unwisely narrowed, as when history is made a record of wars and political changes merely, literature a text-book for philology or rhetoric, that we lose much of their ethical, because their human, value. Thus it is the wise and broad use of history and literature in the ordinary course of school work that will yield the main value of these subjects for ethical instruction. Neither here do we wish ever to moralize—to tack morals to incidents and characters—but to help the children to understand events and persons in relation to law. Thus the moral meaning will be the human centre of all the sound work in history and literature, rather than a separate teaching abstracted and given apart. M. Vessiot (academic inspector of schools, Marseilles, France) expressed this so admirably in discussing the French program of ethical instruction,

that our American Commissioner of Education in 1882, John Eaton, caused the statement to be translated and issued as a special bulletin by his bureau. M. Vessiot says (pp. 3 and 4):

"Moral and civil instruction ought not then to be confined to one division or subdivision of the scholastic programme, restricted to one class or to a prescribed hour, pressed in the narrow mould of a few inert formulas or solemn maxims; it ought to permeate all parts of the work of instruction, blossoming out in varied developments and reappearing every day and every hour; it ought to be the life, the soul, of the school. It is in the school that a child should draw in morality and patriotism as he inspires air, without noticing it; for to teach morality successfully there is no call for too much moralizing. That moral lesson which is announced risks being lost. Moral instruction should be combined with everything, but insensibly, like those nutritive elements which the scientist finds reappearing in all sorts of food, but which are concealed under the infinite variety of color and form in which nature clothes animals and plants, and which man unwittingly assimilates without a suspicion. Thus moral instruction will enter into the various work of the class, the readings, recitations, dictations, the stories related by the teacher, the selections drawn from the poets and romancers, the familiar and sprightly conversations, the grave reflections on history, the games, the promenades—being everywhere present, in short, without making its presence remarked."

How admirable the statement is! Yet in the French program for ethical instruction, unfortunately, M. Vessiot's view has been departed from, and the French text-books abstract the moral element overmuch and treat it apart.

Perhaps this suggests a practical value in separate courses for ethical instruction, in spite of the fact that they do not form the ideal medium. There is danger in the present condition of our education that the moral element will often be ignored entirely in the teaching of history and literature. Many of our teachers are by no means fitted to deal with these great expressions of human life and bring out the moral heart of them. I recall an eminent university professor of Romance languages telling his class that there was no ethical meaning in Dante, and that the value of the *Divine Comedy* was entirely as a text for philology. This is an extreme case, and often teachers in the grades have a more human appreciation of their subjects than is shown sometimes by advanced specialists. Nevertheless, in many schools the teachers are quite unaware of the opportunities for moral culture presented by their subjects; and history is narrowed to a mere record of wars and political changes, while literature is studied for some single interest, rhetorical or linguistic. By separate courses for ethical instruction we should avoid this, and be sure that the due time and attention would be given to the moral meaning of the two subjects we are considering, so that children would clearly appreciate it.

On the other hand, such separate courses would almost inevitably tend to carry further than is true of the regular courses in history and literature, the vicious practice of using selections; for it would be natural to cull from the whole field of these subjects the incidents, scraps of verse and prose, bits of narration, which would give concrete form to the lessons we desired to teach. Undoubtedly selections have their place: a good deed is worth remembering apart from the man who did it, and the beautiful

expression of a lofty thought is inspiring, though removed from its context; but to depend upon such fragments as the basis of our ethical instruction would be to miss the main moral value history and literature should have. An incident in the life of a man can be understood truly only in relation to his entire character; an event in the history of a people is to be interpreted only as we study the people and their whole civilization. Even more rigidly does the same principle apply to literature, where the artistic unity of a composition gives its place and meaning to every detail of the whole. Nothing is more vicious than to try to teach literature through volumes of scraps. The broken meats may be good tasting, but they lack the artistic and moral unity that makes a literary masterpiece so wonderful an expression and interpretation of human life. Better one good novel than a dozen best scenes from as many separate stories; better one sound poem than an anthology of happy lines; better the life of one great man than a collection of ethical incidents from the biographies of many individuals. This principle is sadly violated in much of the material we put into the hands of our children in home and school,[1] but it need not be violated, as it at least probably would be in separate courses in history and literature for ethical instruction.

[1] A striking example of the violation of this principle is found in a considerable portion of the *Young Folks' Library*, edited by Thomas Bailey Aldrich *et al.*, and recently published in twenty volumes by the Hall and Locke Co., Boston. Some of the most eminent names in the United States are associated with the compilation of these volumes, the books contain portions of the noblest literature ever produced for children and young people; yet such gathering together of climaxes and especially thrilling bits and fragments (as for instance in vol. XIII, *Sea Stories*) is thoroughly vicious if made the daily bread of the child's reading. It is like eating all the frosting from cake instead of a good nourishing breakfast.

There would be a further disadvantage in such courses, which has been implied in what has already been said: to deal with history and literature purely for ethical instruction would mean to abstract overmuch the moral interest from the whole of human life, and thus to get it out of proportion and true perspective. As it would be unfortunate to wear one's heart on the outside of the body, so it is a pity to bring the moral element to the surface unnaturally and make it too explicit. Much of the best moral nurture comes unconsciously, and we can easily go too far in making the student aware of the ethical implications of what he is studying Moreover, when we teach the great expressions of human life purely with reference to ethics, we are in danger of falling into the detached moralizing which we have found to be so great a bane to all ethical instruction. It is not that we want to trick children into listening to ethical instruction when they imagine it to be something else; but that the moral element should be kept in vital relation to all others, as a beating heart, not removed and dissected, but alive within the organism, sending its life-blood to every part.

Thus separate courses utilizing history and literature for the purpose of ethical instruction bear much the same relation to the regular work in those subjects that the communisms, in which groups of people gather apart to construct an ideal society, sustain to the great human world. We need the altruistic people in the world to contribute their leavening to its coarse lump; meanwhile we may rejoice at every such experiment even though it fail, because of the standard it sets and the lesson it teaches. Similarly the chief value of such courses, utilizing history and literature for ethical instruction, as characterize the

French system of education,[1] or as are so wisely conducted in the New York Ethical Culture Schools, is to show our teachers the moral implications of the subjects they teach and help them to utilize the full moral value of history and literature in the ordinary course of school work. When all our teachers are able to do this, and history and literature are given their full place in the curriculum, the need for such separate courses will perhaps have passed, through the learning and applying of the lesson they exist to teach.

Meantime, the millennium is not near, and we must welcome every expedient which will reinforce the work of ethical instruction. Without establishing separate courses for such instruction in history and literature, it may be well to increase the time given to direct ethical teaching as outlined in Chapter XIX, and to use material drawn from history and literature frequently for texts and illustrations in the talks with the children. The controlling principle is to keep all our ethical teaching, direct and indirect, soundly human and in sane relation to the whole of life.

There are, further, certain incidental ways, apart from the regular work of the school, in which literature may be utilized for moral ends. The opening period of the school is usually given, very wisely, to some exercise that may contribute a helpful thought to consecrate the day's work. Whether or not the law and practice of the community sanction the use of the literature of the Bible for this purpose in the public school, for private and public schools alike there is a large amount of other ethical literature which may be used to advantage. *The Little Flowers of*

[1] Compare J. C. Bracq, Moral and Religious Instruction in France, *Educational Review*, vol. XXIII, pp. 325-337.

Saint Francis of Assisi, *The Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis, the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius, portions of Emerson, Lowell, Whittier, Wordsworth, are examples of the kind of literature, directly moral in import, selections of which may be read with the children at the opening of the day and so consecrate it. Days for public celebration and birthdays of world heroes furnish a further opportunity for the use of literature, biography and history for ethical purposes.

The main use of history and literature for ethical instruction and moral inspiration, however, must come in the ordinary course of home and school life. I must point in conclusion to the general principles which should guide our selection of material for children of different ages.

These principles are well known and I have already indicated them:

(1) Here as everywhere we must begin with the child's experience, and work out from that to the larger world it interprets. (2) The concrete must precede the abstract; (3) At the same time the interest in the generic whole precedes interest in the special part. (4) The imagination and emotions can be appealed to earlier than the reflective reason, and synthetic appreciation can be awakened before intellectual analysis should be stimulated.

Following these guiding principles we should begin in history with simple actions and concrete lives as near as possible to the child world. These should be chosen at first very widely from the life of humanity, without reference to the accepted divisions of history. Gradually these characters and deeds may be identified with the movements of humanity they interpret. The field should be narrowed as the work goes on, the study enriched by a recognition

of all the affinities in time, race and civilization of the lives studied. In the high school period the student will be able to take a specific phase of history, deal with the various expressions of life it presents, appreciate the characters in all their historic relations, and reflectively discover the laws underlying and controlling both men and events.

Parallel with this rough outline should be the classification of the material literature presents. We begin with literature simple in form, imaginative and emotional rather than intellectual, general in interest but dealing with concrete life, and in subject-matter as close as possible to the child world. It is interesting to see that there are two kinds of literature that fulfill in different ways these conditions and are complementary to each other. We have seen how powerful is the appeal of primitive mythology to young children, since it springs from the plane of life upon which the child lives and fulfills usually all of the conditions mentioned above. In another way portions of the simplest literature arising from the child's own time and race fulfill the same conditions. The poems of Longfellow, Lowell, Bryant, Field and Riley that touch nature and child life in subject and are simple in form have a powerful appeal to young children. Primitive mythology contains the great simple ethical contrasts, this modern literature gives the refinement and delicacy resulting from centuries of moral evolution. Where the one embodies the generic race life, the other expresses the moral reaction of the highly developed individual. In both, the remaining conditions are fulfilled, and the simplification of form can be secured for the youngest children by oral retelling.

This must show how wrong is a course of study graded with reference merely to the chronology of the literature.

Children should begin at both ends and work toward the middle. For instance in English literature, *Beowulf* and the simpler works of Wordsworth, Scott, Tennyson, and especially the American writers, should precede Chaucer, Milton and Shakespeare.

As the child grows, a wider range of material becomes available, more attention can be paid to the relation of the artistic expression to the author and his world. A little later, the child may study a number of works from the same writer, then those expressing an epoch and race. The end here as in the case of history is the exhaustive reflective study of a special part of the material with reference to all its relations and the laws it reveals.

I can merely point to these large principles of arranging our material for indirect ethical instruction, repeating that much of it should be used over and over again. While we must beware of emasculating great expressions of human life by attempting to use them earlier than the child's experience and state of development would warrant, nevertheless, as the great laws of life are implicit in the simplest and earliest phases of experience, so we can teach them repeatedly on different planes of life, deepening the intellectual consciousness each time. Thus we may well turn, over and over again, to the great expressions of humanity in history and literature, hoping to unlock them more deeply each time with the ever new key of enlarged experience and more mature character.

XXIV

INSTRUCTION IN THE INTIMATE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN LIFE

THERE is one phase of the problem of ethical instruction on which I have not touched, but which is the most difficult of all; this is the task of giving children knowledge concerning the most intimate phases of human life—sex, marriage and parenthood. This problem concerns us throughout the child's development, though it centres in the period of transition from childhood to young manhood and womanhood; and because it is so difficult and stands somewhat apart from the general problem of ethical instruction, I have reserved it for separate discussion. Certainly it is amazing that so many children should be allowed to grow up with no knowledge, except what has been vulgarly acquired, regarding the most important ethical questions of human life, those upon which by far the majority of wrongly directed lives are shipwrecked. It is surely shameful that the child's knowledge of the most sacred elements of human life should come to him from vulgar companions in the gutter.

Why is it that with so much insistence as there is today upon the need of some systematic instruction in these problems, parents and teachers are slow to undertake it? Of course, the obvious reason is that the task is so difficult we naturally shrink from it. But is there not a deeper

reason? Where such deep-seated, instinctive repugnance exists as is shown toward instructing children in these intimate problems there is usually some sound justification for it. Even thoughtful and devoted parents show this repugnance, which I believe is born of the veil of reserve that rightly clothes the deep things of human life. That veil is not lightly to be lifted. The people who do draw it carelessly are in danger of degrading themselves and making their children morbid and precocious. No one can treat carelessly a fundamental instinct of the human being, such as this that protects the deeps of life, without grave harm.

Nevertheless, we are in no way excusable for abdicating our responsibilities and simply drifting. It remains the parent's and teacher's shame if the solution of the problem is left to vulgar comrades and other chance influences. Moreover, if children do not acquire reverently knowledge concerning the most intimate functions and relations of their lives, they are not only thrown open to the influence of evil-minded companions, but are in danger of misunderstanding their own instincts as these dawn in consciousness and so of responding to them in ways that are destructive. The great need, therefore, is that parents, teachers and all concerned in the moral education of children should undertake the task of giving the needed information, while maintaining a reverence for the native veil of modesty that should always clothe this aspect of life.

First of all, it is necessary to cultivate reverence for every natural human capacity, if we are to bring the child to a sound attitude toward sex and parenthood. The notion that the sex life is in itself evil and that marriage is a sanctioned indulgence of human weakness has done

infinite harm. Much that we teach by behavior and implication tends to inculcate this false view, whose persistence in our civilization is the source of great suffering and moral degradation. The life of the body is just as sound and right as the life of the soul when the one is the natural garment of the other. It is only when some capacity is affirmed out of true relation to the whole of life that it becomes a source of evil. Thus every natural power should be regarded as just so much opportunity for life when expressed in sane relation to the whole. Better the pagan worship of creative forces than a morbid dividing of human nature into two parts one of which is considered devil-born.

On the other hand, if the sex life, rightly lived, is sound in meaning, it is most important to avoid any precocious development of it. Rousseau[1] held that it was advisable to try to retard the growth of sex-consciousness as long as possible; and if that view be extreme and due probably to Rousseau's own morbid experience, certainly the danger for the children in our civilization is of too early rather than too late a development of sex life. Nowhere else is it so necessary that a long period of quiet preparation should precede the period of action. Thus we should strive to keep the minds of children away from subjects which do not yet concern their normal functions and actions. Morbidly stimulating literature should be carefully kept away from them. Children's parties that unhealthily ape adult society, jests concerning sex-sentiment, above all, opportunities for secret talk with precocious comrades should be rigorously avoided; while every native interest in healthy outdoor life and vigorous physical

[1] See *Émile*, translated by Payne, pp. 196-197.

action should be sedulously fostered. I need hardly add that the ruinous stimulation coming from unsanitary clothing, vicious secret habits, depraved servants and companions must be guarded against as the very plague morally.

It is not enough that this protection be accomplished for our own children: we must rise to that larger fatherhood and motherhood that seeks thus to guard all children. The crying shame to us all in the crowded tenements of our cities is the lack of privacy of life to protect the innocence of children. And we cannot escape from being 'our brother's keeper.' There is no way of guaranteeing the safety of our children while we carelessly allow the moral plague to spread over child life.

Further, to avoid precocious development we must beware of mistakes in teaching children. Well-intentioned instruction given too early may be a powerful means of fostering morbid curiosity. Everyone has noticed the new shy reserve toward each other that boys and girls display in the period of transition. Children who had previously played together with innocent familiarity now become aware of a kind of spiritual wall, raised between the sexes, which cannot easily be broken down. This withdrawal and sensitiveness result from the dawn of instincts and functions in the child's own life, and indicate a new power to take a reverent attitude toward the facts of the sex life. Before the individual's own awakening such a reverent attitude is impossible. It is always dangerous to know the facts of life externally without appreciating their spiritual corollaries, and this appreciation depends far more upon one's own life and growth than upon any instruction one receives. I have known children

seven years old who had been taught by 'progressive' parents all the facts concerning the physical relations of marriage. It would have been utterly absurd to say that the children knew what marriage meant. They had merely an external knowledge of certain facts with little if any appreciation of the spiritual counterparts that give those facts sacredness. They were aware of a means of expression with no conception of what was expressed. The result was a soiled attitude toward the whole problem, with morbid curiosity stimulated instead of satisfied. The parents could not have done worse, and the repugnance of so many fathers and mothers to giving their children any instruction whatever in this connection is due, I believe, to their instinctive sense of this possible harm. It may be laid down as an unvarying pedagogical principle that we should never *know* anything we cannot *appreciate;* that is, it is always harmful to be brought into contact with expressions of life the inner sense of which we have no key to unlock. If it is sorrow whose garment we see with no recognition of the soul that wears it, the result in us may be callous contempt; if it is cynicism and despair into contact with which we are brought, with no appreciation of the experience from which this reaction springs, the result is often a blighting of our lives. If it is love whose clothes we handle with no sense of what they express, the result is apt to be the vulgar and morbid curiosity that is so ruinous.

Thus a child's questions are not, as they are so often taken to be, sufficient proof that he is ready for the full answer. When not due to morbid stimulation, they do indicate a dawning interest which should be gratified rather than suppressed; but many times it is wise and

necessary to put the child off, making him understand that he is by no means ready yet for the answer to his question. This can be done without deceiving or angering the child and certainly without stimulating a morbid curiosity.

We dare not wait too long to teach; and here we must consider not only the psychological moment ideally, but the way in which this is modified by accidental circumstances of the child's life. There is always danger that delayed instruction may be anticipated by vulgar companions, thus multiplying the harm that would come from reverent teaching given even far earlier than the child's point of growth would warrant. Indeed, the only sure protection against evil-minded comrades is for the child to know in advance reverently what they would teach vulgarly. Thus the parent must keep informed not only of the state of his child's inner development, but as far as possible, of all the associations that may influence him.[1]

It will thus be seen how indispensable it is to get and keep the child's confidence. Little children like to express themselves, and with some care on our part there is small difficulty in knowing in detail what goes on in their lives. In the period of transition from childhood to young manhood and womanhood these confidences become much more difficult for the child. He tends to withdraw into himself and a new sense of his spiritual isolation from the rest of the world comes over him. At the same time

[1] See Ludwig Woltmann, *System des Moralischen Bewusstseins*, pp. 383-387, for an excellent illustrative dialogue with reference to sex-teaching. Compare also Earl Barnes, Books and Pamphlets Intended to Give Sex-Information, *Studies in Education*, vol. I, pp. 301-308; G. Obici, Les Erreurs de l'Éducation Sexuelle, *La Revue*, vol. XLII, pp. 381-404; E. Lyttleton, Instruction of the Young in Sexual Knowledge, *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. IX, pp. 453-467.

dawns a new hunger for union with other lives. As self-expression is more difficult, so it is sweeter and more precious. If confidences cannot be babbled with the ease of the little child, there is a much stronger desire and need to give them, and they rarely cease altogether in our children without some fault on our part. The ability to confide one's inner life to another depends largely upon the measure of appreciation one can reasonably expect to receive. If we take time and thought to make sure to our children that we appreciate sympathetically all that comes into their lives and minds, they will normally continue to find joy and peace in expressing themselves frankly to us, even into the period of young manhood and womanhood.[1]

Thus the parent's problem is to give the child reverent knowledge of himself, the functions of his organism, and the intimate relations of human life *as fast as that knowledge can be reverently acquired.* There is no way of saying in advance just how fast that can be. It depends upon the character and spirit of the individual child, the nature of his inner development, and the circumstances and associations of his life. It is no easy task—this of the parent—de-

[1] Compare Locke's sound advice with reference to a father's reception of his son's confidences:

"But whatever he consults you about, unless it lead to some fatal and irremediable Mischief, be sure you advise only as a Friend of more Experience; but with your Advice mingle nothing of Command or Authority, nor more than you would to your Equal or a Stranger. That would be to drive him for ever from any farther demanding, or receiving Advantage from your Counsel. You must consider that he is a young Man, and has Pleasures and Fancies which you are pass'd. You must not expect his Inclination should be just as yours, nor that at twenty he should have the same thoughts you have at fifty. All that you can wish is, that since Youth must have some Liberty, some Out-leaps, they might be with the Ingenuity of a Son, and *under the eye of a Father*, and then no very great Harm can come of it."—Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, edited by Quick, pp. 79-80.

manding love, thought, wisdom, unceasing watchfulness and care; but how great is the possible result. By the age of three or four years the child can be taught reverence for his own body and care in cleanliness. *Some* children of nine or ten can safely be taken into the mother's confidence with reference to the coming of a younger brother or sister. Daughters should invariably be taught by the mother the meaning and care of the functions of womanhood before these have matured. Almost equally great is the need for the father to teach young boys the meaning of their dawning manhood as a protection not only against evil comrades and temptations but against the legion of criminals who prey upon the young under the guise of medical advisers.[1] Direct instruction in the question of sex-relation should, if possible without incurring graver dangers, be postponed until the epoch of the child's own physical and moral awakening in the period of transition. In all the teaching I must warn against the bad compromise of giving the child a book he may go off to read alone. This shirking of parental responsibility is tempting; but it serves to weaken the bond of union between parent and child, which is strengthened by oral teaching wisely given, increases the child's secretive tendencies and adds the glamor of the half-forbidden to the knowledge gained.

The instruction of the school may supplement most helpfully what is taught by the parent. In botany and zoölogy the child can study, in the simplest, most objective way,

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[1] Compare E. G. LANCASTER, The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. V, pp. 124-125; and G. STANLEY HALL, *Adolescence*, vol. I, pp. 457-463, for sad details of the extent to which boys and young men are victimized and injured by medical quacks. These details illustrate impressively the need for sound instruction in questions of the sex life.

the mystery of sex and the birth of life from life, with nothing of the danger that arises when these problems are thought of in relation to specific human beings. Later, when the child's life awakens, nature becomes a book of teaching which the individual may apply to human life; yet that application is rarely made by unspoiled children earlier than is helpful.

In high school and college it becomes possible to take up the problems of human life in all the more intimate personal relations, and study these directly as subject-matter of ethics. It is needless to say that this teaching is only a little less difficult than is the more personal instruction required of the parent. It demands personal soundness in the teacher, reverence for human life and a tactful appreciation of young people. Much of the best work may be done by indirection. For instance, the literature of personal autobiography furnishes numerous texts which can be made most illuminating in the study of the deepest questions of personal life. Similar material may be selected from the general field of imaginative literature which, if less real than autobiography, nevertheless presents human life in the same concrete, living form.

Quite as important as the teaching is healthy association with persons of the opposite sex. It is the natural mingling of boys and girls, young men and young women, in common interests and sound activities, that prevents morbidness and keeps a healthy attitude between the sexes. This is the greatest argument for coeducation from the beginning to the end of the school course. It is undoubtedly true that certain ends of comradeship and *esprit de corps* are conserved by segregating a group of one sex and similar age. These and other reasons may be so strong

in certain cases as to make coeducation inadvisable. But such segregation always involves a great sacrifice, and in the main it is the natural association of the two sexes in common interests that best safeguards sound development.[1] Particular problems arise, such as the frequent engagements and marriages occurring in coeducational colleges. Yet even these are an advantage rather than otherwise. Someone has wisely pointed out that a marriage made in the class-room is more apt to be permanent and happy than one made in the ball-room. Certainly nowhere else will more vulgarity of attitude develop than among a group of young men constantly denied all association with good women,[2] and morbid hysteria breaks out in its worst form among boarding-school girls who are excluded for a long time from the society of the other sex.

Further there is need of helpful personal influence on the part of all who are associated with children and young people, to supplement and at times correct the work of the

[1] "There is no country in the world in which the relations between the sexes are so simple, natural, free and healthy as in the United States, and this, it can hardly be doubted, is largely due to coeducation. Nor is it difficult to account for this result. In the class-room young men and women learn to know, and, knowing, to respect, each other in a way and to a degree hardly possible elsewhere. Each sex behaves more humanly because the other is present: each sees the other engaged in serious work,—the best way for anybody to be seen."—THOMAS DAVIDSON, The Ideal Training of the American Girl, *Forum*, June, 1898, vol. XXV, p. 474.

[2] "No one can teach boys to respect women but women themselves: if a lad or young man is to emerge into manhood with any right ideas on the subject whatever, it must be because women themselves have put them there."—ENNIS RICHMOND, *Through Boyhood to Manhood*, p. 119.

"I have had a long and intimate experience of boys of all ages, and I do not hesitate to say that no boy or young man goes cleanly through his school and college career unless the influence of some woman or girl in the concrete, or womankind in the abstract, is strong upon him.'—*Ibid.*, p. 178.

parent. The problem of instruction in the most intimate questions of human life belongs peculiarly to the parent; nevertheless every teacher, physician, minister, should feel that he ought to fulfill in some measure the parental relation toward every child who comes under his care. We dare never place merely professional limits on the work we do for children: all work with children is a mission to the human spirit, and must be so regarded if it is to be well done. The teacher and minister can hold up the hands of the parent, helping him to see the child's need and supplementing his work by the right word to the child when it will help most. Especially is it possible for the physician, whose work is so intimately personal and who is so reverenced because of his science and skill, to give just the word that will help to brave self-control in trying circumstances. Further, all these who stand in less intimate relation to the child than the parent must take up the latter's work in the spirit of the larger parenthood and fulfill it for the child in those sad cases where the parents are oblivious or careless of their duty.

Finally, all who share in the work of instruction in these most intimate problems of life—parents, teachers, ministers, physicians alike—must never teach what is false in the direction either of prudery or license. Whatever measure of instruction we decide it is wise to give children, at any stage of development, must be the truth as we see it, never altered for reasons of expediency. Only thus can we hope to develop in the child the reverent, earnest attitude toward the most important questions of human life and to hold him to the right, when the trying chapters of his life open, by the power of his respect for us and the truth we have sought to teach him.

XXV

THE RELATION OF MORAL TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

It is outside the scope of this work to attempt a study of the problem of religious education. Nevertheless, the influence of religion on good conduct is so important that it is necessary to show the general relation of our problem of moral education to that of religious culture.

There is just now a wide awakening of interest in religious education. The churches have been impressed with their loss of hold on the great masses of the people and with the failure of their older methods of work to meet the needs of modern industrial and city life. Earnest religious people of all sorts of creeds are realizing more and more clearly that conversion is not enough, but must be supported by education, that the religious life should involve deliberate cultivation as well as sudden transformation. These new ideas came to clear consciousness in the addresses given at the Chicago convention called in 1903 to consider the problem of religious education. The one point in common to all the addresses was the recognition of the need for new and stronger efforts in the cause the speakers came to discuss.

This new attitude is due largely to the influence of modern psychology. Inductive studies into mental development, especially in the period of transition from childhood

to youth, have shown how intimately changes in the religious life of the individual are connected with other normal phases of growth, and how all alike are subject to consciously planned influences.[1] In harmony with these more recent conceptions new ranges of practical work with children and young people have developed which, while still largely in the stage of using devices, give fresh vitality to religious influences and are full of promise for even greater usefulness in the future.

With all this new ferment there is still, however, considerable misconception as to what the task of religious education really means, and problems of quite different import are confused with each other. More than one of the speakers at the Chicago convention assumed the whole problem of religious education to mean teaching the Bible to children, and one goes so far as to say that there cannot be more direct religious teaching in the schools unless the laws regarding the use of the Bible in the public schools are changed![2] It becomes necessary to define religion

[1] Compare: G. STANLEY HALL, *Adolescence*, vol. II, chapter XIV; A. H. DANIELS, *The New Life;* E. G. LANCASTER, *The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence;* A. C. ELLIS, *Sunday School Work and Bible Study in the Light of Modern Pedagogy;* E. D. STARBUCK, *A Study of Conversion*, and *The Psychology of Religion.*

[2] "The law ranges, as you have observed, between absolute prohibition of Bible reading; permitting it when no one objects, but not otherwise; leaving it to the option of the local authorities, either trustees or teacher; and requiring it, either leaving the amount and method to the option of the teacher or prescribing a very limited amount of reading daily.

"At the best this is not much—not much of the Bible and almost nothing in the way of effective teaching. But it is well to understand that there are laws governing this matter, and that we are not dealing with a question that can be settled off-hand in a religious gathering or a teachers' convention. If there is not more direct religious teaching in our schools, at least it is not the fault of the teachers. Nor can there be more than there is now, unless the laws

over again, and separate carefully the different problems involved in cultivating a religious spirit and attitude.

There are really two different problems loosely confused under the general head of religious education. There is first the problem of initiating the child into the history of religion, especially of the religion that is dominant in the society to which he belongs. Second, there is the problem of inspiring him with a reverently religious attitude in his own life. It is evident that these tasks overlap, the first contributing to the second; but their significance is so different that they should not be confused.

The first task is one part of the general work of the history of culture. To appreciate the literature, sculpture, painting, action and, indeed, all expressions of life during these Christian centuries, a knowledge of the basal sources of the Christian religion is essential.[1] Consider, for instance, how necessary a knowledge of the Bible is to the appreciation of half the paintings in any European gallery. As the Bible is the great text-book of Christianity, so it is a source from which much of our civilization can be explained. The study of the history and sources of the religion prevalent in the society about the individual should have, therefore, an important place in the work

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are changed. Referring to the reasons I have suggested for the enactment of these laws, and with a knowledge of the lurking danger of sectarian strife, we cannot escape the conviction that we have here a most difficult and delicate problem."—CHARLES H. THURBER, Religious and Moral Education through Public and Private Schools in *Proceedings of the First Convention of the Religious Education Association*, p. 133.

[1] Obviously the same argument applies to the old Bible in relation to subsequent Jewish civilization, or in fact to the sources of any religion prevailing in the society about the child.

we do in the history of culture.[1] Moreover, such study, no matter how coolly and scientifically undertaken, will have some reaction, beneficial in character, on the student's own religious attitude. As we are initiated into the spirit of philosophy by studying the history of philosophy, so all earnest study of the history of religions tends to develop in us a reverent religious spirit.

This reaction on the student's religious attitude which results from his study of the history and sources of religion is, however, but a fraction of the task of religious education. *Religion* is more than all historic religions, and thus should not be identified with any one of them. In this larger sense one's religion is one's whole attitude in thought and feeling toward the sum of things. As Carlyle has it, religion is whatever "a man does practically believe," and we must add, feel, "concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe."[2] In this sense religion is eminently personal, increasingly so as the mind grows in breadth and freedom; and every earnest man has a religion even though he have no affiliations with existing religious organizations.

The first element in the work of religious education,

[1] "Christian theology is ten-fold more important to us than the pagan, from a purely secular point of view. How can a child read Whittier, or how can he understand the period of Henry VIII if he is ignorant of theology? How can we teach a child anything of the great painters if he lacks the knowledge which alone can give significance to their creations? No one can ever realize how important this is until he tries to teach our literature, art and history to Japanese or Chinese students. Of course, they lack other keys; but theology is one of the most important."—EARL BARNES, Children's Attitude Toward Theology, in *Studies in Education*, vol. II, p. 286. Mr. Barnes's study, while taking unusual ground with reference to the theological instruction of children, is valuable in connection with the whole problem of religious education.

[2] *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, lecture I.

interpreted in this larger way, is to waken wonder in the presence of the immensity and mystery of the universe, awe and reverence in the presence of its majesty, order and harmony. Such wonder and reverence characterize the distinctively religious attitude as contrasted with the smart cynicism which imagines it has solved the universe and superficially ignores the deep below deep beyond our last sounding. This essentially religious attitude is necessary to the noblest living. Life needs to be touched with the glamor of wonder and deepened with the atmosphere of reverence. Men live less by knowledge than by an appreciation of what has not yet been gathered up in the categories of science. The great experiences of human life break in through the closed circle of our knowledge: we can never anticipate them in theory. Life precedes philosophy: in a very true sense men are better than they know, living in experience much that they have not yet formulated in terms of the understanding. Thus "mere morality," were such conceivable, would mean cold conformity to intellectually recognized principles of conduct, with no touch of enthusiasm, no sense of the infinite reach of life, no atmosphere of wonder and reverence. Such morality is obviously inadequate to the ends of human life, and moral education must include the task of cultivating this higher religious attitude.[1]

Beyond wonder and reverence, education should foster a further element in the higher religious attitude, namely,

[1] "Noble types of character may rest on only the native instincts of the soul or even on broadly interpreted utilitarian considerations. But if morality without religion were only a bloodless corpse or a plank in a shipwreck, there is now need enough for teachers to study its form, drift, and uses by itself alone."—G. Stanley Hall, Moral Education and Will-Training, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. II, p. 77.

the passion for human service. While conduct that is helpful to humanity is a noble element of morality, the love that inspires such conduct is part of religion. In the same sense there is a religion of truth, a religion of art, of work and of personal love. Thus the higher religious spirit should pervade all aspects of our conduct: life itself should become a religion.[1]

This higher religious spirit will be awakened not by talking about it, but through the books and people which express this spirit and into contact with which the student is brought. The religious impulse will come, therefore, not as a separate element of instruction, but through the whole course of moral education, where this is reverently carried out. As literature and history are the great expressions of human life available for education, they will furnish the important channel for communicating the enthusiasm for humanity, while natural science will equal them in arousing wonder and awe in the presence of the majesty and order of the universe.

It is, above all, through persons that the higher religious attitude is to be awakened. That is why all who have to do with education should be earnestly religious in the sense in which I am using the word. There is no limit to the extent to which wonder, reverence and love may be communicated from one spirit to another, while a 'smart,' superficially cynical attitude in the teacher will spoil whole groups of students by cutting off the roots of their love and enthusiasm before the latter have had time to flower out into practice.

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[1] See the chapter on The Religion of Humanity, in *The New Humanism*, by EDWARD HOWARD GRIGGS, pp. 225-239 (B. W. Huebsch, 1904) for a fuller development of this thought.

Beyond the fostering of this religious attitude, there is the further problem of the relation of our teaching to the great theses of spiritual faith. The four fundamental problems of philosophy—God, Immortality, Freedom and Duty—are at the same time the questions personal religious faith must answer in order to lay a foundation for action. The first is the problem of the ultimate source of the universe and so of human life. The second is the problem of the ultimate end of life. The third is the problem of the ultimate nature of the process of life. The fourth is the problem of the ultimate law of life. These are, indeed, the four aspects of our relation to the universe, and what answer we give them is not a matter of indifference to the practical life. On the contrary, every slightest action is a focusing point in which the answers we consciously or unconsciously give to these fundamental enigmas find expression. Thus the character of the instruction we give children in regard to these four ultimate problems will have deep importance for the moral life.

The question as to what instruction we should give children in this connection must be answered differently in public and private schools and in the home. Let me consider first the problem in the public school. In certain foreign countries the plan has been adopted of allowing clergymen of different faiths to teach, for a period each day, the groups of children belonging to their confessions. Other countries[1] have tried the differentiation of the schools by residence districts: making one Catholic, another Prot-

[1] See the chapter on Religious Instruction in England, France, Germany, and America, by C. De Garmo, in *Principles of Religious Education*, by N. M. Butler, *et al.*, pp. 49-75.

estant, according to the religious affiliations of the majority of people living in the neighborhood. Fortunately, these compromises have not tempted us in America. The complete separation of church and state has resulted in a general sentiment upholding the complete secularization of the public schools. Evils have undoubtedly followed from this,—some quite unnecessary. For instance, it is a pity the Bible has so often been excluded as the textbook of certain religions, without recognizing that it may be readmitted as a body of noble literature entirely apart from any theological explication. Yet in the main the result has been far more satisfactory than in the case of the various compromises attempted in other lands. Thus in our American system it may be laid down as a general principle that instructors in the public schools should never teach as scientific truth any religious dogma that is rejected or questioned by an intelligent portion of the community, if only one citizen. This applies to any doctrine, no matter how reverently cherished it may be by the teacher. The divinity of Christ, the existence of a personal God, or the thesis of materialism: whatever the doctrine is, the teacher must never confuse belief and objective knowledge, and should never deliberately inculcate beliefs which reverent parents hold to be false.

On the other hand, the teacher should be accorded some freedom in the expression of personal beliefs if these are not unnecessarily obtruded and are kept strictly within the field of belief and not confused with science. The influence of a teacher over his pupils is so great that there should be wise reserve in thus expressing personal faith, yet children cannot learn too early that personal faith is the basis of action, and that each thoughtful individual

has at bottom his own reaction upon the whole of life, which may or may not agree in large features with the faith of others.

Thus a teacher can always keep clear the distinction between what some men believe and what all know to be true, and with careful tact can quite undogmatically inculcate a reverence for all earnest faith, no matter how remote its theses may be from the student's or teacher's own attitude. Moreover, this just reserve in reference to the teaching of any dogmatic theology need in no way interfere with that deeper religious impress—the communication from teacher to student of the spirit of wonder and reverence in relation to the mystery, order and harmony of the universe, and of enthusiasm for human service.

Private school teachers naturally have much more authority in religious instruction than those in the public schools, since that authority is directly delegated to them by the parents; and one of the common reasons for choosing a private school is to secure a certain type of religious influence. Thus the problem of religious instruction in private schools must be solved variously according to the aims of the specific school and its relations with its patrons. The teaching, however, must obey the same principles that should guide the parent.

So with the teaching in the Sunday school. This institution is unique among all those concerned in the education of children, as the only one devoted entirely to ethical and religious instruction and inspiration. The Sunday school can accomplish little through government and discipline, since it has children for so short a time weekly and has so slight a hold upon them. It may do something in determining social atmosphere, and the personal influence of the

teacher may be very important; but its chief function is ethical and religious instruction and inspiration. In this respect, therefore, the Sunday school has a rare opportunity to supplement and crown the work of the week: untrammeled by the conventional aims of the day school, its material may be selected and lessons arranged wholly with reference to the highest development of the children.

It is obvious, then, how necessary it is that the teachers in the Sunday school should have the best preparation for their work, and that the latter should be planned and conducted in obedience to the best ideas of modern psychology and education. That the same didactic lessons should be used in the Sunday school for children of all ages is one of those anomalous survivals showing that the Sunday school has been the last educational institution to respond to the influence of the modern spirit.[1] It is responding so powerfully in many directions today, however, that there is even hope its progress may in rare instances outstrip that of the secular schools.

While it is indispensable that a better training of the teachers in the Sunday schools should be insured, there have been advantages in the fact that the Sunday school teacher's contribution has been that of a friend, voluntarily given. The formal study of the day school is quite undesirable in the Sunday school, which should stand primarily for a touch with life, an awakening of the spirit. How far the practice of regularly paying Sunday school teachers for their work, if generally adopted, would tend

[1] Compare DAWSON's study on Children's Interest in the Bible, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. VII, pp. 151-178, showing that different parts of the Bible appeal to children of different ages.

See also G. STANLEY HALL, The Moral and Religious Training of Children and Adolescents, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, pp. 196-210,

to spoil this quality and reduce the work of the school to formalism is an open question.

Since the Sunday school has so rare an opportunity to give inspiration for noble living, as well as religious and ethical instruction, it should broaden the range of material it utilizes. The value we have found history, mythology and literature possess in this connection should lead to a much wider use of material from these fields in the work of the Sunday school. However, the difficulties in the way of using the literature of the Bible in secular education give an additional reason for emphasizing in Sunday school work material drawn from that source.

In all the religious teaching children receive in the Sunday school, as in private schools, the principles which should govern the teacher are, as already indicated, those which the parent should obey. To these principles I must now turn. For those parents and teachers who rest quietly within the limits of a finished creed the situation is far more comfortable than for those who are compelled to struggle with doubt and questioning. A little while ago even radicals fell within the former class. On turning the pages of Froebel's *Education of Man* one is surprised to find how simple and clear the problem of religious education seemed to that great reformer. Alas! how many of us today are forced, through no choice of our own, into the arena, and compelled to struggle ceaselessly for our own faith! The great upheaval of thought in modern times, rendering the results of science accessible to everyone, has led to a general breaking down of old standards and landmarks, forcing the average thinking man as completely into the intellectual arena as was the philosopher of former times. The result is, the problem of religious education for

those who fall within this group centres in discovering what we may dare to teach children, on the basis of what we ourselves may dare to accept as the foundation of our lives.

Both classes of parents and teachers need to recognize the following guiding principles:

It is never safe or wise to teach as true that of which we ourselves are in doubt. We are often tempted to do this, realizing, as we frequently must, that a dogmatic teaching received in our childhood has given a moral backbone through a later period of liberalized belief. Yet to teach, for this ulterior purpose, a creed from which we have graduated is most dangerous. If the child comes to react against the creed, as he is almost sure to do, his doubt of the teaching will be accompanied by the far more blasting doubt of the teacher.[1] On the other hand it is safe, though for further reasons often not advisable, to teach children anything we do earnestly believe; for if the child comes to doubt the creed, he will nevertheless keep his faith in the sincerity of the parent or teacher, and this will be a sheet-anchor in the time of storm and stress.

As in all other phases of instruction, it is necessary to consider the stage of the child's development and not attempt to force upon him conceptions to which he cannot rise.[2] To be sure, as there is but one beauty for children and adults, so truth is one, but the growth into its appre-

[1] "We are not bound to teach children all we know, but we are most solemnly bound not to teach them anything which we feel to be doubtful as though it were certain, and still more are we bound not to teach them anything of which we ourselves begin to suspect the reality."—F. W. Farrar, The Higher Criticism and the Teaching of the Young, in *The Bible and the Child*, p. 22.

[2] "All control is wrong that attempts to fetter the child with a man's thoughts, a man's motives, or a man's creed."—J. L. Hughes, *Froebel's Educational Laws*, p. 166.

ciation must be gradual and unhastened. When children seven years old get up in prayer-meeting and confess to a consciousness of sin and a need of regeneration, this principle has been sadly violated in the religious instruction they have received. So the child conceives the world and its forces, as we have seen, in terms of personality, and it is foolish and futile to attempt to force upon him the abstract conceptions in regard to the great theses of spiritual faith which are possible to a mature and philosophic mind. Thus it is well not to disturb the trusting, naturally anthropomorphic attitude of the child, holding definite religious instruction in abeyance, and letting it come largely by indirection. Yet the period of simple trustfulness naturally passes into that of conscious questioning, and we shirk part of our responsibility, when the later period comes, unless we do everything in our power to help the individual to clarify his thinking and come to terms as best he may with the ultimate problems of life. Our service here should be to aid and guide the awakening mind of the child or youth, rather than to transfer our own beliefs didactically to him. Thus it is well to help the student to understand as early as possible that faith, if a precious working-basis of life, is constantly changing under the influence of study and experience. However sure he may be or may become with reference to certain basal questions, the content of the answers he gives them and the whole horizon of his belief will change somewhat with every step of his growth, and the complete absence of such change would indicate stagnation in the intellectual life.

It is wise to allow children considerable contact with forms of faith other than the parent's own. The only type of influence to be rigorously avoided is the superficial

cynicism, the evil effects of which I have already pointed out. If this be avoided, a variety of influences will be helpful, leading the child to recognize the fact that equally earnest and lovable people differ radically on the great questions, and helping him to learn toleration by practising it. Often the children of liberal parents need such contact with a variety of influences, even more than other children, in order to escape that worst form of intolerance which springs from a reaction against the faiths of others and imagines itself quite free from error.

In all I have said it is evident that two different aims are before us in the task of religious instruction. We want to aid the child and youth to build as earnest and strong a foundation of faith as possible, on which the superstructure of noble living may be erected; at the same time we want to keep the individual open to new experience and to the new truth, or perspective of truth, which comes from it, and thus to make growth, in faith as in conduct, deep and long-continued. The fine balance between these two elements is difficult indeed to attain. To reach or approximate it, inspiration is far more important than instruction. The impress of the higher religious spirit and attitude, let me repeat, is the great need. If that impress is given through all the influences—books, teachers, parents—to which the child is subjected, we may dare to trust life with all its stress and pain, its periods of doubt and reaction, and hope that through all may remain the influence of wonder, reverence and enthusiasm to transfigure the moral life.

CONCLUSION

Our work together now draws to a close. We have studied the aim of moral education and the great forces and influences we may utilize in developing the noblest human life. We hope for no kingdom of heaven from the education advocated, even were it put into immediate and universal application: we may trust that every step in fostering such culture in one individual will make life more joyous and helpful and better worth while for him and for all others. Increasing self-mastery and intelligent, free response to the order of the universe should come from such education, with an ever greater power to recover from the mistakes and marring faults of our yesterdays. Thus endless power of growth may be our heritage, growth toward the highest that is ever higher as we climb.

To give such education, the one requisite behind all others is that we be willing to give ourselves to our children. The wise guidance of the child's activities in work and play, the regulation of the environing conditions that influence him, the helpful conduct of government and discipline, the direct and indirect instruction we give him, as well as the most helpful personal influence, all depend upon daily, continuous and loving companionship with our children. Without such companionship we cannot even understand the problem, much less contribute to its solution. Some parents and teachers give this companionship without thought or effort, enjoying by nature

every phase of it. Others find far less pleasure in joining children in work and play; and such parents and teachers must plan consciously to give the measure of companionship with their children indispensable to all good influence. To turn children over almost entirely to hired servants, seeing the children but occasionally, as some parents do, is really to abandon the problem of moral education. Whether easy or difficult for us, it is only as the friends and comrades of our children that we can establish a moral atmosphere in which any influence can work helpfully.

Education is difficult, almost as difficult as life. Meanwhile, every parent and teacher is face to face with the problem, and it presses for immediate solution at every step. No matter what progress education may make in the future, for the children with whom we are associated 'now is the acceptable time of the Lord,' and there is no other. Each moment presents its own opportunity for just one moment; gone, it is irrevocable. We must summon all our courage, gird up our spirits, use all the wisdom we have, but strive *now*, trusting that with all our weakness and limitations, the great universe will coöperate with us if we earnestly do our best.

For all that we give how great is the return! Every worker in the field of adult education knows how much more the teacher is taught than the student. The greatest value of the social settlement has been to the social settler; the university-extension lecturer learns more from his audience than he can ever hope to teach them; while the minister, the reformer, the neighborhood visitor, find life illuminated, deepened and sweetened for them by the service they seek to do. It is in our work with children that this principle of the return of the good deed upon the doer

finds its highest application. It is the moral education of the parent and the teacher that is achieved far more than that of the child. How we are educated in self-control, patience, quiet putting aside of our selfish whims, by all the effort we put forth to educate morally our children!

Those who are not blessed with children often look pityingly at the over-burdened parent, wondering how he (it is more often she) can go on so cheerfully, accepting the seemingly impossible task without chafing under it. They do not understand, these unblessed people on the outside, unless a loving heart expressed in loving service of little children has made them share in the larger motherhood and fatherhood. But every wise parent, who is the friend and companion of his child, knows that "children pay their way as they go." It is not that they will return in our age the care we have given to their childhood: no, but that now, day by day, the child does more in educating the parent than the most devoted parent can do for the child. Living, as we have found children do, in the presence of the great verities not varnished over with the conventions of our adult life, children bring us constantly into the presence of these eternal bases of life. It is thus that the child is a missionary to fallen humanity. It is thus the child world reacts ever upon the adult world, bringing it back to truth and beauty and love and song. It was said: "Except ye become as little children ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Surely no one ever saw into that kingdom of the spirit without looking through the eyes of a little child; and the patient, consistent care and love, the gift of time, thought and companionship, the earnest seeking of the child's best good through all the doubt, trouble, questioning and mi

takes that must come—all this is repaid—how wonderfully!—by the vistas of the spirit that are opened up to us, the softened tenderness of our own hearts, the deepest wisdom of experience, and the unlocking of all the mystery of joy and tears.

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——— —— *Punishment as Seen by Children.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 235–245. Worcester, October 1895.

An inductive study of children's views of just and unjust punishment. Its conclusions are suggestive with reference to discipline. Compare: Mr. Barnes's later study on "The Growth of Social Judgment," *Studies in Education*, vol. II, pp. 203–217; and the type study on "Discipline," running through eight numbers of *Studies in Education*, vol. I.

——— —— Editor, *Studies in Education*, vol. I, second edition, pp. 400, Philadelphia, 1903; vol. II, pp. ii+400, Philadelphia, 1902. Published by the editor.

These two volumes represent, with the inductive studies in the *Pedagogical Seminary*, the best work yet done in the statistical study of children. Many of the studies are by the editor, and the rest are by his students. The second volume is especially illuminating in the comparative studies of American and English children. Many of the studies in both volumes and much of the editor's interpretative comment bear directly on the problem of moral education.

Barnett, P. A. *Common Sense in Education and Teaching: An Introduction to Practice.* Pp. ix+321. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1899.

See especially chapter II, The Discipline of Character. Modern, loosely comprehensive.

——— — — Editor. *Teaching and Organization; with Special Reference to Secondary Schools; A Manual of Practice.* Pp. xix+419. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1897.

An excellent general manual by several British authorities. See especially articles on: "The Criteria in Education," pp. 1–13; "Organization and Curricula," pp. 14–33; "Form Management," pp. 295–312; "Health and Physical Culture," pp. 356–383.

Barrows, W. *Teaching of Morals in the Public Schools.* In New Englander, vol. XLIII, pp. 840–850. New Haven, November 1884.

Review of Massachusetts laws and practice. Advocates non-sectarian moral instruction in public schools.

Bartlett, Elisha. *The Head and the Heart, or the Relative Importance of Intellectual and Moral Education.* A lecture, delivered before the American Institute of Instruction, in Lowell, August 1838. Pp. 20. Ticknor & Co., Boston, 1838.

An effective appeal for moral as against merely intellectual education. Superseded, but interesting in showing how old is the demand for the culture of character in American education.

Bashkirtseff, Marie. *The Journal of a Young Artist.* Translated by Mary J. Serrano. Pp. viii+434. Cassell & Co., New York, (copyright) 1889.

Full of concrete material bearing on the moral influence of environment,—personal and social,—books, travel. Especially valuable for moral education in the period of youthful reaction.

Beebe, Katherine. *The First School Year; For Primary Workers.* Pp. 147. The Werner Co., Chicago, (copyright) 1895.

A bright, simple exposition of thought based on the kindergarten. Occasional suggestions for moral education.

Bell, Sanford. *A Study of the Teacher's Influence.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 492–525. Worcester, 1900.

A study based on answers, furnished by students in normal school and college, to a questionnaire. Suggestive results with reference to the personal influence of teachers over young people.

Betts, Lillian W. *The Leaven in a Great City.* Pp. vi+315. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1902.

Interesting concrete account of New York social conditions in tenement houses, working-girls' clubs, home life and social settlements. Valuable, like the books of Jacob Riis, in showing the new moral problems presented by modern city life.

—— ——— — *The Story of an East-Side Family.* Pp. iii+342. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1903.

A story of the whole history of a unit family among those struggling with poverty, overcrowding and drunkenness in the poorer quarters of a great city. Presents one great social phase of the problem of moral education.

Bierbower, Austin. *Ethics for Schools.* Pp. 294. Hinds & Noble, New York, (copyright) 1903.

Conventional analysis of duties. Intended as a text for high schools.

Bikkers, Alex. V. W., and Hatton, Joseph. *Ethics for Undenominational Schools.* Translated from the German of Dr. Wilhelm Fricke . . . and adapted to the Use of English Schools and Families. Pp. 156. Grant & Co., London, 1872.

An interesting older attempt to make a text-book for the ethical instruction of children. Resembles the French manuals. Didactic lessons, illustrated by maxims and quotations (sources not given), with detailed explanations.

Blackall, C. R. *Sunday School Organization for the Purpose of Religious Instruction.* In Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, 1903, pp. 175–185. Executive Office of the Association, Chicago, 1903.

Blackwell, Elizabeth. *Counsel to Parents on the Moral Education of Their Children, in Relation to Sex.* Pp. 160. Hatchards, London, 1882.

One of the best books available on the instruction of children in the intimate problems of human life. Occasional over-statement, but in the main sound in spirit.

Blow, Susan E. *The Kindergarten Ideal of Nurture.* In Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1902, vol. I, pp. 594–602. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1903.

Excellent statement of the aims of the kindergarten, with answers to some misconceptions and criticisms.

——— ——— *Letters to a Mother on the Philosophy of Froebel.* Pp. xix+311. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1899.

Follows *Symbolic Education* in a more conversational style.

——— ——— *Symbolic Education.* A commentary on Froebel's "Mother Play." Pp. xvi+251. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1895.

One of the best modern interpretations of Froebel, modified by Hegelianism.

Bohannon, E. W. *A Study of Peculiar and Exceptional Children.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 3–60. Worcester, October 1896.

An inductive study based on 1,045 answers to a questionnaire. Aims to aid teachers to understand the individual child. Some helpful pedagogical conclusions.

Bondois, Marguerite. *L'Enseignement de l'Histoire et la Morale.* In Revue Universitaire, Année 10, pp. 333–338. 1901.

A criticism of the indiscriminate teaching of historical facts without making pupils aware of the moral meaning of history. Claims that thus admiration for mere power and brilliancy is awakened.

Boutwell, George S. *Thoughts on Educational Topics and Institutions.* Pp. 365. Phillips, Sampson & Co., Boston, 1859.

Expression of the old-time educational leadership in Massachusetts. Echoes of the struggle to show that free schools are not immoral nor a menace to the public: interesting in the light of the recently revived discussion of religion in the schools.

Bowker, Richard Rogers. *The Arts of Life.* Pp. viii+306. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1900.

See especially "Of Education," pp. 49–95.

Brackett, Anna C., Editor. *The Education of American Girls, Considered in a Series of Essays.* Pp. 401. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1874.

By distinguished leaders of the woman's movement a quarter of a century ago, and written mainly in answer to Dr. E. H. Clarke. Echoes from the flood-tide of the coeducation movement: well worth re-reading now that the ebb-tide is quietly setting in. Much bearing incidentally on moral education.

Bracq, Jean Charlemagne. *Moral and Religious Instruction in France.* In Educational Review, vol. XXIII, pp. 325–337. New York, April 1902.

An excellent brief review of the present program of ethical instruction in the public schools of France. Lists of French text-books given in notes.

Braun, Th. *Principes d'Éducation et d'Instruction Populaire.* Pp. 219. A. Jamar, Brussels, 1850.

Excellent in its day and still of value. Gives a general view of education in home and school, with specific counsel to parents and teachers regarding discipline.

Briggs, Le Baron Russell. *School, College and Character.* Pp. vi+148. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1901.

A sane protest against some extremes of the new education. Emphasizes work and discipline.

——— ——— ——— *Some Old-fashioned Doubts about New-fashioned Education.* In Atlantic Monthly, vol. LXXXVI, pp. 463–470. Boston, October 1900.

An expression of the reaction against the elective system and the new education. A suggestive article with implications throughout for moral education.

Brockman, F. S. *A Study of the Moral and Religious Life of 251 Preparatory Students in the United States.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IX, pp. 255–273. Worcester, September 1902.

The most important conclusion of this inductive study is its emphasis of the need of instructing boys in the intimate problems of human life.

Brunetière, F. *Éducation et Instruction.* Pp. 107. Didot et Cie., Paris, 1895.

A stimulating little book, opposing commercialism, athletics and specialization in education, and urging the cultivation of *social* virtues and ideals. If prejudiced in its negative contentions, in its affirmative ones it is fine and noble.

Bryan, E. B. *Nascent Stages and Their Pedagogical Significance.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 357–396. Worcester, October 1900.

An effort to gather up the results and point the educational applications of the various studies of genetic development previously made. Describes the periods of growth, and is especially strong in suggestions for the treatment of childhood.

Bryant, Sophie. *Educational Ends; or, The Ideal of Personal Development.* Pp. x+292. Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1887.

A theoretic ethical discussion seeking to outline the educational ideal in intellect and character.

——— ——— *Short Studies in Character.* Pp. vii+247. The Macmillan Co., New York. No date.

A book composed of lectures. Part II (pp. 139–247) contains some excellent, suggestive chapters on moral education.

Buck, Gertrude. *Another Phase of the New Education.* In Forum, vol. XXII, pp. 376–384. New York, November 1896.

Describes the 'culture-epoch school' experiment in Detroit.

Buck, Winifred. *Boys' Self-Governing Clubs.* Pp. ix+218. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903.

An excellent study of the value of clubs for boys, with full information and counsel as to forming and guiding them.

Buisson, F. *Education of the Will.* Closing lecture of the Course in Pedagogy delivered at the Sorbonne, 1899. In Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1902, vol. I, pp. 721–740. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1903.

Gives a condensed statement of Buisson's philosophy of moral education in relation to French life.

——— — Editor. *Dictionnaire de Pédagogie et d'Instruction Primaire.* Part I, 2 vols., pp. 3,108; and part II, 2 vols., pp. vii+2491. Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1882–1888.

The first part of this great work is devoted to educational theory and history, the second part to practical applications. See articles under the various headings of moral education, as "Discipline Scolaire," "Punitions," "Obéissance," etc.

Bulkley, Julia E. *Social Ethics in the Schools.* In Forum, vol. XXVI, pp. 615–620. New York, January 1899.

A good article; opposed to corporal punishment in schools; advocates direct teaching of social ethics as a means of discipline.

Burdette, Robert J., et al. *Before He is Twenty. Five Perplexing Phases of the Boy Question Considered.* Pp. 104. The Fleming H. Revell Co., Chicago, (copyright) 1894.

Popular papers by various writers. The first, The Father and His Boy, is the one of most value for moral education.

Burk, Frederic L. *Teasing and Bullying.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 336–371. Worcester, April 1897.

An inductive study, presenting a large amount of painful material expressing the darker side of children's activities. The conclusions are all in the form of questions, but suggest important investigations and reflections.

Burnham, William H. *The Study of Adolescence.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. I, pp. 174–195. Worcester, 1891.

A helpful article, tentative but full of suggestions for other workers.

Butler, N. M., Editor. *Education in the United States. A Series of Monographs prepared for the United States Exhibit at the Paris Exposition,* 1900, 2 vols., pp. xviii+977. The J. B. Lyon Co., Albany, N. Y., 1900.

An excellent general survey of present American education in its different aspects.

Butler, N. M., et al. *Principles of Religious Education.* Lectures delivered under the Auspices of the Sunday School Commission of the Diocese of New York. Pp. xx+292. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1900.

An interesting expression of the new interest in religious education. See especially Lectures I, III, VII, VIII.

Carlyle, Thomas. *Sartor Resartus: The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdroeckh.* Pp. iv+228. Chapman & Hall, London, 1893.

This work, both as Carlyle's spiritual autobiography and as a reflective study of life and education, contains much that is of great value in connection with the problems of moral culture. Book II deals most directly with education.

Carpenter, Edward. *Affection in Education.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. IX, no. 4, pp. 482–494. Philadelphia, July 1899.

An excellent article showing the moral value of healthy school friendships in contrast to unwise repression and vicious association. Helpful in connection with education in questions of sex.

Carr, J. W. *Religious and Moral Education through Public and Private Schools.* In Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, 1903, pp. 138–147.

Carus, Paul. *The Moral Education of Children.* In Open Court, vol. XIII, pp. 176–184. Chicago, March 1899.

Deals with education in truth, prudence and love of animals. Fragmentary but sensible.

Cash, Miss K. G. *Children's Sense of Truth.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. II, pp. 308–313.

A brief inductive study with conclusions as to the significance and treatment of children's lies.

Chace, Mrs. E. B. *Teaching of Morality in Schools.* In Education, vol. IV, pp. 15–24. Boston, September 1883.

Advocates ethical instruction and discussion in the schools.

Chamberlain, Alex. Francis. *The Child: A Study in the Evolution of Man.* Pp. xii+498. The Walter Scott Publishing Co., London, 1900.

A mass of facts and views bearing on child development, collected from the evolutionary point of view and loosely organized. Much of the book has an indirect value for moral education.

Chambers, Will Grant. *The Evolution of Ideals.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. X, pp. 101–143. Worcester, March 1903.

A study of the same character as those by Miss Darrah and Mr. Barnes. Throws interesting light on the ideals of children at different stages of development.

Chandler, Mary G. *The Elements of Character.* Pp. 234. Crosby, Nichols & Co., Boston, 1854.

An interesting old book of essays reminding one of Emerson. Emphasizes the unity of character and the need of training thought, imagination and affection in relation to each other. Evidently radical in its day and still sound and helpful.

Chenery, Susan. *As the Twig is Bent: A Story for Mothers and Teachers.* Pp. 164. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1901.

A good, simple discussion of the concrete handling of two children in the home.

Clark, Kate Upson. *Bringing Up Boys.* Pp. 227. T. Y. Crowell & Co., New York, 1899.

Practical counsel on the treatment of boys in the home. Sound in the main, and always bright and suggestive.

Clarke, Edward H. *Sex in Education; or, A Fair Chance for Girls.* Pp. 181. Osgood & Co., Boston, 1874.

One of the thoughtful books of the last generation, by a physician, urging the necessity of a special regimen for girls if coeducation is not to harm the development of sane womanhood.

Clarke, James Freeman. *Self-Culture: Physical, Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual.* A Course of Lectures. Pp. 446. Osgood & Co., Boston, 1880.

Scattered through the book is a good deal of helpful suggestion bearing on moral education.

Coe, George A. *The Spiritual Life: Studies in the Science of Religion.* Pp. 279. Eaton & Mains, New York, 1900.

One of the recent helpful studies of the religious life, undertaken in a scientific spirit. Indirectly of value with reference to religious and moral education in the period of youthful awakening.

Coeducation of the Sexes in the United States. In Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for 1900–1901, vol. II, pp. 1217–1315. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1902.

An exhaustive review of the present situation in the United States in regard to coeducation, with citations of views from educational authorities, American and foreign. Contains a good bibliography of the subject.

Coit, Stanton. *Neighbourhood Guilds, an Instrument of Social Reform.* Pp. x+150. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1892.

Discussion of a London experiment having important bearings on moral education.

Combe, Andrew. *The Management of Infancy, Physiological and Moral, Intended Chiefly for the Use of Parents.* Pp. 302. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1871.

Excellent in its day, but largely superseded. Pp. 239–276 deal more directly with moral education.

Comenius, John Amos. *The Great Didactic.* Translated by M. W. Keatinge. Pp. 468. Adam and Charles Black, London, 1896.

Interesting not only as the basis of subsequent educational reform, but because much of it is still of value. Imbued with a religious spirit and containing chapters dealing with phases of moral and religious education.

——— ——— ——— *School of Infancy; An Essay on the Education of Youth During the First Six Years.* Translated by Daniel Benham; revised and edited with an introduction and notes by Will S. Monroe. Pp. xvi+99. Heath's Pedagogical Library, D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1896.

See especially Chapter IX on Moral Training.

Compayré, Gabriel. *Development of the Child in Later Infancy.* Being part II of *The Intellectual and Moral Development of the Child.* Translated by Mary E. Wilson. Pp. xxxi+300. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York. 1902.

——— ——— *Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, (degré élémentaire),—récits, exemples, préceptes, parables, fables.* Pp. vi+138. Paul Delaplane, Paris, 1882 (?).

One of the French text-books for the ethical instruction of children. Each lesson is based on a short story followed by reflections and questions.

——— ——— *The Intellectual and Moral Development of the Child,* part I. Translated by Mary E. Wilson. Pp. ix+298. (For part II, see Compayré, *Development of the Child in Later Infancy.*) International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1896.

An indirect bearing on moral education.

——— ——— *Lectures on Pedagogy.* Translated by W. H. Payne. Pp. x+491. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1890.

See especially part I, chapter X, Moral Education; and part II, chapters VIII, Morals and Civic Instruction; XI, Rewards and Punishments; and XII, Discipline in General.

——— ——— *Psychology Applied to Education.* Translated by W. H. Payne. Pp. ix+216. Heath's Pedagogical Library, D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1893.

Chapters XI–XIV, in division C, deal with moral education.

"C" (Cox, Mrs. James Farley). *Home Thoughts.* Pp. 311. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, 1901.

Popular and slight, but containing many helpful suggestions on the home training of children.

——— ——— ——— ——— *Home Thoughts, Second Series.* Pp. xii+340. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, 1902.

Crooker, Joseph Henry. *Religious Freedom in American Education.* Pp. ix+216. American Unitarian Association, Boston, 1903.

Croswell, J. R. *Amusements of Worcester School Children.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VI, pp. 314–371. Worcester, September 1899.

A study based on the answers of 2,000 children to a questionnaire. Valuable educational applications, especially in reference to the adaptation of play to different periods of development. Bibliography.

Currie, James. *The Principles and Practice of Common School Education.* Pp. xiii+424. Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, 1884.

A fair text-book, but with little hold on real life. Part I, chapters II and III, deals with Moral Education; and part II, chapter II, with Discipline.

——— ——— *The Principles and Practice of Early and Infant School Education.* Pp. xvi+285. Kellogg & Co., New York, 1887.

Good sense, but rather commonplace. See for moral education, part I, chapters II, III, IV, IX, X; part III, chapters IV, V.

Curtis, Henry S. *Vacation Schools, Playgrounds, and Settlements.* Advance sheets from the Report of the Commissioner of Education for 1903. Pp. 38. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1904.

Excellent. Touches the general problem of play in moral education, and the influence of the social atmosphere.

Daniels, Arthur H. *The New Life: A Study of Regeneration.* In American Journal of Psychology, vol. VI, pp. 61–106. Worcester, October 1893.

One of the many studies of adolescence inspired by President Hall. Good but superseded by President Hall's recent work. Shows connection of spiritual and physical changes in the period.

Darrah, Estelle M. (Mrs. C. B. Dyke) *Children's Attitude toward Law.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. I, pp. 213–216; pp. 254–258.

Two brief inductive studies, with an important bearing on discipline.

——— ——— — *A Study of Children's Ideals.* In Popular Science Monthly, vol. LIII, pp. 88–98. New York, May 1898.

One of the earliest statistical studies in this fertile field.

Davidson, Thomas. *The Education of the Greek People; and its Influence on Civilization.* Pp. xiv+229. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1894.

The first chapter on "Nature and Education" and the summing up of the last chapter are especially full of stimulating conceptions, presenting an original and interesting philosophy of education.

——— ——— *A History of Education.* Pp. 292. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1900.

Chapter I, Introductory, and division III, chapter IV, The Outlook, have a general bearing on moral education.

——— ——— *The Ideal Training of the American Girl.* In Forum, vol. XXV, pp. 471–480. New York, June 1898.

An admirable article, especially strong in advocating a truer spirit of democracy in our higher education.

Davies, Henry. *The New Psychology and the Moral Training of Children.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. X, no. 4, pp. 493–503. Philadelphia, July 1900.

An attempt at a review and criticism of the relation of the new psychology to moral education. Suggestive but incomplete in view.

Dawson, George E. *Children's Interest in the Bible.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 151–178. Worcester, 1900.

A study applying to children's interest in the Bible the same methods already employed by other inductive investigators of children's interests. Conclusions illuminating with reference to the curriculum of the Sunday school and of religious education generally.

——— ——— — *A Study in Youthful Degeneracy.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 221–258. Worcester, December 1896.

A study of 60 'juvenile delinquents,' classifying their characteristics and studying the causes of their crimes. Contains a few conclusions of value for the larger problem of moral education in society.

Day, Thomas. *The History of Sandford and Merton.* Pp. xii+388. Ward, Lock, Bowden, & Co., London. No date.

A typical 18th Century book for children, "replete with information, of unimpeachable morality," (from *Preliminary Sketch of the Life of Thomas Day*). Really a charming book in spite of its morality.

Defoe, Daniel. *The Family Instructor, in Five Parts, and a Variety of Cases on the Necessity of Setting Proper Examples to Children and Servants.* Two vols., pp. x+393 and xi+403. Talboys, Oxford, 1841.

Quaint old volumes of dialogue between different members of a family in which the father and mother seek suddenly to reform the children. Deeply pious in intention, but written with racy vigor of style. Chief interest historical.

De Garmo, Charles. *Ethical Training in the Public Schools.* In Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. II, pp. 577–599. Philadelphia, 1892.

An excellent, thoughtful contribution. Considers the moral effect of life under institutional forms, and the value of history, literature and illustrations from practical life in enforcing ethical teaching.

— ——— ——— *Social Aspects of Moral Education.* In Third Year Book of National Herbart Society, pp. 35–57. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1897.

Considers the social aim in education, and opportunities in the school, through its organization and its studies, to further that aim.

Dewey, John. *The Chaos in Moral Training.* In Popular Science Monthly, vol. XLV, pp. 433–443. New York, August 1894.

A brief article showing the chaos in the popular mind with reference to the sanctions of good conduct.

——— ——— *Ethical Principles Underlying Education.* In Third Year Book of National Herbart Society, pp. 7–34. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1897.

An admirable condensed article dealing with the fundamental principles of moral education, urging especially reform in the direction of preparing for social life by helping the child to practise its activities.

——— ——— *The School and Society.* Supplemented by a statement of the (Chicago) University Elementary School. Pp. 129. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1900.

Contains much helpful suggestion bearing on moral education through activity.

Dilthey, Karl. *Moralisches Gängelband für Kinder. Dialogen für Kinder.* Pp. 230. Langbein & Kluger, Rudolstadt, 1799.

Pleasant and bright moral dialogues between father and children.

Dismorr, Blanche. *Ought Children to be Paid for Domestic Services?* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. II, pp. 62–70.

Dodge, M. A. (See Hamilton, Gail.)

Dole, Charles F. *The American Citizen.* Pp. xvi+326+42. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1894.

For children and young people. Portions of the book deal with social and economic duties.

——— ——— — *The Young Citizen.* Pp. xv+194. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1899.

An excellent little book, brightly written, giving a simple statement of social and public morals with reference to the duties and opportunities of service children have. Well illustrated, with notes under the illustrations making them an instructive part of the work.

Dopp, Katherine Elizabeth. *The Place of Industries in Elementary Education.* Pp. 208. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1903.

Considers comparatively the development of the child and the race in regard to industrial activities, with important applications to education.

Du Bois, Patterson. *Beckonings from Little Hands.* Pp. xiii+166. John D. Wattles & Co., Philadelphia, 1895.

Exquisite, simple interpretation of childhood written with delicate sensitiveness to the tragedies and joys of children. Concrete incidents from a father's experience.

— —— ——— *The Natural Way in Moral Training.* Pp. 328. The Fleming H. Revell Co., Chicago, (copyright) 1903.

Deals with the application to the moral and spiritual field of the principles of bodily growth through atmosphere, light, food and exercise. Urges a more natural method in moral and religious education.

Dutton, Samuel T. *School Management. Practical Suggestions concerning the Conduct and Life of the School.* Pp. xv+278. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903.

——— ——— — *Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home.* Pp. ix+259. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1900.

General papers, many of them touching phases of moral education.

Ebers, Georg. *The Story of My Life from Childhood to Manhood.* Translated by Mary J. Safford. Pp. viii+382. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1893.

Especially interesting because Ebers's early education was in the Froebel Institute, at Keilhau. Thus one of the best available opportunities for studying Froebel's ideas in practice.

Eby, F. *The Reconstruction of the Kindergarten.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 229–286. Worcester, July 1900.

A suggestive study of the kindergarten from the point of view of genetic psychology.

Edgeworth, Maria, and Edgeworth, Richard Lovell. *Practical Education.* Two volumes in one. Pp. 332 and 312. T. B. Wait & Sons, Boston, 1815.

Excellent common sense, often pungently stated. While largely superseded, still useful through the vigor with which ideas are expressed and illustrated.

Egidy, M. von. *Gedanken, über Erziehung* In Sammlung pädagogische Vorträge, vol. X, no. 6, pp. 127—147. Address in Berlin Lehrverein, 21 May, 1897.

A fine, popular address, urging the substitution of free for compelled action in education, as peace and its ideals are substituted for war.

Eliot, Charles W. *Educational Reform. Essays and Addresses.* Pp. ix+418. The Century Co., New York, 1898.

Represents the various phases of President Eliot's leadership in education. See especially chapter XVIII, The Function of Education in Democratic Society.

—— ——— — *More Money for the Public Schools.* Pp. 193 Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 1903.

Three admirable addresses dealing respectively with the failure of American public education, advances in recent years, and the next desirable steps.

Ellis, A. Caswell. *Suggestions for a Philosophy of Education.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. V, pp. 159—201. Worcester, October 1897.

An attempt to gather up the results of the child study movement and apply these to the general problem of education.

—— — ——— *Sunday School Work and Bible Study in the Light of Modern Pedagogy.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 363—412. Worcester, June 1896.

Contains a suggestive outline of the child's moral and religious unfolding. Advocates allowing the lower characteristics to develop at periods of growth with the idea that so they will pass off. Sketch of the Sunday school. Bibliography.

—— — ——— and Hall, G. Stanley. *A Study of Dolls.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 129—175. Worcester, December 1896.

Based on answers to a widely circulated questionnaire. Some illuminating pedagogical conclusions. Certain of these quite contradict the traditional notions regarding the meaning of play with dolls. Advocates much wider use and more careful direction of doll play by parents and teachers.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. *Education.* In Lectures and Biographical Sketches, vol. X of Emerson's complete works. Riverside edition, pp. 123—156. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, (copyright) 1883.

Everett, C. C. *Ethics for Young People.* Pp. iv+185. Ginn & Co., Boston, 1891.

Didactic lessons giving an analysis of duties, with general illustrations and kindly moralizing.

Farrar, F. W., et al. *The Bible and the Child.* Pp. vii+171. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1896.

A discussion, by various religious leaders, of the effect of the 'Higher Criticism' on teaching the Bible to children.

Fitch, Joshua G. *Educational Aims and Methods.* Pp. xii+448. University Press, Cambridge (Eng.), 1900.

General lectures. See chapter III, The Evolution of Character, and chapter XIII, The Sunday School of the Future.

——— ——— — *Thomas and Matthew Arnold and Their Influence on English Education.* Pp. ix+277. The Great Educators Series, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1899.

Chapter V, pp. 75–109, deals with Thomas Arnold's methods of government and discipline.

Forbush, William Byron. *The Boy Problem, A Study in Social Pedagogy.* Pp. 206. The Pilgrim Press, Boston, 1901.

An enthusiastic book embodying the results of practical experience in religious work with young boys. Centres on plans for boys' clubs.

——— ——— ——— *The Social Pedagogy of Boyhood.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 307—346. Worcester, October 1900.

An article anticipating the author's book. Reviews applications of genetic psychology to the 'Boy Problem,' and suggests practical methods and expedients in dealing with boys.

Fouillée, Alfred. *Education from a National Standpoint.* Translated and edited by W. J. Greenstreet. Pp. xvi+332. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1892.

A corrective to hasty generalizations from science and evolution, containing a strong argument against merely utilitarian education in favor of moral culture. While somewhat of a special plea, the book is modern and suggestive with reference to the whole problem of moral education.

——— ——— *Les Jeunes Criminels. L'École et la Presse.* In Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 139, pp. 417—449. Paris, January 15, 1897.

A thoughtful article dwelling on the criminal suggestion in licentious literature as a chief cause of the increase of crime among children and youth. Emphasizes moral education as the main corrective.

Frear, Caroline. *Class Punishment.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. I, pp. 332—337.

A brief inductive study of the attitudes of children toward punishing a class as a whole. Some applications to the problem of discipline.

French, C. W. *The Problem of School Government.* In School Review, April 8, 1900, pp. 201—212. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1900.

An excellent article—one of the few studies recognizing that the problem of school government is one of moral education. States that in America school government should be *American, social,* and *moral* in effect upon character.

Froebel, Friedrich Wilhelm August. *Education by Development.* The Second Part of the *Pedagogics of the Kindergarten.* Translated by Josephine Jarvis. Pp. xxvi+347. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1899.

More miscellaneous than the essays in the *Pedagogics of the Kindergarten,* but illuminating for Froebel's principles, returning again and again to education through self-activity.

——— ——— ——— ——— *The Education of Man.* Translated by W. N. Hailmann. Pp. xxv+332. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1892.

The central work with reference to Froebel's philosophy which focuses always on moral education.

——— ——— ——— ——— *Letters on the Kindergarten.* Translated and edited by Emilie Michaelis and H. K. Moore. Pp. xi+331. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1891.

Miscellaneous letters selected by Mme. Froebel and H. Poesche, the German editor, as throwing light on the kindergarten and Froebel's philosophy in relation to it.

——— ——— ——— ——— *The Mottoes and Commentaries of Froebel's Mother Play.* Translated by Henrietta R. Eliot and Susan E. Blow, with an introduction treating of the philosophy of Froebel by Susan E. Blow. Pp. xxii+316. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1895.

——— ——— ——— ——— *Pedagogics of the Kindergarten.* Translated by Josephine Jarvis. Pp. xxxvii+337 +xiii. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1899.

Contains fifteen of Froebel's essays dealing with play and the educational meaning of the "Gifts" and the plays of children.

Gardener, Helen H. *Facts and Fictions of Life.* Pp. 269. C. H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1893.

Contains a great deal on the relation of heredity to morality. Advocates teaching children and young people the truth about life and people. Much of the book has an indirect bearing on moral education.

Garlick, A. H. *A New Manual of Method.* Pp. xx+378. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1897.

Text-book. See chapters I, School Economy; and II, Discipline.

Garrison, Wendell P. *Parables for School and Home.* Pp. xv+214. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1897.

Material of some value for ethical instruction.

Giles, Arthur E. *Moral Pathology.* Pp. viii+179. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1895.

A good subject and idea, poorly developed. Some helpful suggestions under "Moral Hygiene." Rather slight and forced comparisons in detail between physical and moral medicine.

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins (Stetson). *Concerning Children.* Pp. 298. Small, Maynard & Co., Boston, 1900.

Fresh and suggestive but one-sided. Sound counsel in reaction against conventional education in the home. The dogma of heredity is overworked and questionable inferences are drawn from 'science.' Some of the cures suggested indicate limited experience with children.

Gilman, Nicholas Paine, and Jackson, Edward Payson. *Conduct as a Fine Art.* Containing *The Laws of Daily Conduct,* pp. vi+149, by N. P. Gilman; and *Character Building,* pp. viii+230, by E. P. Jackson. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1891.

Two essays receiving the prize offered by the American Secular Union for the best treatise aiding teachers to instruct children and youth in morality without inculcating religion. The first treatise gives an analysis and classification of ordinary ethical conceptions; the second consists of rather sprightly didactic dialogue between Dr. Dix and his pupils.

Gilson, Roy Rolfe. *In the Morning Glow. Short Stories.* Pp. 187. Harper & Brothers., New York, 1902.

Exquisite interpretation of childhood; belongs to the best modern artistic work revealing child life sympathetically for an adult audience.

Girardey, Ferreol. *Popular Instructions to Parents on the Bringing Up of Children.* Pp. 202. Benziger Bros., New York, 1897.

An excellent, simple Roman Catholic manual for parents; restfully certain in its theses. Emphasizes religious training and the sending of children to Roman Catholic schools.

Goddard, Henry H. *Negative Ideals.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. II, pp. 392—398.

Complementary to the numerous positive studies in children's ideals: seeks to discover the ethical dislikes of children. Pedagogical applications.

Goethe, J. W. von. *Autobiography and Annals.* Translated by John Oxenford, *et al.* Two vols., pp. viii+520 and 501. George Bell & Sons, London, 1891.

The earlier portions of the *Autobiography* are full of illuminating material and frequent wise thought on the problem of moral education. The whole work is one of the most instructive in the entire field of personal autobiography.

——— — — ——— *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels.* Translated by Thomas Carlyle. Two vols., pp. xxiii+420 and 469. Critical introduction by Edward Dowden. Edited with notes by Clement King Shorter. Masterpieces of Foreign Authors Series, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1890.

Of value not only as containing Goethe's direct treatise on education, but because the work is filled with illuminating wisdom in regard to all aspects of culture and personal life.

Gorst, Harold E. *The Curse of Education.* Pp. vi+144. G. Richards, London, 1901.

Very reactionary, regarding all educational systems in operation at present as worse than useless, because cramming with information and destroying power to think. One-sided but suggestive criticism.

Grahame, Kenneth. *Dream Days.* Pp. 228. John Lane, New York, 1898.

Excellent interpretation of child life for *adults.* Value in giving sympathy with the spirit and attitude of childhood. The Dragon Story is a good example of what not to tell children, since it deals with legendary material in a way that seems bright to the adult but irreverent to the child.

——— ——— *The Golden Age.* Pp. vii+241. John Lane, New York, 1898.

Delightful interpretative fiction showing the child's dream-world. Possibly somewhat overdrawn as compared with every-day children, but helpful in awakening sympathy for the child's point of view.

Gréard, Oct. *Éducation et Instruction. Enseignement Secondaire.* Two vols., pp. 350 and 339. Hachette et Cie. Paris, 1889.

See especially vol. II, pp. 163–235, L'Esprit de Discipline dans l'Éducation; and pp. 237–272, L'Éducation Morale et l'Éducation Physique dans les Lycées.

Green, Sanford M. *Crime: Its Nature, Causes, Treatment, and Prevention.* Pp. 346. The J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1889.

An excellent modern view by a life-long judge in Michigan. Advocates education as treatment and prevention of crime and argues against all retributive punishment.

Groos, Karl. *The Play of Man.* Translated with the author's coöperation by Elizabeth L. Baldwin. Pp. ix+412. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1901.

A thorough, scientific study. Play exhaustively described and classified. Especial value for moral education in the pedagogical inferences, pp. 398–406.

Gulick, Luther. *Psychological, Pedagogical and Religious Aspects of Group Games.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VI, pp. 135–151. Worcester, March 1899.

Urges that games of Anglo-Saxon boys are forceful, objective, involve organization and hero-worship, and that religion must utilize these tendencies in its educational activities.

Guyau, J. M. *Education and Heredity.* Translated from second edition by W. J. Greenstreet, with an introduction by G. F. Stout. Pp. xxiv+306. The Contemporary Science Series. The Walter Scott Pub. Co., London, 1891.

Full of suggestions bearing on moral education. Contains an excellent discussion of punishment from the medico-scientific point of view and considers the use of suggestion in dealing with children.

H. H. (pseudonym of Jackson, Helen Hunt.) *Bits of Talk about Home Matters.* Pp. viii+239. Roberts Brothers, Boston, 1873.

Good counsel, much of it bearing on treatment of children within the home. Fine in sentiment.

Hailmann, W. N. *Moral Results in School Training.* In Education, vol. 4, pp. 415–426. Boston, March 1884.

An excellent article, in hearty sympathy with the best in the 'new education,' and broad in suggestions on the whole field of moral culture. Opposed to the report of the Committee to the National Council of Education in 1883 (see W. A. Mowry). Advocates intellectual ethical instruction.

Hale, Edward Everett. *How I was Educated.* In Forum, vol. I, pp. 55–63. New York, March 1886.

Following the article by Dr. Hale are some ten others, running through vols. I and II of the *Forum*, on the same subject by prominent leaders in education. The series is especially illuminating in showing the value of non-scholastic influences in molding character.

—— ——— ——— *A New England Boyhood, and Other Bits of Autobiography.* Pp. xxvi+500. Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1900.

Hall, Frank O. *Religion in the Home.* In Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Congress of Religion, held at Buffalo, N. Y., June—July, 1901, pp. 124–142, including discussion by W. C. Gannett and L. G. Janes. Unity Publishing Co., Chicago. No date.

Hall, G. Stanley. *Adolescence. Its Psychology and its Relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education.* Two vols., pp. xxi+589 and vi+784. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1904.

A masterpiece. Outrivals any previous work in massing facts bearing on all aspects of genetic development. Great, as all President Hall's work, not only in the accumulation of material, but in a prodigal wealth of ideas stimulating to other minds. Valuable for nearly all aspects of moral education, but especially for education in religion and instruction in the intimate problems of human life.

—— — ——— *Moral Education and Will-training.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. II, pp. 72–89. Worcester, 1892.

Reprinted from the *Princeton Review*, New Series, vol. X, pp. 306–325, November 1882, where the same article appears under the title, The Education of the Will. A strong article dealing with some fundamentals of moral education.

——— — ——— *The Moral and Religious Training of Children and Adolescents.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. I, pp. 196–210. Worcester, 1891.

A part of the same article appears in earlier form in the *Princeton Review*, New Series, vol. IX, pp. 26–48, January 1882. A fragmentary but illuminating study expressing certain of the ideas subsequently worked out in more complete form in President Hall's *Adolescence.*

——— — ——— *Some Fundamental Principles of Sunday School and Bible Teaching.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VIII, pp. 439–468. Worcester, December 1901.

An application of the results of modern psychology to the problem of the curriculum and teaching in the Sunday school, and an appeal for reform in harmony with these principles. Excellent.

——— — ——— *Some Social Aspects of Education.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IX, pp. 81–91. Worcester, March 1902.

An address given before the Harvard Teachers' Union. Shows the existing social implications of the school and advocates the conscious extension of its possibilities in the same directions.

——— — ——— *The Story of a Sand Pile.* In Scribner's Magazine, vol. III, pp. 690–696. New York, June 1888.

A descriptive study in the educational value of play activities.

——— — ——— *A Study of Fears.* In American Journal of Psychology, vol. VIII, pp. 147–249. Worcester, January 1897.

A suggestive inductive study with some conclusions as to the place of fear in education.

Hamerton, Philip Gilbert. *The Intellectual Life.* Pp. xix+455. Roberts Brothers, Boston, 1891.

See part II, The Moral Basis, and part III, Of Education.

Hamilton, Gail. (Pseudonym of M. A. Dodge.) *Nursery Noonings.* Pp. 310. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1875.

Miscellaneous counsel on the treatment of children. Pleasant and helpful, taking throughout the child's point of view.

Hanus, Paul H. *Educational Aims and Educational Values.* Pp. vii+211. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1899.

"A progressive attempt . . . to disentangle from the contemporary educational confusion, in both theory and practice, our *educational aims*, and to examine these aims in the light of present and future needs." —Preface.

——— ——— — *A Modern School.* Pp. x+306. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1904.

Loosely connected essays, several bearing in a general way on moral education. See especially chapters I, A Modern School; V, The School and the Home; VI, Our Faith in Education.

Harris, W. T. *Moral Education in the Common Schools.* In Journal of Social Science, no. 18, pp. 122–134. New York, 1884.

Address before the American Social Science Association, September 4, 1883. Deals with the opportunities of the public school to train children in the three types of virtue, "mechanical, social, celestial."

——— ——— *Moral Education in the Public Schools.* Pp. 20. E. Steiger, New York, 1877.

Reprinted from Dr. Harris's *Report* for 1871, as Superintendent of St. Louis public schools. Discusses the range of moral training possible in public schools and advocates our present system of secular education.

——— ——— *The Philosophy of Crime and Punishment.* Pp. 20. Publisher? 1890?

An address read before the National Prison Association of the United States, at Cincinnati, Ohio, September, 1890. Bearing on the relation of education to crime and on the moral significance of discipline in home and school.

——— ——— *Psychologic Foundations of Education—an Attempt to Show the Genesis of the Higher Faculties of the Mind.* Pp. xxxv+400. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1898.

Has only a general reference to the problem of moral education.

——— ——— *The Relation of School Discipline to Moral Education.* In Third Year Book of the National Herbart Society, pp. 58–72. Prepared for discussion at the Milwaukee meeting of the National Educational Association, 1897. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1897.

The same article is reprinted in the New York Teachers' Monographs, Class Management Number, pp. 1–10, New York, March 1900. An excellent article, dealing with the phases of moral training possible through the organization and discipline of the school, and representing Dr. Harris's latest views in this connection.

Harrison, Elizabeth. *Some Silent Teachers.* Pp. 187. The Sigma Publishing Company, Chicago, (copyright) 1904.

Deals with the influence and meaning of shop-windows, architecture, color and literature.

——— ——— *A Study of Child-Nature from the Kindergarten Standpoint.* Pp. 207. Chicago Kindergarten College, Chicago, 1895.

A good modern expression of Froebel's influence, in harmony with the spirit of the new education. Emphasizes kindness, sympathy and appreciation of the individual child, with positive methods of moral culture.

Harrison, Frederic, and Adler, Felix. *The Relation of Ethical Culture to Religion and Philosophy.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 335–347. Philadelphia, April 1894.

An interesting discussion: Mr. Harrison advocating, from the positivist point of view, the teaching of religion and philosophy; Professor Adler holding that ethics has its own sanctions, and that the separation of ethics from religion may be complete.

Haskell, Ellen M. *Imitation in Children.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 30–47. Worcester, October 1894.

A mass of unclassified instances with comments. Makes for sympathy with child life and contains a strong plea for freedom for the child.

Henry, Alice. *The Special Moral Training of Girls.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. XIV, pp. 1–15. Philadelphia, October 1903.

A brief article written as a companion study to that by Canon Lyttleton on "The Instruction of the Young in Sexual Knowledge."

Henderson, C. Hanford. *Education and the Larger Life.* Pp. 386. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1902.

In radical reaction against present tendencies in education. Optimistic and full of faith in the higher human life. While regarding life rather from the point of view of the segregated few, without recognizing sufficiently the inexorable necessities under which the many struggle, the book is sane in spirit and contains much helpful suggestion with reference to educational reform.

Herbart, Johann Friedrich. *Herbart's A B C of Sense-Perception and Minor Pedagogical Works.* Translated, with introduction, notes, and commentary, by Wm. J. Eckoff. Pp. xxxi +288. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1896.

Little direct bearing on moral education except in certain of the minor writings; see especially that on The Æsthetic Revelation of the Universe.

——— ——— ——— *Letters and Lectures on Education.* . . . Translated from the German . . . by H. M. and E. Felkin and with a preface by O. Browning. Pp. xvi+285. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1898.

An excellent introduction to Herbart's general educational philosophy, with a wealth of wise observations on the control and guidance of children.

——— ——— ——— *Outlines of Educational Doctrine.* Translated by A. F. Lange; annotated by Charles De Garmo. Pp. xi+334. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1901.

"Herbart's latest, and also his most complete work on education." An outline text-book. A large part deals with aspects of moral education, especially government and discipline.

——— ——— ——— *The Science of Education.* Translated by H. M. and E. Felkin. Pp. xvii+268. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1893.

A large part of this important work deals directly with the various aspects of moral education.

Hinsdale, B. A. *Studies in Education: Science, Art, History.* Pp. 384. Werner School Book Co., Chicago, (copyright) 1896.

See chapter XI, The Moral and Religious Training of Children. Other papers touch the same problem.

Holman, H. *Education.* An Introduction to its Principles and their Psychological Foundations. Pp. xii+536. Isbister & Co., London, 1896.

An attempt at a general philosophy of education on the basis of modern science. Some value for moral education.

Hopkins, Louisa Parsons. *The Spirit of the New Education.* Pp. 282. Lee & Shepard, Boston, 1892.

Popular lectures, fine in spirit, resulting from experience and in line with the best in the new education. See especially: The Moral Problem in the Public Schools, pp. 50–59; Education of the Soul, pp. 60–71; Character as an Object of School Education, pp. 72–101.

Howerth, I. W. *Development of the Social Aim in Education.* In Journal of Pedagogy, vol. XII, pp. 230–242; vol. XIII, pp. 102–109, 169–180. Syracuse, N. Y., December 1899, October 1900, January 1901.

A suggestive sketch of what the author considers the five stages in the development of educational ideals in America: (1) Religious, (2) Political, (3) Economic, (4) Moral, (5) Social.

Howland, George. *Practical Hints for the Teachers of Public Schools.* Pp. xii+202. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1895.

Some value in the chapters dealing with moral education and the teacher's influence.

Hughes, James L. *Dickens as an Educator.* Pp. xi+319. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1901.

An excellent account of the influence of Dickens, fully illustrated by selections. Deals with coercion, nutrition, child nature, training, etc.

——— ——— — *Froebel's Educational Laws.* Pp. xiii+296. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1897.

Good chapters bearing on moral education. See especially: V, Play as an Educational Factor; VI, The Harmony between Control and Spontaneity; X, Individuality and Self-Expression; and XIII, Froebel's Ethical Principles.

——— ——— — *Mistakes in Teaching.* Pp. 135. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1895.

Hughes, R. E. *The Making of Citizens. A Study in Comparative Education.* Pp. viii+405. Contemporary Science Series, The Walter Scott Publishing Company, London, 1902.

A valuable comparative study of the school systems of England, Germany, France and the United States.

Hughes, Thomas. *Tom Brown's School Days.* Pp. xvi+357. A. L. Burt, New York. No date.

One of the best expressions of the moral methods and influence of Thomas Arnold.

Humphreys, Mary Gay. *The Smallest Republic in the World.* In McClure's Magazine, vol. IX, pp. 735–747. New York, July 1897.

A readable popular article on The George Junior Republic. Illustrated.

Huntington, James O. S. Chapters IV and V, pp. 98–204 in *Philanthropy and Social Progress,* by Jane Addams, *et al.:* IV, *Philanthropy—Its Success and Failure;* V, *Philanthropy and Morality.* T. Y. Crowell & Co., New York, 1893 (?).

An admirable arraignment of the errors and insincerities of modern philanthropy, throwing light on the larger problem of moral education. Unusually frank and truthful in spirit.

Hyde, William De Witt. *Practical Idealism.* Pp. xi+335. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1897.

Fine in spirit and contains much bearing incidentally on moral education.

James, William. *The Principles of Psychology.* Two vols., pp. xii+689 and vi+704. Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1899.

See, in this illuminating and suggestive work, especially chapter IV, on Habit, which is an impressive ethical sermon on a fundamental problem of moral education.

——— ——— *Talks to Teachers.* Pp. xi+301. Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1899.

Excellent, fresh, suggestive applications of psychology to education and life.

——— ——— *Varieties of Religious Experience.* Pp. xii+534. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1903.

The main value of the work for moral education lies in showing the transforming power of religious experience in giving purpose, purity and joy to human life.

Jegi, John I. *Children's Ambitions.* In Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child Study, edited by Charles H. Thurber, vol. III, pp. 131–144. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, October 1898.

An inductive study with a review of previous studies in the same field, and educational applications.

Johnson, George E. *Play in Character Building.* In How to Help Boys, vol. III, no. 4, pp. 239–253. Boston, October 1903.

An excellent article discussing play in relation to the theory of evolution, urging that each phase of development needs its own expression.

——— ——— — *Education by Plays and Games.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 97–133. Worcester, October 1894.

"The object of this study is to present somewhat more concretely than has been done before the educational value of play, and to suggest some practical applications to the work of education in the grades above the kindergarten." Suggests a graded course of games. A rather miscellaneous but suggestive study.

Jolly, William, Editor. *Education: Its Principles and Practice as Developed by George Combe.* Pp. xxvi+772. Macmillan & Co., London, 1879.

Compiled from pamphlets and manuscripts of Combe, the great phrenologist. Contains much on training moral and mental "faculties." Out of date, but excellent in its time.

Keferstein, Horst. *Volksbildung und Volksbildner.* Pädagogisches Magazin, no. 121. Pp. ix+38. Langensalza, 1899.

A general review, inclusive but brief and slight, of the instruments of education. Especially good in emphasizing the need for coöperation on the part of home and school, parents and teachers.

Kennedy, Helen P. *Effect of High School Work upon Girls during Adolescence.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 469–482. Worcester, June 1896.

A study of the replies of 125 girls to a series of questions. Shows strongly the need of home instruction in the intimate problems of human life.

Kiddle, Henry, and Schem, Alex. J., Editors. *Cyclopœdia of Education.* Pp. v+868+xi. E. Steiger, New York, 1877.

See articles dealing with various phases of moral education, as: Corporal Punishment, Government, Discipline.

King, Irving. *The Psychology of Child Deveolpment.* Pp. xxi+265. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1903.

Kirkpatrick, Edwin A. *Fundamentals of Child Study.* Pp. xxi+384. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1904.

Several portions of the book treat indirectly of moral education. See especially chapter XI, Development of Instincts—Regulative (Moral and Religious).

Kovalevsky, Sónya. *Her Recollections of Childhood.* Translated from the Russian by Isabel F. Hapgood. With a Biography by Anna Carlotta Leffler. Pp. 318. The Century Co., New York, 1895.

Pages 1–151 give Sónya Kovalevsky's Autobiography of Childhood, an unusually instructive study with reference to the function of parental love and tenderness in the life of a sensitive, gifted child. The Biography deals with the larger problems of life education.

Kramer, John W. *The Right Road. A Handbook for Parents and Teachers.* Pp. v+282. James Nisbet & Co., London, 1892.

An interesting collection of stories, gathered from all quarters, arranged on a scheme of duties, and followed by didactic questions and comments. The book is worth studying as an experiment; but the stories are mainly of the type of the old-time Sunday school literature, and are not sufficiently artistic to serve as the best text for ethical instruction.

Kriege, Matilda H. *The Child, Its Nature and Relations; An Elucidation of Froebel's Principles of Education.* A free rendering of the German of the Baroness Marenholtz-Bülow. Pp. 148. E. Steiger, New York, 1877.

A good expression of Froebel's principles and influence.

Laloi, Pierre. *L'Année Préparatoire d'Instruction Morale et d'Instruction Civique.* Pp. 136. Armand Colin et Cie., Paris, 1900.

Prepared in obedience to the official program for 1887. Very simple moral lessons, brief stories, illustrations, questions.

——— ——— *La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique.* Pp. 208. Armand Colin et Cie., Paris, 1900.

Prepared in obedience to the official program of 1887 and the ministerial order of 1891. Simple lessons, stories, illustrations, questions and reviews. An excellent primary text-book. In its 43rd edition.

Lancaster, E. G. *The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. V, pp. 61–128. Worcester, July 1897.

An admirable study based chiefly on returns from a syllabus sent out under President Hall's direction. This long article contains not only a mass of interesting facts, but some helpful applications to physical and moral education.

Larned, J. N. *Primer of Right and Wrong; For Young People in Schools and Families.* Pp. vi+167. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1902.

Intended as a text-book for direct ethical instruction. Contains didactic lessons giving an analysis of duties, with some quotations, examples, and illustrations from biography and literature. Modern and one of the best texts in English.

Lecky, William Edward Hartpole. *The Map of Life: Conduct and Character.* Pp. xiv+353. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1899.

See especially chapter XII, The Management of Character.

Lee, Joseph. *Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy.* Pp. x+242. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902.

A general discussion of practical work in meeting the problems of modern city life. Chapters dealing with Playgrounds, Clubs, Vacation Schools.

Lehmann, R. *Erziehung und Erzieher.* Pp. viii+344. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1901.

Lesshaft, P. *De l'Éducation de l'Enfant dans la Famille et de sa Signification.* Pp. 269. Albert Schulz, Paris, 1894.

Devoted mainly to a discussion of the various types of childhood.

Le Sueur, W. D. *Canada's Attempted Solution of the Problem of Religious Education in the Public Schools.* In Ethical Record, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 7–13. New York, October–November 1903.

Leuba, James H. *A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena.* In American Journal of Psychology, vol. VII, pp. 309–385. Worcester, April 1896.

This study centres on conversion, containing an analysis of its phenomena, with numerous illustrative cases, and a discussion of the relation of current theology to the facts brought out.

Levasseur, E. *Comparative Study of Popular Education Among Civilized Nations: Administration of Popular Education.* Translated by W. Addis. In Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for 1895–1896, vol. I, chapter X, pp. 601–610. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1897.

The most valuable part of this article deals with the relation of public education to religion and to the state in various countries.

Liard, Louis. *Morale et Enseignement Civique, à l'Usage des Écoles Primaires. Cours moyen et cours supérieur.* Pp. viii+200. Léopold Cerf, Paris, 1886.

A fair example of the numerous French text-books for ethical instruction. Contains brief lessons on duties, partly in dialogue form, with questions and review.

L'Instituteur Primaire et l'Enseignement de la Morale. In Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. CLI, pp. 873–894. Paris, January 31, 1899.

Opposed to the effort to teach morals in the public schools. Gives an excellent idea of the difficulties in the ethical and religious instruction of children in state schools.

Locke, John. *Some Thoughts Concerning Education.* With Introduction and notes by R. H. Quick. Pp. xiv+240. Cambridge University Press, London, 1892.

Sound common-sense, much of it thoroughly applicable today. Especially good on moral discipline.

Long, George. *The Conduct of Life: A Series of Essays.* Pp. xi+239. John Murray, London, 1845.

Readable old-time essays. The part dealing with family life is of some value for moral education.

Loti, Pierre. (Pseudonym for Louis Marie Julien Viaud.) *The Story of a Child.* Translated from the French by Caroline F. Smith. Pp. xi+304. C. C. Birchard & Co., Boston, 1902.

One of the most instructive autobiographies of childhood. Artistic, temperamental, giving only moods and impressions. An extreme antithesis to the autobiography of John Stuart Mill as a study of childhood.

Lukens, Herman T. *A Study of Children's Drawings in the Early Years.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 79–110. Worcester, October 1896.

An inductive study, agreeing in its results with the studies by Earl Barnes and others in holding that art should be a language of expression for young children long before they are taught the grammar of art. All these studies have an important bearing on the general problem of moral education through free activity.

Luqueer, Frederic Ludlow. *Hegel as Educator.* Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology and Education, vol. II, no. 1. Pp. 185. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1896.

Contains a translation of the principal thoughts of Hegel on education.

Lynd, W. S. *Moral Influence of Rewards.* Chapter VI, pp. 109–128, in *The Teacher's Miscellany,* a selection of articles from the proceedings of the College of Professional Teachers, by J. L. Campbell and A. M. Hadley. The J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1856.

Somewhat out of date, but good.

Lyttleton, E. *Instruction of the Young in Sexual Knowledge.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. IX, no. 4, pp. 453–467. Philadelphia, July 1899.

A sane, temperate, straightforward article, advocating definite instruction in sex knowledge, and showing the method in some detail.

———— — *Mothers and Sons, or Problems in the Home Training of Boys.* Pp. ix+169. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1893.

Mac Cunn, John. *The Making of Character. Some Educational Aspects of Ethics.* Pp. vii+226. The Cambridge Series for Schools and Training Colleges, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1900.

A good discussion, utilizing certain aspects of the newer psychology, especially the work of Professor James. Comprehensive rather than organic.

Mac Donald, Arthur. *Abnormal Man, being Essays on Education and Crime and Related Subjects, with Digests of Literature and a Bibliography.* Government Printing Office, Washington, 1893.

Malleson, Mrs. F. *Notes on the Early Training of Children.* Pp. iv+127. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1892.

Early moral education by nurture and discipline.

Mann, Horace. *The Life and Works of Horace Mann.* Five vols. Lee & Shepard, Boston, 1891.

These volumes are the most complete memorial of the work and influence of Horace Mann in American education. The more direct discussion of moral education will be found in vol. II (see especially "On School Punishments," pp. 333–368) and vol. V.

Mann, Mary Peabody. *Moral Culture of Infancy.* Pp. 105–206 in *Guide to the Kindergarten* by Elizabeth P. Peabody and the above. E. Steiger, New York, 1877.

Practical letters full of miscellaneous and unclassified concrete detail, written in the true kindergarten spirit.

Marion, Henri. *De la Solidarité Morale. Essai de Psychologie Appliquée.* Pp. viii+359. *Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine.* Félix Alcan, Paris, 1890.

Excellent and modern, though sometimes slight in treatment. Sound suggestions on the influence of early education and on moral crises.

Mark, H. Thiselton. *Individuality and the Moral Aim in American Education.* The Gilchrist Report presented to the Victoria University, March 1901. Pp. xiii+298. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1901.

An interesting view of American education from the outside. Miscellaneous reports of opinions, with little unity beyond that given by the underlying question of the book.

——— — ——— *An Outline of the History of Educational Theories in England.* Pp. xi+139. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1899.

See chapter VI on the Development of the Theory of Moral Education in England.

——— — ——— *The Teacher and the Child. Elements of Moral and Religious Teaching in the Day School, the Home, and the Sunday School.* Pp. 165. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1903.

A simple manual, written more particularly with Sunday school teachers in mind. Chapters IX–XV deal with aspects of moral education.

Marsh, Harriet A. *A New Aspect of Child Study.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. V, pp. 136–145. Worcester, July 1897.

Describes an interesting and successful experiment in bringing mothers and teachers together at regular intervals to discuss their common problems in the education of children.

Marsh, Mabel A. *Children and Animals.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. II, pp. 83–99.

An inductive study, based on a thousand papers from London School Board children, dealing with the attitude of children toward pets. A further side study by Miss Cash immediately follows the above: see pp. 100–107.

Martin, George H. *The Unseen Force in Character Making.* In Journal of Education, vol. XLIX, pp. 164–166. Boston, March 1899.

An address read at the Department of Superintendence meeting, Columbus. General, dealing especially with the influence of personality, in teacher and books, for character building.

Martin, George Madden. *Emmy Lou, Her Book and Heart.* Pp. 279. McClure, Phillips & Co., New York, 1902.

A charming interpretation of child life, containing incidentally an instructive criticism of our public school system.

Martineau, Harriet. *Household Education.* Pp. viii+212. Lea & Blanchard, Philadelphia, 1849.

Excellent, though a little out of date. Especially good suggestions on the education parents receive from household life.

Mason, Charlotte M. *Home Education.* A Course of Lectures to Ladies, delivered in Bradford, in the winter of 1885–1886. Pp. xi+369. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London, 1896.

Miscellaneous suggestions on all aspects of early education; often helpful, everywhere detailed and concrete, occasionally sentimental.

——— ——— — *Parents and Children.* A sequel to *Home Education.* Pp. xii+429. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London, 1897.

Essays reprinted from the Parents' Review. Of the same type as the lectures in *Home Education.* Sound counsel, especially in the more concrete studies of book II, though over-emphasizing devices for managing children.

Matson, Henry. *Knowledge and Culture.* Pp. 170. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1895

Of some value with reference to the ideal of education.

Matthews, F. H. *A Dialogue on Moral Education.* Pp. 257. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1898.

A treatise covering many aspects of moral education; cast in the form of a series of conversations by a doctor, a schoolmaster, a clergyman and their wives.

Matthews, Shailer. *The Curriculum of Study in the Sunday School.* In Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, 1903, pp. 186–199.

Matthias, Adolf. *Praktische Pädagogik für höhere Lehranstalten.* Pp. 397. C. H. Beck, Munich, 1895.
See pp. 10–29 for an interesting discussion of the influence of the teacher's personality; and pp. 118–214 for a consideration of discipline.

Mayo, A. D. *Methods of Moral Instruction in Common Schools.* In Report of the National Educational Association for 1872, pp. 11–27. Published by the Association, Peoria, Ill., 1873.
A popular, practical address touching the main aspects of moral education.

McMurry, Charles A. *The Elements of General Method Based on the Principles of Herbart.* Pp. 331. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903.
The chief purpose of the book is to show how various studies can be utilized for the central aim of character building. Advocates moral culture as against dry ethical instruction and urges the use of history and literature. One of the best expressions of the American Herbartian movement.

——— ——— — *Special Method in History.* Pp. 7+291. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903.
Plans a course of history for common schools. Considers utilizing history for moral culture.

——— ——— — *Special Method in the Reading of Complete English Classics in the Grades of the Common School.* Pp. v+254. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1903.
See especially chapter I, Educational Value of Literature; and chapter II, The Use of Masterpieces as Wholes. Contains a valuable annotated list of books.

Meynell, Alice. *The Children.* Pp. 134. John Lane, New York, 1897.
Pleasant and sympathetic little sketches.

Mézières, M. A. *Éducation Morale, et Instruction Civique à l'Usage des Écoles Primaires. Cours moyen et supérieur.* Pp. vii+176. Ch. Delagrave, Paris, 1883.
A simple course of didactic lessons, with examples and exercises.

Mill, James. *Education.* In *Essays,* pp. 1–46. J. Innes, London. No date.
A good, clear essay of the dryly intellectual type. Interesting especially as the view of the father and teacher of John Stuart Mill.

Mill, John Stuart. *Autobiography.* Pp. vi+313. Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1887.
Perhaps the most valuable autobiography in existence in throwing light upon education.

Montaigne. *The Education of Children.* Selected, translated, and annotated by L. E. Rector. Pp. xxiii+191. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1899.
Chiefly historical in interest, yet based on shrewd observation and containing some sound wisdom applicable today.

Morgan, C. Lloyd. *Psychology for Teachers.* Pp. xi+240. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1898.

The final chapter, on Character and Conduct, pp. 210–231, deals with the aim of life and of education.

Morley, Margaret Warner. *Life and Love.* Pp. 214. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1895.

Like *A Song of Life*, but for somewhat more advanced pupils. At once frank and delicate in teaching sex through nature as culminating in human life.

——— ——— ——— *A Song of Life.* Pp. 155. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1896.

Elementary instruction in sex and parenthood through lessons from nature. Delicately done and, within its rigid limits, as excellent as anything available.

Mosher, Martha B. *Child Culture in the Home.* A Book for Mothers. Pp. 240. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., London, 1898.

A good modern expression of Froebel, showing also the influence of Emerson.

Mosso, Angelo. *Fatigue.* Translated by M. and W. B. Drummond. Pp. xiv+334. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1904.

A scientific study with a great indirect value in reference to the conditions of sound education.

———• ——— *Fear.* Translated from the . . . Italian by E. Lough and F. Kiesow. Pp. 278. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1896.

See chapter XIII, Fear in Children; and chapter XVI, Hereditary Transmission, Education.

Mowry, W. A., et al. *Moral Education in Schools.* Report of Committee on Moral Education to the National Council of Education. In Education, vol. IV, pp. 1-14. Boston, September 1883.

An admirable report, classifying the virtues of character and discussing the possibility of teaching them in the public schools. Emphasizes the training of habit as against direct instruction in ethics, urging the use of the opportunities in school organization and government to form moral habits. Considers the relation of moral to religious instruction and holds it to be questionable whether any religious instruction should be attempted in the schools.

Mulock, D. M. *Sermons out of Church.* Pp. 217. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1875.

See pp. 75–117, on How to Train up a Parent in the Way He Should Go.

Newell, William W. *Games and Songs of American Children.* Pp. xv+282. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1903.

An interesting collection, with chapters on the inventiveness and conservatism of children.

Nichol, J. P. *Moral Training in Our Common Schools.* Suggestions of Certain Practical Methods of Increasing its Efficiency: being the substance of a discourse read before the Glasgow Branch of the Scottish Educational Institute, on 20th March, 1858. Pp. 56. R. Griffin & Co., London, 1858.

One of the older essays emphasizing the opportunities for moral culture in the common schools.

Obici, Giulio. *Les Erreurs de l'Éducation Sexuelle.* In La Revue, vol. XLII, pp. 381–404. Paris, August 15, 1902.

A criticism of religious teaching, boarding-school influences and home neglect, with a sketch of a positive program for instruction in reference to sex questions.

O'Connell, Jerome A., Editor. *Class Management Number of New York Teachers' Monographs.* Pp. 130. New York, March 1900.

Excellent articles by different educators on all aspects of class management in the public schools.

Oppenheim, Nathan. *The Development of the Child.* Pp. viii+296. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1899.

A readable book; especially good in discussing the relation of physical growth to moral education. Chapter VI deals with the place of religion in the development of the child.

——— ——— *Mental Growth and Control.* Pp. ix+296. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902.

Descriptive of mental life, with didactic general lessons from science.

O'Shea, M. V. *Education as Adjustment.* Pp. xiv+317. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1903.

——— — — *Some Adolescent Reminiscences.* In Journal of Pedagogy, vol. XI, pp. 299–316. Syracuse, N. Y., October 1898.

An inductive study emphasizing the need for the sympathetic appreciation of young people.

Parker, Francis W. *Talks on Pedagogics.* Pp. xvi+491. E. L. Kellogg & Co., New York, (copyright) 1894.

This book is the written expression of Colonel Parker's spirit and influence in education. See especially chapters I, The Child; XIV, School Government and Moral Training; XVI, Democracy and Education.

Parkhurst, Charles H. *Talks to Young Women.* Pp. 136. The Century Co., New York, 1897.

General talks, kindly in spirit. Chapters VII, VIII, IX, X bear directly on moral education.

Pater, Walter. *The Child in the House.* In *Miscellaneous Studies,* pp. 147–169. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1895.

A delicate bit of semi-autobiographical literature of childhood. A searching into shadowy memories; full of the sense of the mystery of life. Strong in showing the influence of environment and events in molding a child's spirit.

Peabody, Elizabeth Palmer. *Guide to the Kindergarten.* Pp. 104. E. Steiger, New York, 1877.

Mrs. Mary Peabody Mann's *Moral Culture of Infancy* is in the same volume, pp. 105–206.

Penn, William. *His Advice to His Children Relating to Their Civil and Religious Conduct.* In Fruits of Solitude, pp. 163–247. R. Eastburn, New Brunswick, N. J., 1807.

Interesting old counsel, still applicable, if somewhat commonplace.

Perez, Bernard. *L'Éducation Morale dès le Berceau, Essai de Psychologie Appliquée.* Pp. xxiv+321. Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1888.

A good, sound book in the main, giving concrete and detailed counsel. Urges a combination of severity and kindliness. Modern in spirit.

——— ——— *The First Three Years of Childhood.* Edited and translated by Alice M. Christie. Pp. xxiii+292. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1894.

A somewhat scrappy survey, with numerous citations of concrete cases and frequent helpful suggestions.

Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich. *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children; An Attempt to Help Mothers to Teach Their Own Children and an Account of the Method.* Translated by Lucy E. Holland and Francis C. Turner. . . . Edited by Ebenezer Cooke. Pp. li+256. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1894.

Most of the book bears on Pestalozzi's method of teaching with reference to senses and intellect. The last portion deals with moral and religious education through the child's relation to its mother. In that relation Pestalozzi sees the centre of all educational influence. These concluding pages contain the germ of Froebel and many subsequent educational reformers.

——— ——— *Leonard and Gertrude.* Translated and abridged by Eva Channing. Pp. xii+181. D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1891.

Homely sense in relation to life and its duties. Suggestions for sound moral discipline. Not only interesting historically, but still of value.

——— ——— ——— *Letters on Early Education.* Translated from the German manuscript. Pp. 180. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1898.

An interesting work. The German original was never published and is probably no longer in existence. The book is especially strong in expressing Pestalozzi's view of the mother's share in the child's education, and contains many hints which are still helpful.

Plato. *The Republic.* Translated by B. Jowett. Pp. ccxxxi+379. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1888.

See Books II, III, VI, VII for Plato's views on education.

Plutarch. *Morals.* Edited by Wm. W. Goodwin. Five vols. Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1871.

See vol. I, pp. 3–32: On the Training of Children.

Poulsson, Emilie. *Love and Law in Child Training.* A Book for Mothers. Pp. 235. The Milton Bradley Co., Springfield, Mass., 1899.

One of the good expressions of Froebel and the kindergarten, containing helpful applications of the principles and experience of the kindergarten to the home.

Powell, Aaron M., Editor. *The National Purity Congress* (held at Baltimore, 1895), *Its Papers, Addresses, Portraits.* Pp. 453. The American Purity Alliance, New York, 1896.

A few of the papers consider the education of children in questions of sex.

Preyer, W. *Mental Development in the Child.* Translated by H. W. Brown. Pp. 170. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1894.

Prince, J. T. *Moral Training and School Government.* In Education, vol. V, pp. 113–126. Boston, November 1884.

Emphasizes development of character as the one great end of all education. Recognizes that moral culture must come through the whole work and government of the school. A large number of helpful miscellaneous suggestions.

Putnam, Daniel. *Elementary Psychology or First Principles of Mental and Moral Science, for High, Normal, and Other Secondary Schools, and for Private Reading.* Pp. x+283. American Book Co., New York, 1889.

A simple, readable book, consisting largely of definitions and description.

Quilter, Hugh H. *Onward and Upward. A Book for Boys and Girls.* Pp. 200. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1902.

An attempt to teach morals to children from ten to fourteen, by analogies from nature popularizing evolution. Though denying that he does so, the author 'writes down' to children, and the result is rather unsatisfactory.

Rein, Wilhelm. *Culture and Education.* In Forum, vol. XXVI, pp. 693–702. New York, February 1899.

A strong, brief article advocating wider adult education and a closer union of the schools with the masses of the people. While written from the point of view of German problems, it is full of suggestion for America.

—— ——— *Erziehungs- und Bildungs-Ideale.* In Göttinger Arbeiterbibliothek, vol. II, no. 9, pp. 129–144. Göttingen, 1898.

Written for workingmen. Didactic and to the point. Considers especially the relation of education to the problems of German civilization.

—— ——— *Outlines of Pedagogics.* Translated by C. C. and Ida J. Van Liew. Pp. xii+199. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1893.

Religious Education Association. *Proceedings of the First Annual Convention, Chicago, February* 10–12, 1903. Pp. viii+422. Executive Office of the Association, Chicago, 1903.

The whole volume is interesting as expressing the revived interest in religious education. Contains some helpful addresses.

Repplier, Agnes. *Books and Men.* Pp. 224. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1893.

The chapter on Children, Past and Present, pp. 1–32, keenly contrasts the old régime of restriction with the new one of license. The chapter on What Children Read, pp. 64–93, contrasts the reading of whole books of true literature, with the effect of the diluted and fragmentary material children read today.

——— ——— *Little Pharisees in Fiction.* In *Varia*, pp. 85–109. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1897.

Contains a bright criticism of Sunday school stories of the *Elsie Dinsmore* type.

Rice, J. M. *Public School System of the United States.* Pp. vi+308. The Century Co., New York, 1893.

Based on the investigation, undertaken for the *Forum*, into the school systems of a number of the larger cities of the United States. Full of concrete data and frank criticism. Indirectly of much value for the present problem of moral education.

Richmond, Ennis. *Boyhood. A Plea for Continuity in Education.* Pp. 154. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1898.

A simple discussion of moral training in the early years of boyhood. For parents, with the aim of bringing about greater coöperation of teachers and parents.

——— ——— *The Mind of a Child.* Pp. 176. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1901.

Advocates the 'spiritual' as opposed to the scientific view of childhood. A general discussion of phases of moral education for parents.

——— ——— *Through Boyhood to Manhood. A Plea for Ideals.* Pp. 194. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1899.

A criticism of English schools for boys. Contains some helpful ideas with reference to dealing with sex problems.

Richter, Jean Paul Friedrich. *Levana; or, The Doctrine of Education.* Translated from the German by "A. H." Preceded by a short biography of the author, and his autobiography, a fragment. Pp. xliv+413. George Bell & Sons, London, 1886.

Contains much homely wisdom bearing on various aspects of moral education. Somewhat apart from the main line of German educational reform, but none the less helpful.

Riis, Jacob A. *The Battle with the Slum.* Pp. xi+465. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902.

The best account of the problem moral education confronts in a great city. Optimistic, vigorous, born of direct experience in helping to solve the problem.

—— ——— — *The Children of the Poor.* Pp. xi+300. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1892.

A large amount of concrete material, collected through personal investigation, illustrating the conditions under which children live in the crowded districts of New York, and showing certain acute phases of the problem of moral education.

—— ——— — *How the Other Half Lives. Studies Among the Tenements of New York.* Pp. xv+304. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1892.

Mr. Riis's first book and the type of all his work in showing the moral problems in the great centres of population.

—— ——— — *The Making of an American.* Pp. xiii+443. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902.

A charming book with considerable incidental bearing on the larger task of moral education.

Rosenkranz, Johann Karl Friedrich. *The Philosopy of Education.* Translated by Anna C. Brackett. Pp. xxviii+286. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1891.

Chapters XII–XVI deal with aspects of moral education.

Ross, Edward Alsworth. *Social Control. A Survey of the Foundations of Order.* Pp. xii+463. The Citizen's Library of Economics, Politics, and Sociology, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1901.

A study of the forces society uses (such as belief, art, ideals, education, public opinion) to bring the individual into harmony with the ends of the group. Suggestive, fresh, one-sided and incomplete.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. *Émile; or Treatise on Education.* Abridged, translated and annotated by Wm. H. Payne. Pp. xlv+355. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1893.

Full of suggestiveness. Reactionary upon the time, with Rousseau's characteristic strength and weakness. Largely superseded in detail and corrected by modern thought and work, but permanently valuable for its spirit, aims and suggestions. The translation is unfortunately badly cut and rather officiously annotated.

Royce, Josiah. *On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. III, no. 4, pp. 413–436. Philadelphia, July 1893.

Valuable in reference to the aim of moral education. States two great aspects of the aim (benevolence and reasonableness) and studies the conflict between them in the development of conscience.

——— ——— *The New Psychology and the Consulting Psychologist.* In Forum, vol XXVI, pp. 80–96. New York, September 1898.

An excellent article vigorously urging the appointment of consulting psychologists in our public schools to mediate between laboratories and teachers.

Ruskin, John. *Præterita: Outlines of Scenes and Thoughts Perhaps Worthy of Memory, in My Past Life.* Three vols., pp. iv+301 and 304 and 126. J. Wiley & Sons, New York, 1890.

The portion of this autobiography dealing with Ruskin's childhood is of value for moral and religious education.

Rylands, L. Gordon. *Crime, Its Cause and Remedy.* Pp. iv+264. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1889.

Chapters V and VI deal with the moral education by the state, in industrial schools, of children who bid fair to become criminals. A valuable book.

Sabin, Ellèn. *Ethics in Education.* In Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Congress of Religion held at Buffalo, N. Y., June–July 1901, pp. 29–46. Unity Publishing Co., Chicago. No date.

An admirable general article urging a more hardy moral discipline in home and school, with the direct ethical instruction of children.

Savage, M. J. *The Rights of Children.* In Arena, vol. VI, pp. 8–16. Boston, June 1892.

A pleasant general article expressing the modern kindly attitude toward childhood.

Schallenberger, Margaret E. *A Study of Children's Rights as Seen by Themselves.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. III, pp. 87–96. Worcester, October 1894.

Scholz, Fr. *Die Charakterfehler des Kindes, Eine Erziehungslehre für Haus und Schule.* Pp. viii+255. E. H. Mayer, Leipzig.

An effort to depict the chief types of pathological children, with suggestions as to cause and cure.

Schwickerath, Robert. *Jesuit Education: Its History and Principles Viewed in the Light of Modern Educational Problems.* Pp. xv+687. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo., 1903.

See last four chapters: The Moral Scope, pp. 522–573; Religious Instruction, pp. 574–607; School-Management, pp. 608–635; The Teacher's Motives and Ideals, pp. 636–661.

Search, Preston W. *An Ideal School, or Looking Forward.* Pp. xxv+357. International Education Series, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1901.

Advocates radical educational reform in the direction of individualism. Criticism of the whole plan of public education. Constant bearing on the problem of moral education.

Sears, Charles H. *Home and School Punishments.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VI, pp. 159–187. Worcester, March 1899.

An article based on replies to a questionnaire sent to parents and teachers for opinions on punishment, its purpose and effects. A poorly-digested summary of answers. Contains bibliography.

Seeley, Levi. *The Foundations of Education.* Pp. xi+263. Hinds & Noble, New York. No date.

A book of simple, fatherly advice for young teachers. Full of helpful suggestion for parents as well. Practical, mingling common-sense with an appreciation of modern educational thought.

Seelye, Julius H. *Duty: A Book for Schools.* Pp. 71. Ginn & Co., Boston, 1892.

A didactic text-book for children; brief, simple, giving the conventional analysis of duties.

Sergi, Giuseppe. *L'Educazione del Carattere.* Pp. vi+287. Fratelli Dumolard, Milan, 1893.

Sharp, Frank Chapman. *Some Aims of Moral Education.* In International Journal of Ethics, vol. IX, pp. 214–228. Philadelphia, January 1899.

Contains a protest against the extreme view of the importance of habit. Discusses the aim of moral education and considers the value of contact with heroes in literature.

Shearer, W. J. *Morals and Manners, or Elements of Character and Conduct.* Pp. 218. Richardson, Smith & Co., New York, 1904.

Intended as a text-book for the direct ethical instruction of children. Pleasant and less dry than such texts usually are. Lessons, descriptive and exhortative, followed by maxims and questions. Good, but too didactic and lacking in unity and organization.

Sheldon, Walter L. *An Ethical Sunday School: A Scheme for the Moral Instruction of the Young.* Pp. vi+206. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1900.

An attempt at an organic course, applicable beyond the limits of the Sunday school. A graded course of ethical instruction carrying out the plan outlined in the above book is now in process of publication in several volumes.

Shirreff, Emily A. E. *Essays and Lectures on the Kindergarten.* Pp. 187. E. Steiger & Co., New York, 1883.

——— ——— — — *The Kindergarten at Home: A Practical Hand-Book for Mothers and Teachers.* Pp. xvi+201. Abbott, Jones & Co., London. No date.

An excellent interpretation of Froebel by a leader of the English kindergarten movement.

——— ——— — — *Moral Training: Froebel and Herbert Spencer.* Pp. 20. George Philip & Son, London, 1892.

An admirable brief discussion, somewhat over zealous for Froebel, but pointing clearly the limitations in Spencer's theory of punishment in education.

Shute, Henry A. *The Real Diary of a Real Boy.* Pp. v+154. Everett Press, Boston, 1902.

An interesting account of natural boy life. Whether or not the book is what it purports to be—the real journal of a boy—it is instructive in showing the moral value of the vigorous contact of a lad with his peers.

Skinner, Charles R. *Moral Instruction in Our Schools.* In Education, vol. XXIII, pp. 75–82. Boston, October 1902.

A brief article urging moral instruction in the public schools, and indicating the range of teaching possible without entering upon the field of religion.

Small, Maurice H. *On Some Psychical Relations of Society and Solitude.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. VII, pp. 13–69. Worcester, April 1900.

——— ——— — *The Suggestibility of Children.* In Pedagogical Seminary, vol. IV, pp. 176–220. Worcester, December 1896

An inductive study. Some valuable pedagogical applications, tentative, but directly applying to moral education.

Smith, Nora Archibald. *The Children of the Future.* Pp. 165. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1898.

An excellent expression of the spirit and contribution of the kindergarten. Consists mainly of counsel to mothers, and contains helpful advice on typical cases of discipline.

Smith, William Hawley. *The Evolution of "Dodd."* Pp. 153. Rand, McNally & Co., Chicago. No date.

A strong criticism of 'machine' education, cast in the form of a story. Most of the points of criticism are somewhat overstated. Emphasizes especially the personal influence of the teacher.

Snedden, David S. *Children's Attitude toward Punishment for Weak Time Sense.* In Studies in Education, edited by Earl Barnes, vol. I, pp. 344–351.

One of the numerous suggestive studies carried out under the direction of Earl Barnes to determine the reaction of children on corrective discipline.

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